

Once Our Military Has Counted Them Dead, The Least They Could Do Is Fall Over

"Once Hanoi understands that it cannot win, the Washington theory holds, it is bound to recall its forces. . . . That same information is read in Saigon against abundant evidence that the North Vietnamese forces continue to seek

offensive positions; that they do not divulge to Hanoi and may not even believe that they have been hurt as much as the American command thinks it has hurt them."

—Max Frankel from Saigon, New York Times, Nov. 23.

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The Arab Challenge To Jewish Magnanimity

"Violence breeds violence. . . . This large-scale military action cannot be justified, explained away or excused by the incidents which preceded it. . . . This is not a new attitude on the part of my Government. My government has expressed itself about retaliatory raids in the past." The sentiment was unexceptionable. The speaker was Ambassador Goldberg. The occasion was the meeting of the Security Council to hear Jordan's complaint against Israel. The very same words apply to the U.S. bombings of North Vietnam. Not a single one of the great Powers which condemned Israel for its reprisal raid into Jordan has failed to take the law into its own hands when it felt its national interest at stake. The most melodramatic occasion was in 1956 when the Soviet Union sent troops into Hungary, and kidnapped and murdered its Prime Minister, Nagy, after he had the temerity to ask the United Nations to safeguard its newly declared neutrality. The U.S., as Mr. Goldberg said, has made its opposition to reprisals known, but only when committed by others. It condemned France for its reprisal raid into Tunisia in 1958 and disapproved of Britain's reprisal raid into Yemen in 1963.

71 Attacks in 2 Years

Yet Israel is not trying to hold an empire. Its people are defending their homes. "There have been 71 such attacks since January 1965," Israel's representative, Michael Comay, told the Security Council on Nov. 16, "partly across the Syrian border and partly across the borders of neighboring Arab states." There have been dozens of attacks, including the dynamiting of apartment houses within the city of Jerusalem itself. Israel's danger, Mr. Comay said, lies in "the organization, training and use of para-military guerrilla and terrorist forces, designed to operate in Israeli territory in advance of a future military showdown with regular forces." In his support Mr. Comay was able to quote the UN Secretary General's latest report (Sept. 1) on the UN Emergency Forces in which he expressed concern over Egyptian recruitment and training of a 12,000-man "Liberation Army" in the Gaza strip.

But Israel cannot find peace by behaving in the Middle East as if it were the American Wild West of a century ago. Reprisal is abhorrent, it punishes the innocent with the guilty. The predictable effect has been to inflame enmity in a fresh spiral of hatred. The Arab demonstrations in the West bank Jordanian cities underscore the political folly of the raid. For Jordan is the only Arab State which benefitted from the crea-

A Hopeless War?

"The war against the guerrillas in the countryside has not yet really begun. . . . The influence of the Saigon government seems not to grow at all. . . . Some Americans insist there is less effective presence in the villages now than there was three years ago. . . . The pacification program . . . all but fell on its face in 1966. . . . Real domestic output has been going down steadily. . . . Ravages of war are one reason, dislocation of peasants is another. . . . One of every six military men desert in the course of a year. . . . The Viet Cong continue to levy taxes of one form or another in every Province in South Vietnam, including Saigon. . . . Saigon's land reform program . . . has never really been put in motion. In the secure areas, tenant farmers—that means 70% of all farmers in the Delta—still are forced to pay up to 50% and more of their rice crop to absentee landlords. . . . A law on the books since 1955 sets the limit at 25%."

—"Vietnam—A Hopeless War?" a 10-page special report in U.S. News & World Report, Dec. 5.

tion of a Jewish state in Palestine, and Jordan is the only Arab state which will lose if Israel is destroyed. The original UN partition plan, as voted 19 years ago, called for the creation of twin Arab and Jewish states in the territory of Palestine. The Arab states, in defiance of the UN decisions, began to send their troops into Palestine to destroy the Jewish State even before the plan could take effect the following May. In the expectation that the Jewish communities would be overwhelmed, no steps were taken to set up an Arab State. When the Arabs were defeated, Jordan annexed the lands and peoples on the West bank of the Jordan which would have been the heart of Arab Palestine. These are the lands Jordan will lose should an Arab Palestine be established. The more advanced Palestinians have long resented rule by this desert monarchy. This is the most precarious Arab regime in the Middle East, the one which has been most cooperative with the UN truce commission. If the consequences are to topple this regime, the result may be a chain reaction of instability in this most dangerous area of Soviet-American rivalry. Arab oil is far more important to U.S. interests than the "face" our military bureaucracy would lose by a negotiated peace in Vietnam and the focus of world tension could shift overnight.

(Continued on Page Four)

Now We Learn Bombers Were Being Ordered to Thailand and Combat Troops Readied

While Johnson Was Making Those "No Wider War" Speeches in 1964

There were two important revelations in the censored transcript of the Tonkin Bay resolution hearing finally released on Thanksgiving Day (when fewer people read the papers and it would attract a minimum of attention). The first lay in the anxiety of the State and Defense Departments to censor out not only answers but questions bearing on the events which set off what Secretary McNamara called "the unprovoked and deliberate attacks" on U.S. destroyers off North Vietnam on August 2 and 4, 1964.

How to Elude the Censor

On the opposite page, readers will see how the censor's blanks can be filled in from the Senate speeches made by Senator Morse on August 5 and 6, 1964. We can thus see that the attacks, far from being deliberate and unprovoked, followed attacks on North Vietnamese coastal islands by South Vietnamese naval vessels under the watchful eye of our own naval vessels inside the North Vietnamese 12-mile limit.

The more important revelation lies in McNamara's secret report on Aug. 6, 1964, now released for the first time. This shows (see box below) that under cover of this attack, the Administration took far-reaching steps to escalate the war. *Fighter-bomber aircraft were ordered into Thailand whence they were soon to be ordered to bomb North Vietnam.* Army and Marine forces were alerted for movement to South Vietnam where hitherto we had not had combat troops.

Some of the bombers and combat troops must have already reached their battle stations when Johnson almost two months later, Sept. 25, 1964, told the American electorate "We don't want American boys to do the fighting for Asian boys . . . and get tied down in a land war in Asia," and three days later "we are not going north and drop bombs at this stage of the game. . . . We are going to continue to try to get them to save their own freedom with their own men."

Who would have been cynical enough to suspect that "at this stage of the game" might mean only until the election was over and Goldwater defeated? *Who would have thought that the government could engage in secret preparations to do*

So We Got Ready to Do Exactly What Japan and Our Other Allies Hoped We Wouldn't

Sen. Smathers: Two questions: First, what has been—or is it too early to determine—the reaction of our action in Japan, and the Philippines? I am particularly interested in those two areas.

Sec. Rusk: The government of the Philippines gave us whole-hearted support on this, very glad to see the action taken. In Japan the attitude was that taken in many countries around the world, complete understanding of the necessity of the action.

The Japanese Government referred to this as inevitable, this response. But on the other hand expressed some strong hope that this itself would not lead to a major escalation of the war. We have had that right around the world, a high degree of understanding of the necessity for the counter-action, and also a hope that it will not escalate."

—Newly released transcript of the Tonkin Bay resolution hearing before Senate Foreign Relations Aug. 6, 1964.

"In view of the unprovoked and deliberate attacks in international waters on our naval vessels and bearing in mind that the best way to deter escalation is to be prepared for

What McNamara Called A Limited Reprisal

" . . . the destroyers relayed messages stating that they had avoided a number of torpedoes, that they had been under repeated attack, and that they had sunk two of the attacking craft. By midnight local time, the destroyers reported that, even though many torpedoes had been fired at them, they had suffered no hits nor casualties. . . .

"The U.S. military response was carefully planned and effectively carried out. . . . These reprisal attacks . . . were limited in scale . . . our naval air forces launched 64 sortie attacks against 4 North Vietnamese patrol boat bases and against a major supporting oil storage depot. . . . 10% of North Vietnam's petroleum storage capacity was 90% destroyed. . . . Some 25 North Vietnamese patrol boats were destroyed or damaged." —McNamara's report to Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees.

When Senator Sparkman asked the Secretary whether North Vietnam had a navy, McNamara replied that it "has had about 12 patrol boats known as PT-4s, and something on the order of 30 similar type boats known as Swatow boats, something on the order of 40 to 50 patrol-type vessels." So this one reprisal raid wrecked half of its entire navy. Quite a reprisal for an attack in which we suffered not a single hit or casualty.

exactly what the President was telling us in the campaign he would not do? That the members of these two Senate committees, with the exception only of Senator Morse, would favorably report out a resolution giving Johnson a blank check for wider war even after hearing this testimony? As disturbing as Johnson's duplicity is Senatorial acquiescence in secret government. The Pentagon and State are able to draw Senate committees into a conspiracy of silence against the people's supposed right to know what is happening to them. Isn't it time to challenge a system of secrecy which makes the military the masters of policy? The material on these two pages is devoted to its exposure. For few if any newspapers reported what was in this transcript when finally released.

it, the President and his principal advisers concluded that additional precautionary measures were required in Southeast Asia. Certain military deployments to the area are therefore now underway. These include:

"a. Transfer of an attack carrier group from the Pacific Coast to the Western Pacific;

"b. Movement of interceptor and fighter bomber aircraft into South Vietnam;

"c. MOVEMENT OF FIGHTER BOMBER AIRCRAFT INTO THAILAND (emphasis added);

"d. Transfer of interceptor and fighter bomber squadrons from the U.S. to advance bases in the Pacific.

"e. Movement of an anti-submarine force into the South China Sea;

"f. The altering and readying for movement of selected Army and Marine forces."

—Statement to the Committee by McNamara at pp. 6-7 of the hearing, disclosing for the first time the extensive escalation prepared under cover of the Tonkin Bay incidents and kept secret during the election campaign.

What the Government Tried to Black Out of That Tonkin Bay Hearing Record**Maybe the Pentagon Had Better Censor the Congressional Record, Too**

"In going over the transcript [of the Aug. 6, 1964 hearing before Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Tonkin Bay resolution] as approved by the Executive Branch, I noted that all references were deleted to the point I raised early in the hearing concerning the raids made on North Vietnamese islands by South Vietnamese war vessels shortly before the incident between the Maddox and the North Vietnamese torpedo boats. By no stretch of the imagination is this security information, since there were published accounts of the raids. I can understand why the Administration wants to cover up any mention of these raids in the official records of the Committee's deliberations on the Southeast Asia resolution, but I resent the attempt to delete my comments about the subject when they were not in any way based on information from official sources."

—Sen. Morse in letter to Secretary Rusk, Sept. 16, 1966.

"The reason for doing so was that these questions, while not classified in themselves, were questions to which classified answers were given. . . . I can assure you that these recommended deletions were not in any way an attempt at censorship. . . ."

—Ass't Secy MacArthur replying Sept. 22, 1966.

Sec. McNAMARA: I would like to cover three points. 1st, [deleted]. The Maddox was operating in international waters, was carrying out a routine patrol of the type we carry out all over the world at all times. [Deleted]. I think it is extremely important that you understand this. If there is any misunderstanding on that we should discuss this point at some length.

Sen. MORSE: I think we should.

Sec. McNAMARA: I say this flatly; this is a fact.

Sen. MORSE: What was your testimony the other day, Mr. Secretary, on the record [deleted].

Sec. McNAMARA: I testified the other day that the American vessels were, or the American vessel was—it was the Maddox at that time—was operating on a southerly course in routine patrol in international waters in this area [deleted].

Sen. MORSE: [Deleted]. * * *

Sec. CARLSON: As I gather this attack on the USS Maddox was a surprise. Press reports indicate there is a continuous infiltration of Southern Vietnamese into North Vietnam. [Deleted.] How good is our intelligence in this area?

Sec. McNAMARA: This is such a highly classified subject, Senator Carlson, it is difficult for me to answer your question fully.

Sen. CARLSON: I will not ask you to discuss it then.

Sec. McNAMARA: [Deleted]. * * *

Sen. CHURCH: Secretary Rusk . . . there is one other area here raised by Senator Morse to some degree [deleted].

Sec. RUSK: [Deleted.]

Sen. MORSE: Could I ask one question of fact on patrol? [Four pages later he finally gets his chance.] I thought he ought to tell us in the establishment of patrols of our ships, how close they will come to the North Vietnam border. The other day the Secretary testified that the ships at a time were within 11 miles, which shows we did not recognize their 12-mile limit. . . .

Sec. RUSK: [Deleted] miles.

Gen. WHEELER: [Deleted] miles is the answer.

Sen. MORSE: I just want to say it is too close if you want to keep yourself in position and not be subject to the charge of provocation.

—From the transcript as now released Nov. 24, 1966.

"In a very recent incident which was the forerunner to the attacks on American destroyers in the Tonkin Bay, it is known that South Vietnamese naval vessels bombarded two North Vietnamese islands within 3 to 5 or 6 miles off the main coast. . . . While the South Vietnamese vessels were

Widening the Credibility Gap

"The determination of the Administration to rewrite the history of relations between North and South Vietnam was never more evident than it was in Secretary McNamara's statement, on p. 26 of the hearing, that he knew nothing of any desire on the part of South Vietnam to 'go north.' . . . Yet the views of President Diem on this matter were well known. . . . On July 16, 1955, the government of Diem announced its refusal to meet with representatives of North Vietnam to lay plans for the elections to unify the country called for by the 1954 Geneva agreement. It used these words, ' . . . The mission falls to us, the Nationalists, to accomplish the reunification of our country. . . . To those who live above the 17th Parallel, I ask them to have confidence. With the agreement and the backing of the free world, the National Government will bring you independence in freedom.' In 1958 the Diem government created the Committee for the Liberation of North Vietnam. Is it possible that all this was really unknown to Secretary McNamara in 1964? What is left of his discussion with Senator Carlson [see this page] suggests that he knew something of the activities South Vietnam was carrying on against the North in pursuance of its announced intentions. The Vietnam credibility gap is further widened, not only by what was left in this particular hearing record, but by what was taken out."

—From Morse's press release of Nov. 24 protesting the censorship of the Tonkin Bay Senate hearing.

attacking the North Vietnamese islands, the newspapers tell us that U.S. vessels of war were patrolling Tonkin Bay, presumably some 6 to 11 miles off the shore of North Vietnam. Was the U.S. Navy standing guard while vessels of South Vietnam shelled North Vietnam? That is the clear implication of the incident. . . . The U.S. also knew that the South Vietnamese vessels planned to bomb, and did bomb, two North Vietnamese islands within 3 to 6 miles off the coast of North Vietnam. . . . It should be unnecessary to point out either to the Senate or the American people what the position of the U.S. and its people would be if the tables were reversed and Soviet warships and submarines were to patrol 5 to 11 miles at sea while Cuban vessels bombarded Key West."

—Morse in the Senate August 5, 1964.

"We knew for quite some time that the dictator of South Vietnam has wanted to go north. We know that recently there was a big demonstration in Saigon, staged pretty much by students, but there were others, and in response to a speech made by Dictator Khanh, the cry was 'Go north, go north, go north' which meant escalating the war into North Vietnam. . . .

"On Friday, July 31, the war was escalated to the North. That is not a matter of infiltration. That is not a matter of junks trying to bring in supplies. That is not a matter of South Vietnamese people being slipped into North Vietnam or of North Vietnamese intelligence agents being slipped into South Vietnam. This was a well-thought out military operation. These islands were bombed. When these islands were bombed, American destroyers were on patrol in Tonkin Bay, and they were not 60 or 65 miles away. . . .

"If Senators want my opinion, a 'snowjob' is being done on us by the Pentagon and the State Department in regard to that bombardment. Not only had we full knowledge of it, but it was being done with our tacit approval. If we did not want to escalate the war into North Vietnam, that was the time for the U.S. to stop escalating."

—Morse in the Senate next day Aug. 6, 1964.

No Easy Answers in the Middle East

(Continued from Page One)

Nothing could be more ludicrous than the idea that this deteriorating situation can be shorn up by giving 36 new model jets to King Hussein, or by sending the Sixth Fleet to the scene. This is a political crisis and it can only be met by political means. The United Nations has become a kind of world Oxford debating union. As Chief Adebo of Nigeria said in the debate on the Jordanian complaint, "The Security Council, in a spirit of self-complacency bordering on self-deception, seeks to conclude each and every one of its deliberations by merely formulating a resolution." In the earlier October debate on the Israeli complaint against Syria, when a Soviet veto blocked a judgment that might have calmed the spirit of desperation on the Israeli side, the Nigerian said peace depended on "the readiness of the great Powers to deal with this problem outside of the 'cold war' context and purely with the future happiness of the parties to the dispute." Again, in the Jordanian debate, the wise Nigerian urged that "to bring stable peace to the Middle East" it was essential "to tackle the Palestine problem as a whole and not piecemeal on the basis of incidents and reprisals." It was this failure to deal with the broader aspects of the problem which led New Zealand to abstain on the final vote, and the Netherlands to express its dissatisfaction.

Never in 15 Years

The Israeli have been taught by a bitter history that the UN acts only when they take up arms. If not for their own efforts, they would have been overwhelmed in 1948. In 1956 their Suez campaign destroyed the Soviet arms stockpiled for their destruction and at least forced the UN to end Egypt's illegal blockade of their only outlet to the Eastern seas on the Gulf of Akaba. The Security Council has never in 15 years been able to adopt a resolution on Israel's complaints. The question for Israel is one of survival. But the moral tragedy for world Jewry is that we could not make homes for our postwar refugees without making three quarters of a million kindred people homeless. No solution can be found until we Jews ourselves are willing to face up to the problem in

Stennis Questions LBJ's Asian Policy

"North Vietnam is a small, non-industrial nation with a population of only 17 million. . . . It has practically no Navy or Air Force. Yet we have had to commit more than 425,000 men on land and sea. . . . There are reliable estimates that indicate 750,000 may be required, and that the war might continue for many years. . . . We must win the war or an honorable settlement . . . however, I think we must begin now to seriously consider whether our long-term national interests lie in Asia. . . . The Asian population totals almost 2 billion. Ours is only 193,000,000. A third-rate nation there now has us pinned down and is heavily draining our resources. . . . The culture, religion, philosophy, traditions and the way of life . . . are greatly different from ours. . . . The burden of providing the economic and military needs of that area is far too great. . . . Our genuine long-term national interest, I believe, lies in those areas of the world which historically have been of importance to us. . . . Latin America . . . Western Europe."

—Sen. Stennis to the Miss. Mfrs. Assoc., Nov. 4.

all its terrible three-dimensional human complexity and that means to see it through Arab eyes as well as our own. They see it, as Mr. El-Farrah of Jordan told the Security Council, as "the forcible occupation of territory from its rightful owners by foreigners" and "the refusal of the occupying authority to permit repatriation." The Israeli look at their open borders and fear extinction. The Arab refugees—in bitterness and frustration that also commands our understanding and pity—see their lost farms and homes. Until their just claims have been met there can be no peace in the area. This struggle of right against right offers no easy solutions, but it holds great dangers for world peace. These might be averted by a fresh effort on the part of the whole world Jewish community to resolve the Arab refugee problem. Peace also requires the two great Powers to suspend their rivalries in the area, and permit a program of repatriation and compensation as part of a final settlement in a neutralized Middle East, in which Arab and Jew can be reconciled. The likelihood is slight, and the outlook dim.

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