

The Public Seems to Have A Better Grasp of Realities Than The President

"Only one person in five predicts a total U.S. military victory in Vietnam."

—George Gallup's latest poll (Sept. 18) showing a further decline in LBJ's popularity to 48 percent.

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Half Dove, Half Hawk and Wholly Opportunist

Eighteen months later, two John F. Kennedy aides have joined the teach-ins against the Vietnamese war, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., in an article for the *New York Times* Sunday Magazine Sept. 18, Richard Goodwin in a speech to the national board of the ADA the day before. They now make their own much of the criticism they disdained at the time of the Washington teach-in in May of last year; what was then heretical has now become obvious and respectable. But both the "middle way out" offered by Schlesinger and the "National Committee Against Widening The War" proposed by Goodwin are opportunistic in design. Goodwin's rhetoric before the ADA was heroic. In pursuit of principle, a man should be ready to stand "if necessary, alone against the multitude." It is "our duty as patriots . . . to oppose any President" whose policy "threatens the grandeur of this nation." But all he opposes is any further escalation of the war in the North. His committee "will not be aimed at withdrawal or even a lessening of the war in the South . . . It will neither be against the Administration nor for it . . . Its purpose is to help the President." Its stand "will not end the war in South Vietnam. It may even prolong it . . ." He sounds like a Patrick Henry saying, "Give me liberty or give me death—or give me some compromise so I can stand with the British."

Free Elections a La Ky and LBJ?

Schlesinger, though far abler, is in much the same position. When he pinch-hit for McGeorge Bundy at the Washington teach-in, defending the Johnson war policy, though with reservations, Schlesinger asked the professors to moderate their criticism. "What this country needs," he quipped, "is a good night's sleep." His *New York Times* article is an awakening from his to a brilliant and passionate attack upon the fallacies of the war. But he differs from Goodwin only in proposing that we "taper off" the bombing of the North "as prudently as we can" and offer the Vietcong amnesty if they lay down their arms, open up their territory and abide "by the ground rules of free elections." This is a lot to ask after the recent farce in Saigon. In the meantime he is prepared like Goodwin for intensification of the war in the South, though with more stress on social reform. This looked promising when John F. Kennedy first broached it in 1961. It is delusion today. So is Schlesinger's notion that the U.S. can draw back and let the South Vietnamese army "take all the initiative it wants." It is clear by now that it has no stomach for battle. Schlesinger is still engaged in the same self-deception he criticizes in

White Power at Work

From a hard-boiled political point of view, the surprise about this year's civil rights bill is how close it came to victory. It was no secret that the inclusion of "open housing" provisions would risk defeat. These provisions had to be cut down in the House until they reached only 40% of future—and higher-priced—housing. The small home and apartment owner was left secure in his racism. But the House before passage did add the Conyers amendment for a Fair Housing Board with powers like those of the National Labor Relations Board. In the Senate, only four Democrats were recorded against cloture, only one—Lausche of Ohio—from a State with any sizeable number of Negroes. Even on the G.O.P. side, there were only two votes against cloture from Northern States with large numbers of Negro voters: Dirksen of Illinois and Murphy of California. Dirksen and the Republicans killed the bill. The Administration was afraid of a real fight before November, lest it make white votes for the G.O.P. So the White House preferred a quick defeat. The painful truth is that whites do not want to live beside Negroes, and that Negroes see through all the complexities to this essential fact. The outcome will add to their despair and to the growing racial crisis. Ideally, the President ought to heal wounds and restore faith by issuing the kind of sweeping executive order on housing that Kennedy failed to. The bulk of the home market depends on Federal money, and there is no good reason why whites shouldn't be forced to choose between Federal aid and their prejudices. But the chances of such an executive order are nil; it would add to Johnson's unpopularity. Black power? It's windy rhetoric beside the white power quietly at work to keep the Negro in his ghetto.

the past and he engages in it for the same reason—because it is not politic to face up to the whole truth.

The Goodwin proposal for a new committee nevertheless raises serious political questions. One's attitude toward it will depend on one's assessment of the war. If Johnson is planning an invasion of the North, with all the heightened risk that entails of war with China, then a broad committee based "simply" as Goodwin says on "the victorious slogan of the Democratic party in 1964 . . . No wider war" might be the answer. But if Johnson—as many well-informed observers here believe—is planning not an invasion of the North but a major expansion of the war in the South, then the committee could end up by being as big a trap for the peace forces

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Just When 12 Nobel Prize Winners Warn MLF Prevents Non-Proliferation Pact

The Prime Author of MLF Is Approved for High Office in State Department

The day after a distinguished committee, including 12 Nobel Prize winners, made an appeal to President Johnson on the urgent need for a non-proliferation treaty, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, many of whose members are supposed to be liberal and aware, took a step which undercut that effort. The appeal to the White House called the plan for a multilateral nuclear force the obstacle to an agreement with the Russians and asked that the MLF be shelved. It warned that no less than 12 countries could produce nuclear arms within three years, and little time was left to prevent a world nuclear arms race. Yet the very next day the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by voice vote favorably approved the nomination of Robert R. Bowie to be Counsellor of the State Department. Bowie is the father of the MLF idea and still favors it, as he made clear in his confirmation hearings last August. Senator Clark of Pennsylvania, Bowie's principal critic at the hearings, had asked that no vote be taken on the nomination that day because he was tied up on poverty legislation. The Committee nonetheless voted in his absence, and the Senate routinely approved the nomination. Only Clark appeared to oppose it. "There's not a dove in the Senate Department," he protested, to an almost empty Senate chamber.

A Trio of Hard-Liners

Bowie was for four years a right hand man to John Foster Dulles in the State Department, first as director of the policy planning staff and then as assistant Secretary of State for policy planning. Bowie's principal aid in selling the MLF idea, Henry Owen, has recently been made the chief of the Department's Policy Planning Staff. With Walt W. Rostow in the White House, these three men represent a hard-line trio in key policy-making positions. Senator Clark's vigorous and thorough interrogation of Bowie before the Foreign Relations Committee brought out that Bowie was with Dulles when he left the Geneva conference in 1954 to register his disapproval of the negotiations to end the Vietnamese war. "I went when Mr. Dulles went," Bowie said. He still favors war over negotiation. "To me the strategy of attempting to coerce the Vietcong into desisting from subversion," he told Senator Clark, "is a rational strategy and is worth the risks it entails." Clark asked, "including a constantly accelerating number of American casualties?" Bowie replied, "Well, along with the strategy go the casualties." When Johnson announced the Bowie appointment last July 5, a number of liberal Sena-

U Thant's Twin Nuclear Warnings

"It is difficult to conceive of any other reason for these underground tests than that they are intended to produce more sophisticated nuclear weapons or, perhaps, to develop antiballistic missile systems. The possible consequence are alarming. If there should be a unilateral technological breakthrough by one of these powers in either offensive or defensive nuclear weapon capability, it could upset the existing uneasy balance of terror and lead at once to a new and greatly accelerated nuclear arms race. . . .

"The dangers of nuclear proliferation are very real. . . . The risks that now exist of the further spread of nuclear weapons hold such perils for humanity that international safeguards should be established not only over nuclear power reactors but also over other nuclear plants which produce, use or process significant quantities of fissionable materials."

—From the Secretary General's new report to the UN

tors talked privately of fighting it, but the opposition—except for Clark evaporated. The *Boston Globe* deserves credit for sparking earlier protest with an editorial (July 9) on Bowie, "A Brinkman to Washington."

Earlier in the Johnson Administration, the MLF seemed to have been scrapped in favor of a plan by McNamara to offer the Germans consultative arrangements within NATO on nuclear matters instead of the "finger on the trigger" the Russians fear in the MLF. But Rusk like Bowie still favors giving the Germans a share in what Clark called "nuclear hardware". The Bowie appointment will strengthen those who think it more important to please the German military than to come to terms with the Russians. These men could have increased their numbers and power only because their viewpoint is congenial to Johnson's. The liberals on Senate Foreign Relations had a duty to air the significance of the Bowie appointment. They have again shown how little they can be depended upon even when Eisenhower's scientific adviser, George Kistiakowsky, and Kennedy's scientific adviser, Jerome Wiesner, join as they did in that public warning against the consequences of the MLF. The impressive plea they signed (the text was published in the *New York Times*, Sept. 15) made this an ideal moment to focus public attention on Bowie's views and background. Vietnam is not the only obstacle to agreement with Moscow.

An Appeal to the White House to Put A Curb on Chemical and Biological Arms

"We American scientists wish to warn against any weakening of the world-wide prohibitions and restraints on the use of chemical and biological (CB) weapons. CB weapons have the potential of inflicting, especially on civilians, enormous devastation and death . . . they could become far cheaper and easier to produce than nuclear weapons . . . they lend themselves to use by leadership that may be desperate, irresponsible or unscrupulous. . . .

"During the Second World War, the U.S. maintained a clearly stated policy of not initiating the use of CB weapons. In the last few years the U.S. position has become less clear. Since the late 1950s, Defense expenditures on CB weapons have risen several fold. . . .

"Most recently, U.S. forces have begun the large-scale use of anti-crop and 'non-lethal' anti-personnel chemical weapons in Vietnam. We believe this sets a dangerous precedent. . . . The employment of any one CB weapon weakens the barriers to the use of others."

—From a letter to the President, asking a White House study of CB arms control, an end to the use of CB weapons in Vietnam and a declaration that the U.S. would not initiate the use of CB weapons. Among the initiators are the famous heart specialist Paul Dudley White of Boston, the Harvard chemist Paul Doty, the Wisconsin geneticist James F. Crow, Freeman J. Dyson, Eugene Rabinowitz, John T. Edsall and Matthew Meselson.

German-Born Bomber Pilot A Little Vague on the Freedom He Was Defending

A New Naval—and Perhaps Movie Hero—Makes His Debut in Washington

Lt. (jg) Dieter Dengler, USNR, a handsome young fellow of 28, in dazzling Navy whites, appeared under TV floodlights before the Senate Armed Services Committee Sept. 16 to tell how he refused under torture to sign a statement condemning the U.S. while a Communist prisoner in Laos and how he escaped last June. He was captured in February after his plane was shot down by ground fire while on a bombing mission over the North Vietnamese border. At the close of his story, both the Senators and the audience—for the first time in the memory of reporters present—broke into applause. One felt that a new naval—and perhaps movie—hero was being born.

Why Did He Carry His German Passport?

According to a Pentagon press release, the only documents Dengler was carrying when captured were his ID card and the expired German passport he used when he came to the U.S. in 1957. He is now a U.S. citizen. The news that a pilot with a German passport had been captured created an uproar in Germany where it was cited as evidence that Germans were being recruited for service in Vietnam. The passport has never been satisfactorily explained. It is a violation of regulations to go into combat with anything but one's ID card. Dengler said he carried the passport because it would explain his German accent, an explanation that would more plausibly fit the Battle of the Bulge, where American and German troops were locked in combat than the jungles of Southeast Asia where natives can't tell one white man from another. Perhaps Dengler thought he might get better treatment by using the passport to prove he was a German rather than an American.

No such questions were raised by the Senators, who treated Dengler with small-boy admiration. The most fervent was Senator Thurmond, who broke into a threnody on the subject of freedom, "the most precious word in the English language next to God", and wanted to know what message Dengler had on the subject for the young people of this country. Dengler seemed vague. His only description of freedom was that it meant being able "to walk down the street, just to go and buy what you want." This sounded more like the Consumers' Union than Jefferson. "And if it means fighting for it," Thurmond pressed him, "it is your opinion that they would be following the part of wisdom to do so, would they not?" "If the government thinks so," Dengler replied, "yes, sir." The answer seemed perfectly to fit the accent.

Conscience-Stricken U.S. Pilots

"Although Pentagon officials are reluctant to talk about it, there is another reason for the lagging reenlistment rates: A few pilots in Vietnam have turned in their wings rather than fly in the war."

—AP from Washington, p. 33 early edition *New York Times*, Sept. 18, "Severe Shortage of Airmen Seen", revealing that some 600 Air and Navy pilots are dead or missing in the Vietnam war. The admission that some pilots have refused to fly confirms a report to which we called attention earlier this year. The Swiss journalist, Fernand Gigon, in his book *Les Américains face au Vietcong* (p. 151, Flammarion, Paris, 1965) said he learned in Vietnam that some U.S. pilots refused to bomb for reasons of conscience and were allowed to turn in their wings and go home after signing a declaration that they would reveal "neither the reasons for their leaving nor the scenes they had witnessed".

Senator Smith wanted to know if peace demonstrations at home had encouraged the Viet Cong. "The only thing that I heard," Dengler told her, "was that these Pathet Lao think that the U.S. is going to go broke by the amount of aircraft they shoot down." Senator Byrd asked whether he had seen any evidence of Chinese participation in the war. Dengler, no doubt unaware that the Pentagon press release said he stole a Chinese rifle when he escaped, said "I saw Russian trucks and Russian weapons and I saw U.S. weapons. I did not see any Chinese indication of anything, sir." Perhaps he had better be re-briefed. Senator Russell was disturbed because Dengler's captors wore—as the Pentagon press release said—"U.S. type shirts and trousers, sunglasses and rubber boots" and had U.S. M-1s and carbines. U.S. military aid certainly gets around.

Dengler said the villagers were friendly. No one asked him how they felt about U.S. bombings, or what kind of gas we were dropping on them—at a press conference 3 days earlier in San Diego, Dengler said that when he heard a plane overhead and smelled the gas it was dropping, he said to himself, "Man, that is Uncle Sam's gas. That is real" and came out of hiding and laid down an SOS. In San Diego he was asked whether he expected to be returned to active duty in Vietnam. "I hope not," was the reply, "but if Uncle Sam wants me, I certainly will be on my way." Otherwise he said he'd rather stay in the United States and open "a German-type restaurant."

Two Replies by U Thant at Press Conference Sept. 19 Which Undercut U.S. Propaganda

"In my own country, Burma, there were elections for the Constituent Assembly in 1947, a few months before independence, in a sort of civil war situation. Of course there were pressures on the voters from all sides. At that time the Burmese government did not bar those directly or indirectly connected with the Communists or neutralists from running as candidates. Everybody was free to run as candidates. At that time the situation was also very bad in my country. There was an insurrection going on after the war. But I must say that the situation at that time was not so messy as the situation now prevailing in South Vietnam. Another difference is that in Burma at the time there were

no foreign elements."

—When asked about the elections in South Vietnam.

"On the projected Asian conference . . . towards a peaceful solution of the Vietnam problem . . . the motivations are very laudable. . . . Regional problems should be settled by regional machinery. . . . But what is more important are the political factors. . . . Some participants in the conflict are claiming that this is a holy war. . . . While the issues are framed in that context, I do not think it is realistic for . . . Asian countries that have subscribed to a particular ideology to come out with the proposal to mediate."

—When asked about Thai-Filipino "Asia peace" proposals

Ike Would Use A-Bombs "Where . . . Life Seems to Be Cheap"

(Continued from Page One)

as was the 1964 campaign.

The Mekong Delta, where the bulk of South Vietnam's people live, has until now been the scene of little fighting and much tacit agreement between the Viet Cong and the government forces. Richard Fryklund, just back from Saigon, reports in the *Washington Star* (Sept. 15) talk of adding another four or five divisions to the six already in Vietnam so we can take over the war in the Delta, too. In that densely populated area—unlike the jungle highlands—this would be not just another escalation but a new war—a war against the South Vietnamese people. Its human cost in their casualties and ours would be enormous. We dare not acquiesce in such a crime. We ought to be for ending the bombing of the North and de-escalating the war in the South while we offer to negotiate with the Viet Cong as U Thant has proposed. I am convinced that were peace negotiated along these lines both North and South Vietnam would be taking U.S. aid and friendly to the U.S. within a few years.

A Bigger Bang for A Buck Against Asians

Either we move toward peace or we continue to move toward catastrophe. No "middle way" is any longer possible. The strategy of limiting the war to the South means a long, painful struggle which will only increase impatience at home for quick and easy bombing solutions. Nixon's campaign to end it without "appeasement" or more ground troops may have a dreadful corollary: the use of the atom bomb as a short-cut. Poor wobbly old Eisenhower was trotted out on educational TV last Monday night to say that he was ready in 1953 to use nuclear weapons to end the Korean war and to imply that we ought to do the same in Vietnam. "We'd have won the war in a week if we'd had to use them," Eisenhower said, like any Air Force Strangelove. Of course, he explained, "no one in a sane moment" would use them against Russia—Russia can hit back—but that doesn't mean that "in sticky situations you couldn't use a proper [sic] kind of nuclear weapon sometime", i.e. against those who can't. Ike didn't "see any difference between gas warfare and this kind of warfare." In his fuzzy logic, if one can be press-agented

Plus Ça Change

Like the Diem regime, the new Constituent Assembly in South Vietnam is heavily weighted on the side of the Catholics, the military and landed interests. Raymond Coffey of the Chicago Daily News reported (Wash. Post, Sept. 14) that 30 of the 117 seats were won by Catholics, who make up about 10% of the population while the Buddhists, who make up 80% won only 34 seats. Among the Buddhist winners only two or three were considered opponents of the Saigon government. On the other hand the Catholics were strongly pro-war. The 30 Catholics elected are just nine short of the one-third (30) required to give the military the veto they need for the Assembly. The junta will have no trouble in getting those votes; 18 military men and 18 civil servants were elected. Only two regular parties, both of the far right, have emerged from these carefully screened elections, the Vietnamese Kuomintang (10) and the Dai Viet (8). Both are reactionary parties of the distant past. "Some of the generals," Charles Mohr reflected in the New York Times Sept. 17, "may be considerably more liberal than many of the assembly members on such questions as land reform. . . ." We add one more statistic for those who doubt that this is a civil war: of the 117 members, 32 are from the North. The proportion of Northerners in the Assembly is far higher than the claimed proportion of Northern troops among the VC.

as humane, why not the other? Eisenhower argued against "the fear of using a weapon that the free world might need in some outlying place where people or life seems to be cheap, and they want to have their way," while we—he of course did not add—want to have ours. The mere suggestion is enough to deepen racial suspicion in Asia.

The Eisenhower interview may prove the beginning of a campaign to sell "proper" kinds of nuclear weapons in "little" wars like Vietnam. Johnson's policy at the moment looks like a lesser evil, as he did beside Goldwater in 1964. But his "middle way" soon turned into exactly that peace-by-quickie bombardment Goldwater had advocated. The Republicans may be the first to talk of nuclear weapons but Johnson may be the first to use them. Something better than opportunism is needed to keep us from this abyss.

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