

Only Two Weeks Before We Bombed The Oil Depots of Hanoi and Haiphong

"On June 17 educators attending a State Department background briefing were told that few military targets remained in North Vietnam that were not already being hit, and that the United States had no interest in persistent attacks on built-up populated areas. U.S. officials

said relatively few tons a day of supplies were going from the north into South Vietnam, and were being carried by coolies or bicycles or moved at night in a manner defying air interdiction."

—AP from Wash. in York, Pa. Gazette & Daily June 30.

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Where Johnson's New Bombings Lead

Easy, wrote Virgil, in a passage every schoolboy once knew, is the descent to hell. And to the moral standards of the damned. This is the path down which Lyndon Baines Johnson is leading our country. His is a Satanic cleverness John Foster Dulles would have envied. Everything becomes transmuted in Johnson's hands until we lose the capacity to distinguish good from evil. So in his TV-cast press conference last night from his opulent ranch in Texas he somehow managed to appear the aggrieved victim, the unjust target, in the bombing of the oil depots in Hanoi and Haiphong.

All Criticism Communist?

Over and over again the President identified criticism with Communism. Some of the Communist countries, he said, "were rather vicious in their statements . . . that we were bombing civilian targets." Perhaps they were only premature. "Most of the Communist countries expressed disapproval," he said. (So, for that matter, did most of the non-Communist.) "We expected the regular Communist response," he said in another passage, "namely, that this would harden the opposition, that it would not lead to negotiations . . ." The unwary listener would never guess that this is overwhelmingly world opinion, that it is the view of the Vatican, of the Japanese, Canadian and Indian governments, of the Secretary General of the United Nations, of every West European government, except perhaps West Germany's; that almost every small country in Latin America, Africa and Asia looks on in horror as the world's largest military power is allowed to burn and bomb at will a country too small and weak to retaliate in kind. Johnson could point for support only to those countries "who," as he elegantly put it, "have bodies there," i.e. in South Vietnam, bodies we pay for in the case of the only large supplier, which is South Korea.

If enemy planes suddenly appeared in the skies over New York or Washington and began to bomb the oil depots on their outskirts, if they returned three days in a row and we had no way of knowing whether this time or next they would hit the center of the city, if it became dangerous to venture out into the streets as the skies rained hot and deadly fragments of shrapnel from the anti-aircraft guns with which we tried vainly to ward off the invaders, we too might be just a little "vicious", as Johnson complained, in our comments. Johnson explained self-approvingly that we "were very careful to select military targets that were not in the center of the

Beware the Cooing of This Dove

"He [the President] sees the future as an era of reconciliation."

—Washington correspondent, The Times (London) June 18 on the basis of a White House briefing for leading European newsmen two nights before Johnson announced he was going to escalate the war.

"Indeed it is said that in his reflective moments the President looks beyond this war to a period of peace unprecedented in this century."

—Chalmers Roberts in Washington Post July 3 fresh from a White House briefing after the oil storage tanks in the suburbs of Hanoi and Haiphong were bombed.

"There are things that, as we look at them from Vietnam, happen with the regularity of clockwork: Every time L. B. Johnson is about to intensify his armed aggression, he talks about his search for peace."

—July 4 appeal to U.S. mothers by North Vietnamese women intellectuals, Hanoi radio, June 28.

area, and to spare all civilians . . ." But even God, with whom our leaders sometimes seem to confuse themselves, could not be that precise if He hurled down the lightning of His judgment. Maps published by the London *Sunday Times* (July 3) show clusters of houses within a few hundred yards of the oil depots in Hanoi and Haiphong and built-up suburban areas within a mile. No doubt the Air Force tried for precision and largely succeeded, but how were the poor people on the ground to know this, and who were we to decide in our omnipotence how far we were to go in punishing and frightening them, like some giant tormenting an ant-hill with huge and clumsy foot?

Eye-Witness In Hanoi

The fear which seized Hanoi was vividly described by Jean Raffaelli, the *Agence France-Presse* man in the North Vietnamese capital. "The noise of the bombers," he reported in a cable to that same issue of the London *Sunday Times*, "the explosions and anti-aircraft fire reached such an intensity that suddenly it brought an element of fear. People took refuge in the shelters, or jumped into the trenches which zigzag across private gardens. Shrapnel rained down upon the

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pavements, injuring dozens of people . . . Accounts which were forthcoming in the evening suggest that the raids were precision jobs, with the bombs well grouped. It was not possible to assess the casualties, but the coming and going of ambulances, and the bustle at the principal hospital . . . suggested that they had been relatively heavy." Washington officials quickly hailed the bombings as "superb" but assured us that they had killed only "one or two civilians, if any," though admitting heavy smoke hampered reconnaissance (*New York Times*, July 3). This smug arithmetic of the body-count is always being adjusted upward or downward, as if with omniscient exactness, to prove our prowess or our rectitude.

What the Nazis Did in Holland

Hanoi is taking no chances on our highly advertised mercy. Strict evacuation orders have been issued and the capital is being emptied as rapidly as possible of all those not engaged in essential tasks; the population is expected to be reduced from 1,200,000 to 300,000. It is rapidly becoming a ghost town. The authorities fear not only the bombardment of the city and the demoralization of its inhabitants, M. Raffaelli reported from Hanoi on the *Agence France-Presse* ticker July 2, but also the possibility that the American fliers may hit the dikes which protect the populous Red River Valley and its rice-fields from inundation. Heavy rains in Yunnan have already swollen the river beyond normal. Parts of Hanoi are below the level of the waters held back by the dikes. These are constantly patrolled and improved by special teams. Destruction of the dikes, especially now as the waters rise, could drown and starve out a substantial portion of the North's most heavily populated area. Hanoi fears that we may duplicate in North Vietnam the war crime the Germans committed by bombing the dikes in Holland. This is the fear aroused as we tighten the screws on North Vietnam's people and intensify the terror in what Johnson blandly calls "a policy of measured response."

Plain words are disappearing from circulation as the government floods us with counterfeit phrases of this kind. The real word for the policy we are following is that "*schrecklichkeit*," that frightfulness, the Germans proclaimed as their strategy in World War I, also as a means of shortening the war by frightening their enemies the more quickly into submission. I can remember as a boy the contempt the Germans aroused as a people who could so openly proclaim so devilish

Add Johnson's Fairy Tales

"The North Vietnamese are trying to deny the people of South Vietnam the right to build their own nation, the right to choose their own system of government . . . and South Vietnam has asked us for help."

—Johnson at Omaha, June 30.

"A limited survey of popular attitudes in government controlled areas of South Vietnam indicates people there tend to regard the war as an American one."

—Associated Press in Washington Star, June 27.

"Premier Ky and other junta leaders appear to be growing less and less hesitant about resorting to authoritarian measures . . . now that the [Buddhist] crisis has ended."

—Neil Sheehan from Saigon, New York Times July 5.

a tactic. We are more clever than they, and portray a massive rain of fire from the skies as somehow the token of our benevolence.

It is only as terror and economic warfare designed to bring all Vietnam to its knees on our terms at the bargaining table that the escalation can be rationalized. Pentagon sources eager for new and more deadly targets are already leaking the truth about the oil depot raids. Richard Fryklund, a military affairs reporter with good sources in the Air Force, reported in the *Washington Star* (June 30) that despite the raids the infiltration of North Vietnamese regiments was expected to increase, as it has since the bombings of the North began in February of last year. He reported that the enemy has been stockpiling more supplies than they had been using and that "the enemy would require delivery of about 150 tons of material a day if they went on the offensive" and "at the present modest tempo of the war" need only about 90 tons. That is nine 10-ton truck-loads a day, not much for a little country McNamara's computers credit with 10,000 trucks. Oil can be found for that trickle no matter how much we bomb. As recently as Jan. 21, as Senator Fulbright recalled at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing June 30, McNamara said the amount of fuel necessary for their supply trucks could be found even though we were to shut off the supply by mining Haiphong. He added "even if they got no fuel for trucks, they have demonstrated many, many times in the Orient that they can move the quantities of supplies now being moved into the south by animal and manpower." The secret of these raids, which McNamara repeatedly opposed in private talks with reporters at Honolulu and since, lies in

Two Freudian Slips Which Revealed the Real Nature of Our Vietnamese War Policy

Under Secretary of State BALL: What we have said, and it may be that the unconditional surrender [sic] formulation is subject to some misunderstanding, but what that is intended to do is to represent the most flexible approach by the U.S. possible to sitting down and talking. . . .

MR. BALL: I am just advised I used the words "unconditional surrender" instead of "unconditional discussions." It was a mere slip of the tongue.

SEN. CHURCH: Not a Freudian slip? [Laughter].

MR. BALL: Not in the least.

SEN. GORE: What troubles me is the notion of this Administration that punishment is persuasive. . . .

MR. BALL: We are not thinking of this in terms of punishment. . . . Punishment would mean we would say to

North Vietnam, "You either surrender [sic] tomorrow or you are all going to be killed, your cities are going to be decimated, your country is going to be turned into a desert." We do not say that. What we say to them is, "You surrender [sic] tomorrow because at the end of the road you are not going to win this war militarily or politically. You surrender [sic] tomorrow because if you do not do that you are going to have to consume more and more of your resources in a war which is a fruitless one from your point of view and therefore there is nothing in it for you." That is a different thing from punishment. . . .

MR. BALL: I said a moment ago, I used the phrase "surrender tomorrow." I did not intend it that way. I mean stop aggression tomorrow. . . .

—Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing June 30.

domestic political considerations. Johnson hopes to make up for the falling confidence in him within the ranks of the Democratic and the peace-minded by winning the "hawks" and the Republicans. He is shaping up as their ideal candidate for 1968, since he has succeeded in doing what Nixon unsuccessfully advocated in 1954 and Goldwater in 1964. When Johnson speaks of keeping one's word, as he did at Omaha, one remembers all those words he has brushed under the rug since he won the last election by promising so fervently not to do what he is doing.

The Language of One-Man Rule

Slowly and gradually Johnson has set us on a course whose end neither he nor anyone else can foresee. He is reported to be in a Messianic mood, seeing himself as the misunderstood leader of a holy crusade. He is surrounded by hawks and hardliners, and by comparison with them can still believe himself moderate. Always super-sensitive to criticism, he now begins to see it as treasonable. If the enemy can only win on our home front, as he now proclaims, like the French rightists before him in similar circumstances, then criticism of the war is aid and comfort to the enemy. A disturbing note was sounded in his speech at Omaha, with its insistence that he and he alone had been chosen to decide the issues of war and peace. "If everyone in this country," he said in Texas last night, "was working as hard to support the principles of democracy as the men in Vietnam are, I think we should have little to worry about." Does it foster democracy to talk the language of one-man rule?

If the cost of aggression, as the President says, is to be

Persuasion by Bomb and Napalm?

"We must use our power to resist their aggression and to try to change their minds."

—Pres. Johnson, Des Moines, June 30.

Sen. GORE (D., Tenn.)—What troubles me is the notion of this Administration that punishment is persuasive . . . I just know of no instance in history where it has succeeded."

—Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 30.

increased at its source, why stop short at the bombing of North Vietnam? The source of the oil we are trying to shut off is in the Soviet Union. So is that of the anti-aircraft which rings Hanoi and Haiphong. Arms, and other supplies, come from China, and across it from Russia and the rest of the Soviet bloc. If we bomb North Vietnamese oil storage tanks, why not Soviet oil refineries? If we bomb the railroads and roads which carry supplies in North Vietnam, why not those which carry supplies in China? If we attack North Vietnam without a declaration of war, picking and choosing our targets, why not those of China and the Soviet Union? The answer is that we hesitate to do to such formidable big countries what we feel free to do to a helpless small one, with only a negligible Navy or Air Force. But how long before our frustrated hawks call for ultimatums threatening to widen the war to these privileged sanctuaries unless all aid is shut off? "We shall see this thing through to the end," President Johnson says. What does he mean by "the end?" World War III?

July 6

From the Angry Protests in the Senate The Day After Hanoi and Haiphong Were Bombed

SEN. HARTKE (D. Ind.)—This is the policy which the hawks have indicated, including Barry Goldwater during the campaign of two years ago. . . . It is not possible to find the road to peace by escalating war. . . . Have we now made our last decision, the decision that, come what peace opportunities there may, our way shall be irrevocably that of military escalation, of acceding one after another to the successive unsuccessful steps which pave the road to atomic holocaust in the sacred cause of anticommunism? . . . I wonder how interested we would be in peace if we saw bombs dropping on the outskirts of Washington, D. C.?

SEN. CLARK (D., Penn.)—It has been said there is a crisis of credibility in our country with respect to our earnest desire to end the Vietnamese war through negotiations. The Senator from Indiana has pointed out, with powerful logic, the many occasions on which, while talking peace, we have stepped up and escalated the war. . . .

SEN. McGOVERN (D., S.D.)—It will be more difficult for honest dissent to be heard henceforth. The more the bombs and the guns roar, the more difficult it is for thoughtful voices to be heard over that kind of escalation. . . . I recall the sad words of the late President Kennedy after the Bay of Pigs fiasco. Immediately after that tragic misuse of American power that backfired on us, the standing of President Kennedy in the public opinion polls went up. He turned to one of his aides and said, "Isn't it too bad that the worse we do, the more our public opinion standing improves?" I suspect that there will be some temporary applause for the recent action. But when the people learn once again that this is not the answer to the kind of problems that face us in Vietnam, the disillusionment will set in again.

SEN. CHURCH (D., Idaho)—I would ask the senior Senator from Indiana whether we are not simply increasing the

dosage of a medicine that has already failed to cure the patient? We notch up the war to a still higher level after years of continuous escalation, even though the whole process has brought us no closer to a negotiated settlement than we were 12 months ago, and even though the number of American troops engaged in the war has increased by more than tenfold. . . . I do not think Ho Chi Minh can be forced to the negotiating table on his knees—unless we drag him there in chains. . . . No matter how often we stress that the North Vietnamese have engaged in an aggression against South Vietnam, we cannot obscure the fact that the North Vietnamese still remain Vietnamese and that until the American intervention occurred, this was a Vietnamese war between various factions of Vietnamese people. . . . Given these considerations, it is understandable that the world should think of the Vietnamese war in terms of American intervention rather than in terms of the aggression of north against south.

SEN. McGOVERN: I call attention, for example, to the blunt fact that all but one of the South Vietnamese generals who represent the military junta fought with the French against their own people in the war for independence which followed World War II. Would not this be roughly comparable to having eight or nine Benedict Arnolds attempting to run the U.S. in the years that followed our own war for independence some 175 years ago? . . . Mr. President, I view the latest bombing effort with deep misgivings for two reasons: First, it represents another dangerous new dimension to the Vietnam war; and second, it dodges once again the basic political issue of the conflict. . . . What began in the 1950's as a local struggle among two groups in South Vietnam has now moved another step toward a full scale international conflict.

—In the U.S. Senate, June 30.

How Some Supposed U.S. Peace Initiatives Evaporate Under Close Questioning

Close-Up View of Our Slippery Far Eastern Diplomacy In Action

Sen. GORE: You say that the bombing of Hanoi and Hai-phong were designed to speed the day of a peaceful solution. . . . It has been suggested to the North Vietnamese government by our government in different forms several times that the U.S. would be willing to stop the bombing of North Vietnam if North Vietnam would stop her military movement across the parallel into South Vietnam. Is that not true?

Under Secretary of State BALL: In some way that can be policed and check, yes.

Sen. GORE: Subject to verification.

Mr. BALL: That is right.

Sen. GORE: Now, if North Vietnam were willing to stop military movements into South Vietnam would the U.S. be willing to stop military movement into North Vietnam?

No Direct Answer

Mr. BALL: Well, I would not regard these as necessarily the parallels which one would pursue in a negotiation because what has been happening here is a continuance of acts of aggression by the North in the South where the American forces' sole role has been to try to prevent that aggression, and we would want to see put into this equation some very real decisions by North Vietnam to stop the acts of terrorism, the acts of aggression which it is committing in the South. . . .

Sen. GORE: I am persuaded to the view that it is mainland China that is the mainspring of this conflict and the situs where a settlement will ultimately be reached, if it is.

Suggestions have recently been made that the U.S. would be willing to consider the conclusion of a treaty with Red China by which both parties would agree not to be first to use a nuclear weapon against each other except in self-defense, provided China herself would adhere to the nuclear weapons test treaty. China in a public blast only a few days ago branded such suggestions as another trick of President Johnson. I thought that was most regrettable.

What would our Administration's view be to a further major attempt to break this barrier of credibility between the two countries, coupling these two suggestions with the third, which the chairman of this committee originally made, of expressing the satisfaction of the U.S. with a neutralization of South Vietnam?

Mr. BALL: First, let me say, Senator Gore that the U.S. has, as you know, never specifically offered the kind of bargain that you mention, that we were seeking clarification of some comments which the government in Peking had made, but we had never indicated a decision on the part of the U.S. with regard to a bargain of that kind.

Dept. of Ruskification

"Mr. Dean Rusk, the United States Secretary of State, told a closed session of the Council of Ministers of the South-East Asia Treaty Organization today that the United States had made an unparalleled effort in South Vietnam to improve the living standards of the people."

—The Times (London), June 29.

"Though the military conflict has been escalated, what worries some observers is . . . the other war in the south—for economic, social, and to some extent, political reforms. The seeds planted anew at the Honolulu conference in February may not have died altogether, but they have not taken strong root and blossomed. . . . Among the Vietnamese there is a skeptical doubt that their leaders really intend following through on the fanfare. More optimistic assessments in Washington of progress on the pacification front are greeted by Saigon insiders with guffaws."

—John Hughes from Saigon in the Christian Science Monitor, July 2.

Sen. GORE: Are you aware that suggestions have been advanced along this line?

Mr. BALL: Well, as I say, exactly what occurred was an effort on our part to seek some clarification on this possibility, but with no decision on the part of the U.S. government with regard to whether this was or was not the kind of bargain which we would be prepared to accept.

[So it was not so strange that Peking suspected a trick. —I.F.S.]

Hedges on Neutralization

Now you ask whether this could be coupled with the neutralization of South Vietnam. It is a very hard question to answer in open session, as I think you will appreciate. . . .

Sen. GORE: It seems to me that unless there is some security against attack on China itself with nuclear weapons, and a neutralization of the area adjacent to her is essential to a political settlement. . . .

Mr. BALL: Well, I would not necessarily accept the conclusion that Hanoi does not have the ability to make a deal on its own without the approval of Peiping. We have certainly not concluded yet that Peiping calls the tune to that extent, and I think there is a lot of evidence to the contrary.

—Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 30.

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