

Disclosing The Basic Untruth About The War And Why The U.S. Clings To It

"If it were the indigenous revolt, the Communists say it is, 'the United States would have no business taking sides in the conflict'."

—*Washington Post, Jan. 31, quoting Under Secretary of State Ball's defense of U.S. policy in Evanston, Ill., Jan. 30.*

"It was thus by its home policy that the government of the South finally destroyed the confidence of the population, which it had won during the early years, and practically

drove them into revolt and desperation. . . . The insurrection existed before the Communists decided to take part. . . . They were simply forced to join in. . . . And even among the Communists, the initiative did not originate in Hanoi, but from the grass roots, where the people were literally driven by Diem to take up arms in self-defense."

—*Philippe Devillers, in North Vietnam Today, edited by P. J. Honey (China Quarterly and Praeger, 1962).*

I. F. Stone's Weekly

VOL. XIV, NO. 5

FEBRUARY 7, 1966

101

WASHINGTON, D. C.

15 CENTS

Slow-Fuse Sarajevo

In one frank moment during four hours of interrogation by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Jan. 28, two days before the bombing of North Vietnam was resumed, Secretary Rusk said, "I would be misleading you if I told you that I know where, when and how this matter [i.e. the war] will be resolved." Where the way ahead is so murky, caution is wise. By this standard, the resumption's *timing*—first of all—is questionable. The President spoke in his State of the Union message Jan. 12 of his readiness for de-escalation. "We'll respond," he said, "if others reduce their use of force." The very next day at a press conference he noted a reduction in the number of military "incidents." This remark was followed by a rash of inspired stories from the Pentagon and the State Department disparaging any sign of a lull. During the Vietnamese New Year ("Tet") truce, Secretary Rusk held a press conference (Jan. 20) in which he said "There is every sign that the other side is going to intensify its activity after the Tet period." If so it was to the Administration's advantage to let the Viet Cong demonstrate to public opinion at home and abroad that the enemy had rejected the suggestion for mutual de-escalation.

What Was The Hurry?

Instead of waiting to see, we arranged to end the New Year truce Jan. 23 six hours earlier than that set by the other side. We resumed offensive operations and the bombings in the South without waiting to test the enemy's intention. *It was as if our military command feared that maybe the enemy might continue the lull*, and jumped the gun six hours earlier to make sure that the war resumed with vigor. Ever since then we have been on the offensive; the enemy has been hard to find. On the eve of the resumed bombing of the North, the VC's aggressive action had been limited to isolated terrorist and harassing attacks; organized units of the North Vietnamese regular forces seemed to have vanished. Roger Hilsman, recently Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, and before that the State Department's intelligence chief, told the House subcommittee on Far Eastern Affairs Feb. 1 "bombing the North probably makes it more difficult for our troops rather than helping them. The seven regiments of North Vietnamese regulars came South after the bombing and

Add Phoney Claims of A Phoney War

"There are some 35 countries providing assistance to [South] Vietnam."

—*Rusk to the Senate Foreign Relations Com. Jan. 28*

"President Johnson and Secretary Rusk are whistling in the dark when they express hope that other nations will help the U.S. war effort to any extent in South Vietnam. . . . Only one government, Nationalist China, wants in the Vietnamese fight but it is barred for obvious political reasons. . . . Both the President and Mr. Rusk keep referring to some 40 nations who are contributing. But such statements at best are misleading. A study of the list and their contributions shows little or none of military significance or even vital non-military help. In fact, only 31 nations actually have made some kind of contribution. Nine others have agreed to do something but these nine include such flimsy offers as the Dominican Republic's to supply some cement. . . . Most of the 40 nations constantly referred to by the U.S. as 'helpers' come up with only token offerings."

—*R. H. Shackford, Wash. Daily News, Jan. 26*

there is evidence they pulled back at least into the mountains during the bombing pause—which may be a signal." Should we not have waited to see the meaning of this before resuming the bombing?

A second question arises about the timing. If our appeal to the United Nations was meant seriously, why did we have to make its task harder by first resuming the bombing of the North and then appealing to the UN? Except for Nationalist China, there was not a single U.S. ally, much less "the neutrals, which did not regret the resumption; so did the Vatican. The Administration in announcing the resumption created the impression that the other side had used the lull for so great a build-up as to endanger our troops. But if carefully read, parallel stories on Feb. 1 from Pentagon reporters, obviously the fruit of one of those not-for-attribution military intelligence briefings, do not bear out this impression. "These sources," Henry L. Trewhitt reported in the *Baltimore Sun* that day, "held that North Vietnam had not gained any military advantage from the suspension." John G. Norris in the *Washington Post* noted in his account of the briefing that

(Continued on Page Four)

From the Interrogations of Secretary Rusk Jan. 28 by Senate Foreign Relations ...

Sen. CHURCH: If this is the philosophy underlying our policy, Mr. Secretary, I should have thought that it would have been difficult to have ever fought a Civil War in this country had the same principles obtained a century ago. At that time, I suppose the Southerners felt that there had been an invasion of the South from the North, and had England, which favored the South, adhered to the same principle that now seems to govern American policy, and had sent troops in the name of self-determination into the Confederacy, I think they would have been hard put to convince Abraham Lincoln that there should have been an election to determine the ultimate outcome of the war . . .

Now in Vietnam you can look at the war as a covert invasion of the South by the North or you can look at it as some other scholars do, as basically an indigenous war to which the North has given a growing measure of aid and abetment, but either way you look at it, it is a war between Vietnamese to determine what the ultimate kind of government is going to be for Vietnam. When I went to school that was a civil war.

Secretary RUSK: Well, Senator, I do not follow that point at all because whatever you call it, there is aggression from North Vietnam against South across that demarcation line contrary to the military clauses of that 1954 commitment.

Sen. CHURCH: Have all the provisions of the 1954 agreement been adhered to on either side?

Secretary RUSK: No, they have not.

Sen. CHURCH: Were the elections which were called for at the time that agreement was made, were they held?

Secretary RUSK: Neither in North or South Vietnam.

Sen. CHURCH: Right. So it cannot be said that violations of the agreement have been all one-sided.

Secretary RUSK: That is correct . . .

The CHAIRMAN (Fulbright): May I ask in that connection, what is the explanation of why in 1956, in pursuance of the Geneva accords, elections were not held? . . . He [Diem], I am informed, 1955, in accordance with the treaty, he was requested to consult about elections, and he refused to do so, is that correct?

Secretary RUSK: Well, neither his government nor the government of the U.S. signed that agreement . . .

The CHAIRMAN: Why in your opinion didn't we sign it? . . .

Secretary RUSK: My general impression is that the U.S. was at that time not persuaded that this was the best way to settle this affair . . .

The CHAIRMAN: Not having signed it, what business

Why Take Chances?

"Defense Department officials [after denying burial in Arlington to the remains of Communist leader Robert G. Thompson, who fought against Fascism in Spain and later won a Distinguished Service Cross in World War II] disclosed today that they have tightened up regulations covering national cemeteries so that persons convicted under subversive activities legislation cannot be buried there, even if their sentences are for less than five years. Lt. Col. Douglas C. Jones, a staff assistant to Arthur Sylvester, Defense Department spokesman, said 'as far as we know, no known Communists are buried at Arlington'."

—*New York Times, Jan. 28*

Isn't there any way to dig them up and be sure?

was it of ours for intervening . . .?

Secretary RUSK: Well, the prospect of free elections in North and South Vietnam was very poor at the time.

The CHAIRMAN: Now, they have always been poor, and will be for a hundred years, won't they? That was not news to you. I mean this was a device to get around the settlement, was it not?

Secretary RUSK: No, no, Mr. Chairman. I do not believe the prospect of free elections in South Vietnam anyhow are all that dim. * * *

Senator CHURCH: It seems to me . . . that the under-developed world is going to be beset with guerrilla wars regardless of the outcome in Vietnam, and we will have to live in a world afflicted with revolutions for a long time to come. That is why it is so important to try to determine what our basic foreign policy is going to be as it grapples with these revolutionary wars in many parts of the under-developed world in the future; and, as I have listened to your explanations this morning, I gather that wherever a revolution occurs against an established government, and that revolution, as most will doubtlessly be, will be infiltrated with Communists, that the United States regards it (as) in its interest to prevent the success of Communist uprising. This, at least, has been the policy we followed in the Dominican Republic and in Vietnam. I wonder whether this is going to continue to be the policy as we face new guerrilla wars in the future?

Secretary RUSK: Senator, I think it is very important that the different kinds of revolution be distinguished. We are in no sense committed against change. As a matter of fact, we are ourselves stimulating very sweeping revolutions in a good many places. The whole weight and effort of the Alliance for Progress is to bring about far-reaching social-economic changes.

From the Two Anti-War Speeches in the House the Day the Bombs Began to Fall Again

BROWN (D., Cal.): "From all sides we hear it said the pause was a failure—the other side is not interested in peace. I do not wish to debate the point at this time. But those who are honest will admit that the previous 11 months of bombing was a failure. That 11-month period saw the U.S. forced to multiply its ground forces many times over merely to hold its own in South Vietnam. . . . That 11 months saw a strengthening of the will to resist in North Vietnam. . . . To resume the bombing, after this 11 months of failure to achieve any constructive results, demonstrates again and more forcefully the sterility of the U.S. position

in Vietnam. . . . We will weaken democracy and strengthen the totalitarian tendencies of our own society. . . . I think that he (the President) has made a tragic mistake."

WOLFF (D., N.Y.): "The acknowledgement that all our efforts toward peace have been of no avail and that a resumption of the bombing of North Vietnam has been ordered, is a serious blow to those of us who have urged an exhaustive exploration of every possible chance for negotiations. Let us hope . . . all parties to the war—Peiping, Hanoi, the National Liberation Front and South Vietnam—are brought to the peace table."

...How Far Do We Plan to Go in Policing World Against Popular Revolutions?

Sen. CHURCH: That is change, Mr. Secretary, without violence. History shows the most significant change has been accompanied by violence. So you think that with the Foreign Aid program we are going to be able, with our money, to avert serious uprisings in many of these destitute countries in future years?

Secretary RUSK: Not necessarily avert all of them, but I do believe there is a fundamental difference between the kind of revolution which the Communists call their wars of national liberation, and the kind of revolution which is congenial to our own experience, and fits into the aspirations of ordinary men and women right around the world. There is nothing liberal about that revolution that they are trying to push from Peiping. This is a harsh, totalitarian regime. It has nothing in common with the American revolutionary tradition, nothing in common with it.

Sen. CHURCH: The objectives of the Communist revolution are very different indeed from the objectives of our own. But objectives of revolutions have varied through the centuries. The question which I think faces this country is how we can best cope with the phenomena of revolt in the underdeveloped world in the years ahead, and I have very serious doubts that American intervention with military power will often be the proper decision, and that too much intervention may well spread Communism throughout this part of the world rather than thwart it . . . I cannot remember many revolutions that have been fought in splendid isolation. There were as many Frenchmen at Yorktown when Cornwallis surrendered as there were American Continentals. Senator Pell

Like Lighting A Cigar With A \$100 Bill

"Despite lack of publicly disclosed convincing results on their strikes against the matted, deeply-entrenched jungle hideouts of the enemy, the B-52s are going to step up their efforts from their far-away base in Guam. A half billion dollars has been earmarked for this operation for the next fiscal year, according to Washington reports of budget requests."

—Jack Foisie, *Los Angeles Times*, in *Washington Post*, Jan. 26.

tells me more. I accept the correction. In any case, it seems to me that the Communists have not changed the rules of revolution by meddling in them, and the question is not whether we approve or disapprove of them. When we were an infant nation, we stood up for the right of revolution and . . . what I am worried about, Mr. Secretary, is this: That where we intervene too much in wars of this type, our policy may well turn out to be self-defeating.

Secretary RUSK: May turn out to be what?

Sen. CHURCH: Self-defeating.

Sen. CHURCH: I think that in areas where sensitivity to Western imperialism, borne of three centuries of colonialism, is so very great, that Mao Tse-tung might want us to move in massively with Western troops from the opposite side of the world, believing that this intervention serves the larger interests of China in Asia, and tends to spread Communism by identifying Communism with nationalism, and our own policy with the hated Western imperialism.

Voices of Protest, Disquiet and Warning in the Senate Jan. 31 When Bombing Resumed

AIKEN (R. Vt.): "There may be a chance that a world nuclear war can be avoided . . . that we may escape the devastating effect of a general land war in Asia, the kind of war we are least likely to win . . . [but] we must be prepared for the worst. . . . I believe the President has erred in taking new steps which may lead to a cataclysmic world conflict. I well recall Gen. Ridgway telling me after a hearing one day that if we sent 2,000,000 men into the Vietnam area, they would be swallowed up."

MANSFIELD (D. Mont.): "I should like to read a brief comment made by General Ridgway when he was commander of the 8th Army in Korea at the time the truce negotiations were underway. The American people must realize the need for infinite patience. . . . In the world of today we must maintain an equilibrium of forces so that none of them become destructive. A modus vivendi must be found for people who were put on earth to live, and a way must be found to enable them to exist side by side without being at one another's throats."

MORSE (D., Ore.): "I do not believe escalating the war will produce peace. . . . We should face the fact that humanity cannot survive another world war. . . . The proposal to take it to the Security Council comes at least 2½ years late. It is extremely unfortunate that at the same time he has renewed the air raids on North Vietnam, for this will make it far more difficult for the UN."

YOUNG (R., N.D.): "With our limited resources, both in manpower and financially, we should not be picking out an area to fight the Communists where they have all the advantages and we all the disadvantages, as in Vietnam."

COOPER (R., Ky.): "I am one of those who believe that the bombing should not have been resumed—at least for the present. . . . We should support him [the President] in his

efforts to secure action by the United Nations."

GORE (D., Tenn.): "There are many voices in Washington today who say that it would be easier to knock out China now than it would be 10 years from today. . . . I was in Congress after the end of World War II, and I heard voices giving the same message, from the identical sources from which I hear them now. It will be better, they then said, to knock out Russia now than to wait until she has nuclear weapons. Fortunately we did not follow the advice of preventive war then. There has been some rapprochement; we are not now threatening to destroy each other. . . . If the extremists do not prevail, there is yet hope for mankind."

CLARK (D., Pa.): "Resumption of the bombing of North Vietnam and escalation of the war in South Vietnam through a policy of search and destroy makes the achievement of these major objectives of our foreign policy [peaceful co-existence, an end to wars of national liberation, a solution to the German problem, a non-proliferation treaty, a test ban treaty, a stay on the deployment of anti-missile missiles, and meaningful progress on disarmament] difficult if not impossible."

KENNEDY (D., N.Y.): "Our objectives in Vietnam can be gained only by what we do in the South . . . to show the people of that unhappy land . . . that the defeat of the Vietcong will lead to a better life for themselves. . . . If we regard bombing as the answer in Vietnam—we are headed straight for disaster. In the past bombing has not proved a decisive weapon against a rural economy—or against a guerrilla army. . . . The danger is that the decision to resume may become the first in a series of steps on a road from which there is no turning back—a road which leads to catastrophe for all mankind."

The Terrible Meaning of McNamara's Request for More Ammunition

(Continued from Page One)

"officials believe there was increased infiltration of men and supplies during the bombing pause, but the figures they cited do not clearly demonstrate this." He said their estimates of enemy numbers after the 37-day pause was "about the same estimate" given Senator Mansfield in Vietnam last Fall and embodied in the report he submitted in December. "Nor," Norris added, "has there been any significant recent increase in anti-aircraft missiles and guns in North Vietnam, it was said." The best that came out of this briefing from the Administration's point of view was that "This assessment fits into earlier reports," as Trehitt noted, "that a longer pause would begin to reflect military disadvantage for the South." (Our italics). But what of the military disadvantage—and the increased loss of American lives—if resumption of bombing leads the North and the Viet Cong, as it did last year, to raise the level of the fighting?

How LBJ Plays Peking's Game

The available evidence indicates that we used the lull and the truce to ease our own supply problems and build up strength for a renewed push forward. The peace offensive and the appeal to the UN are only a cover for our own expansion and escalation of the war. But again, even from the point of view of those in the Administration who want a military victory in Vietnam, its conduct is clumsy and self-defeating. It bears all the earmarks of hasty improvisation to give "a little something to everybody." What we mean by self-defeating is this: A major objective of China's policy is to avoid its isolation in a confrontation with the U.S. A major objective of U.S. policy was to isolate China by widening the split between Peking and Moscow. This was why the President in his State of the Union message called for an easing of restrictions on our trade with Eastern Europe. It does not make sense to woo Russia and then a few weeks later put the Russians on the spot by a last minute appeal to the UN. Publicly Moscow cannot urge Hanoi to negotiate without exposing itself to charges of collusion from Peking. A public debate at the UN must widen the gap between

Blacked Out in the U.S. Press

Rising Roman Catholic opposition in South Vietnam to continuance of the war has yet to be reported in the U.S. press. In Paris the pro-American *Le Figaro* in its Jan. 8-9 issue carried a French agency press dispatch from Saigon saying that 11 Vietnamese Catholic priests had just issued a manifesto appealing to authorities of both the North and South "to end this fratricidal war." The priests said, "The state of disorder created by the war with the presence of foreign troops has put the masses in economic, social and moral conditions unworthy of men." The *London Observer* (Jan. 23) also quotes a statement issued by the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Saigon Jan. 12 condemning the "political vacuum" in the South. The Government, the Archbishop protested, "is still unable to create a firm legal foundation or obtain the support of the people. This is a most serious obstacle in the path to peace." Why does none of this appear in the U.S. press?

Moscow and Washington. To that extent it serves Peking's purpose, which is to block a Russo-American detente and force a Russo-American confrontation over Vietnam. If war comes, Peking does not wish to face it alone. Hilsman in his Feb. 1 testimony expressed the view that we were headed for war with China, and that if the war resulted from U.S. escalation Moscow would come to Peking's aid "and," he said, "with nuclear weapons if necessary."

The course on which we are embarked will also be self-defeating in the South. Secretary McNamara, in explaining to the Senate Armed Services Committee why the Administration was asking \$4.1 billion for ammunition alone in the fiscal year ending this June 30, said the purpose was "a massive application of firepower to enhance the effectiveness of our forces and reduce casualties." At the December rate (as Don Oberdorfer pointed out in the *Chicago Daily News* Jan. 22) we will be dropping more bombs on Vietnam this fiscal year (480,000 tons) than we did on Korea (418,000 tons) in the three years of that conflict and more than two-thirds as much as the U.S. Air Force in the entire Pacific Theatre in four years of World War II (650,000 tons). This is no way to win the people. It is not pacification. It is genocide.

We'll Be Glad to Send A Sample Copy of This Issue To A Friend — Send A Stamped Addressed Envelope

**I. F. Stone's Weekly 5618 Nebraska Ave., N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20015**

Please renew (or enter) a sub for the enclosed \$5:

Name

Street

CityZone.....State.....

2/7/66

For the enclosed \$5 send a gift sub to:

(To) Name

Street

CityZone.....State.....

For \$5.35 extra send I. F. Stone's *The Haunted Fifties*

Indicate if announcement wished

I. F. Stone's Weekly

**5618 Nebraska Ave., N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20015**

**Second class
postage paid
at
Washington, D. C.**

NEWSPAPER

I. F. Stone's Weekly. Second Class Postage Paid at Washington, D. C. Published every Monday except in August, the last week in December and the first week in January and Bi-Weekly during July at 5618 Nebraska Ave. N.W., Washington, D. C. An independent weekly published and edited by I. F. Stone; Circulation Manager, Esther M. Stone. Subscription: \$5 in the U.S.; \$6 in Canada; \$10 elsewhere. Air Mail rates: \$15 to Europe; \$20 to Israel, Asia and Africa.