

G.O.P. Senator Berates Administration for Taking A Run-Out Powder on the Teach-In

"Could it have been that such a momentous crisis was brewing Saturday afternoon that the White House, the Department of State, and the Defense Department could not produce even one spokesman to defend their policies in Vietnam to an audience, live and hooked-in, of tens of thousands of persons? . . . Is our policy in Southeast Asia so

indefensible that no one in Mr. Bundy's absence could meet the attacks of earnest critics? Is the Administration so unsure of itself? . . . Whatever may have been said about Senator Goldwater, as President he would not have been afraid to level with the American people."

—Prouty (R. Vt.) in the Senate May 17.

I. F. Stone's Weekly

VOL. XIII, NO. 20

MAY 24, 1965



WASHINGTON, D. C.

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An Elephantine Power With More Muscle Than Brain

We may have the world's largest and most expensive military-intelligence-diplomatic apparatus, but it is also probably the world's clumsiest. The Bay of Pigs was the first warning that this apparatus was not too competent. Events in the Dominican Republic are the second. We have again been made to appear in Latin American eyes not as a paper tiger but as an elephantine power with more muscle than brain. First we attack the constitutionalist forces as Communistic, then we turn around and try to purge the military junta and bring the pro-Bosch forces into a new government of men *we* have picked. Now neither side trusts us.

The Computers Are A Menace

One of the casualties of the Dominican affair is the cherished theory of Tom Mann, Johnson's top official for Latin America, that the military provide the most stable basis on which to build. One Latin American diplomat in Santo Domingo told Barnard L. Collier acidly (*New York Herald-Tribune*, May 19) the "big worry" of the Communists in the future "is going to be that the U.S. Marines might *not* intervene." The size of our forces in the Dominican Republic evoked derision. "I could understand a thousand, maybe 2,000 troops," Collier quoted another diplomat as saying, "But to bring in 30,000—that is ludicrous. What you have done is put the Communists wise to the fact that 100 well-trained agitators can tie up divisions of U.S. troops." When Collier asked U.S. military spokesmen about the massive troop buildup they said "that once an operation of the Dominican type goes into the computers there is no simple way to trim the size of the U.S. force that must be committed." All of us may one day be fed into those same computers.

In Vietnam lack of perimeter patrols and other elementary precautions enabled the guerrillas to kill five Americans, wound 76 others and destroy or damage 27 planes at Bien Hoa air base last November. Now explosions have killed at least 21 Americans and destroyed or damaged another 40 planes at the same base. In an angry letter in the Congressional Record May 18 (pps. 10520-1) Congressman Minshall (R. Ohio) demanded an investigation. "There is a history of bungling," he wrote, "throughout the entire Vietnam operation, but I could not conceive of such grievous mismanagement. . . . The cardinal rules of dispersal and revetment obviously were completely ignored. Our planes were stacked

Goldwater Hops Aboard LBJ's Gunboat

"Gunboat diplomacy is the only name for the action in which the U.S. is now engaged. And it's about time. . . . The Dominican operation began on the flimsy excuse of protecting American civilians in that area. But it rapidly became obvious that . . . the U.S. Marines . . . are carrying out a policy operation. This became clear when the President announced what close observers of the situation had known from the first shot, that the revolutionary forces were armed, trained and controlled by Castro Communists."

—Barry Goldwater in *N. Y. Herald Tribune* May 16.

"The CIA now says Dominican revolutionaries were being trained in Cuba and they knew it all the time. But when I was in Havana a few months ago I saw plenty of Venezuelan and other Latin revolutionaries, but no Dominicans, and the Dominican Republic was not even mentioned by Cuban officials. . . . And the Cubans are not addicted to keeping secrets. . . . There is reason to believe that the Communists were not even aware that the pro-Bosch counter coup was likely to occur."

—J. Halcro Ferguson, *Latin American* editor of the *London Observer* in its May 9 issue.

like dominoes at the air base, lined up like sitting ducks for enemy attack." Whatever the mistakes, we are sure the military will find some way to "classify" them.

Our diplomacy seems to be as inept. The differences among Peking, Moscow, Hanoi and the Viet Cong are real. But we utilize them so crudely as to defeat our purposes. One can be played against the other to modify the terms of settlement but none can be put in the position of "selling out" the others. The cessation of bombing raids may have been mainly intended to clear the way for a talk between Rusk and Gromyko at Vienna over the week-end but the latter brushed Rusk off while ostentatiously giving Couve de Murville a two hour breakfast. Now the raids are resuming, this time with economic targets. The U.S., presumably, the AP said (*Washington Star*, May 19) "would have been satisfied if the Communists stopped the flow of arms and recruits to the Viet Cong in the South." What this asked in effect was to leave the Viet Cong wholly at the mercy of American military power. The stage is now set for wider war on the excuse that Hanoi has rejected U.S. peace terms.

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The White House Outsmarted Itself and Put the Spotlight on The Teach-In . . .

The Washington teach-in was both the dupe and the beneficiary of White House manipulation. In order to obtain McGeorge Bundy's agreement to debate, the committee in charge made no less than 30 different changes in program and panels. Bundy even insisted on vetoing the committee's choice of who was to debate with him. He declined to match wits with Prof. Hans Morgenthau, perhaps because Bundy would be unable to treat so respected a senior political scientist with the crisp condescension which is Bundy's stock in trade. All was arranged to suit his wishes; this was reflected in Bundy's last-minute regrets when he said the program was "fair to a fault." On the other hand, it was because the President's right hand man on foreign policy was expected to take part that the teach-in obtained such widespread commercial TV, radio and press coverage. In this respect the White House outsmarted itself. It put the spotlight on the meeting and Bundy's failure to appear made it look as if the Administration was unwilling to stand up to its critics in a fair debate.

Will Bundy Accept The New Challenge?

Whether Johnson felt that Bundy simply had to go to Santo Domingo or seized on this as a last-minute excuse is not something one can determine from the outside. But if the Dominican emergency was the real reason, some other official could have come in his place and read his speech for him. Instead all the White House sent was Bundy's statement of regret. The suspicion that the Administration was only looking for an excuse to back out may easily be countered. All it need do is permit Bundy on his return to accept the university committee's challenge to reschedule the debate.

Whatever the White House does, the teach-in should be extended from the campuses to as many local communities as possible. The organizers should emphasize the difference between the Washington teach-in and the kind of foreign policy seminars the State Department organizes. These, preferably, are semi-private briefings in which (as in the closed party meetings in the Soviet Union) only the official line is expounded. Even the wider public forums on foreign policy which

Smaller NATO Nations Disturbed

"M. Fanfani (Italy), in spite of his sympathy for Washington, insisted on the necessity of a political solution in Vietnam and on the danger of putting impossible choices before the USSR in Southeast Asia. . . . M. Lange (Norway) emphasized the fears inspired by 'escalation' in Vietnam. He was equally clear about the Dominican affair, observing that a country of the size of Norway could not approve the philosophy underlying the landing of the Marines in Santo Domingo. M. Haekkerup (Denmark) . . . basing himself on his experience in a recent visit to East Africa, cautioned his colleagues against an attitude of excessive suspicion toward the young countries of the 'third world.' Its leaders, though not Communist today, could finish by becoming so if treated as such by the Western countries."

—*Le Monde* (May 13) on the NATO Council meeting.

the State Department helps to organize around the country are notable for the absence of any real opposing point of view. The Department prefers these brain-washing operations to genuine debate. In this it fits perfectly with the Johnson Administration.

While some Administration officials of minor rank took part in the evening panels, the only defenders of its point of view in the morning and afternoon sessions were other academicians. There was no one who could speak for the Administration. Even Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., who debated Prof. Morgenthau at the morning session, turned out to be not a spokesman for the White House but for the opposition bloc beginning to form around the two Kennedy brothers in the Senate.

The pointed asides of this "defender" must have rankled more with the White House than the attacks he was supposed to be answering. Schlesinger said Johnson's speech the preceding Thursday promising economic aid for Vietnam was merely an echo of Bobby Kennedy's speech in the Senate the day before; that after reading the White Paper he reflected on the gullibility of Secretaries of State; that he did not approve of

A Picture of Walt Rostow in Action On A Washington Teach-In Panel

Walt W. Rostow, Chairman of the State Department's Policy Planning Council, was the highest government official to turn up at the teach-in on the Vietnamese war. He spoke at the panel on "The Making of American Foreign Policy" and appeared to be complacent and impenetrable under criticism. Stanley Hoffman, Professor of Government at Harvard and one of the panelists, said afterwards with a shrug of his shoulders, "He (Rostow) was a man standing in the rain and yet completely rainproof."

Hoffman was Rostow's most telling critic on the panel. He said that instead of taking as his reference Rostow's latest book, *View From The 7th Floor* (of the State Department), he would prefer to use the book Rostow wrote while looking at U.S. policy from the windows of M.I.T. In *The United States and The World Arena*, according to Hoffman, Rostow argued that "every revolutionary war is prima facie evidence of the failure of social and economic reform." "Do we really believe," Hoffman asked in a ques-

tion that went to the heart of Rostow's optimism about the war, "that a force independent of the Viet Cong exists on which to build the socio-economic reforms we talk about and, if not, do we believe—as the French mistakenly believed in Vietnam and Algeria—that such a force can be created in the midst of war?"

Rostow acted as if he hadn't heard Hoffman and as if there was no need to explain the contradiction between his earlier analysis and his current positions. When Professor Morgenthau said U.S. policy was stuck in a bureaucratic rut, Rostow responded, "I do not believe the foreign policy of the United States has been static. . . . I believe it has been applied with great imagination in Latin America." He was discreetly silent about the Marines in Santo Domingo. Rostow talked with nostalgia about his recent trip to Japan but did not mention the anti-U.S. demonstrations that forced him to cut his visit short. He said kind things about the Japanese press without acknowledging that it is almost unanimously opposed to U.S. action in Vietnam.

... Campus Awakening Is Making Democracy Meaningful on The No. 1 Issue

the bombing of North Vietnam and that "if we took the Marines we now have in the Dominican Republic and sent them to South Vietnam, we'd be a good deal better off in both countries." It was clear from Schlesinger's speech that Johnson, in winning Goldwater, had lost the ADA.

How the CIA Got Its Man

Prof. Hans Morgenthau charged that instead of a two-party system in foreign policy the Administration sought what it "euphemistically called consensus," and that the "spontaneous movement" represented by the teach-ins was filling the function of a parliamentary opposition. He said that instead of policy being based on facts, facts were being distorted to fit policy. He said he warned Diem in 1955 that if he continued his repressive policies he would finally have no support left outside his own family. He said one of the members of the afternoon panel had located Diem in a monastery in this country "and presented him to the CIA" in 1954.

Isaac Deutscher, the third speaker at the morning session, said he spoke as "an unrepentant Marxist." He said he wanted to put the crisis in perspective by reviewing some of the assumptions underlying the cold war: "As long as we accept them, we will go from crisis to crisis." The principal one was that of a military threat from the Communist powers. He said the Truman Doctrine and NATO were based on the myth of a Russian military threat to Europe. "Propaganda pictured two colossi," the biographer of Stalin and Trotsky said, "but if we looked closely one saw a difference. The U.S. had emerged from the war with barely a scratch while Russia was prostrate and bleeding profusely. It had suffered 20 million dead alone and had only 31 million men against 53 million women. Russia was physically unable to be a military threat to anyone. I have been all my life a critic of Stalin for lack of freedom but he was no menace to the peace of the world. That was a myth inflated to apocalyptic dimensions." Deutscher saw a similar myth about China in the propaganda of the Vietnamese war. Deutscher concluded by saying that the class struggle had degenerated into the morass of power

Looks Like We're Not So Popular

"I have listened to testimony here for the last several years on Vietnam and it develops now that about two-thirds of South Vietnam is definitely under the control of the Viet Cong. Preceding witnesses have said that one of the major problems is that the people who do damage at night hide among the people next day. When we go down the streets we cannot tell which one shot us up and which one did not because apparently nobody reports on anybody.

"When it develops that our bases of operation are surrounded by territory that is under the control of the South Vietnamese [sic, apparently he meant Viet Cong] and in some instances, to say the least we do not have enough land to protect ourselves—if I could look at this thing objectively, it would take a whole lot more than that to convince me that there was any real desire on the part of the South Vietnamese people to keep us there. It would appear the South Vietnamese people are not too strong for us."

—Whitten (D. Miss.) in House Military Appropriations hearings for 1966 p. 419 released May 14.

politics, into a struggle of oligarchies, one falsely under the banner of socialism, one falsely under the banner of freedom. He spoke a language Washington has not heard in public since the cold war and the witch hunt began two decades ago.

The afternoon session, which was fully covered in the *New York Times* Monday, May 17, was a little disappointing. The panel method gave none of the participants adequate time for a full exposition. The discussion tended, as in TV panel shows, to fly off in all directions. I was a "resource person" (horrid phrase) on a panel myself in the evening on the origins of the war and the nature of the Viet Cong. It's difficult to be both a reporter and a participant even on a small scale. It was an inspiring occasion. Those intense and concerned young faces, eager to learn, filled one with new hope. The teach-in movement is making democracy meaningful on the one issue where it has counted least and is needed most. The intellectuals are beginning to do their duty.

A Peasant and A Middle Class Answer to A Key Assertion by Prof. Scalapino

"Does the Vietcong really command the support and allegiance of the people of South Vietnam? I think again, though the answer is complicated, the answer on balance must be no."

—Prof. Scalapino at the Washington teach-in, May 17.

"It would be a serious mistake to consider Communist power in South Vietnam as based predominantly on terrorism or military strength, or even upon the indifference of an ignorant peasantry. . . . The fact is that Communism, in the dress of nationalism and its advocacy of land to the peasants, represents a powerful force in South Vietnam, and one which receives widespread support from the peasant population. . . . The peasantry is not so much a pawn or a prize as it is the arbiter in the struggle between Communist and anti-Communist nationalism."

—South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress (pps. 158-9) by Prof. Robert Scigliano who defended the government's side in the same teach-in.

"All observers are in agreement on one point: The program and the conduct of the National Liberation Front have won it the adherence, enthusiastic or resigned, of a very large part of the Vietnamese population. This is a fact which becomes particularly clear when one interviews middle class and intellectual people in Saigon. One of them summarizes the problem in this way: 'We have a choice between two solutions: to wage an endless war while placing ourselves more at the mercy of the Americans, and without any guarantee that this will end in a clearcut victory, or categorically to demand the end of the war and trust to the good faith of the National Liberation Front's leaders and to their willingness to carry out a program which to us appears acceptable.' . . . One thing at least is sure: the fiction that American military power has been introduced upon demand of a people fighting communism no longer holds today."

—Max Clos from Saigon in the (conservative and pro-American) *Le Figaro Littéraire*, Paris, March 3, translated at page 7860 of the *Congressional Record* April 21.

The Last Time We Backed A "War of Liberation" in Latin America

(Continued from Page One)

Johnson's proclivity for strong-arm methods in Latin America has a long history. The Johnson Doctrine may trace back to the Johnson resolution he introduced in the Senate June 22, 1954, four days after a CIA-backed "Army of Liberation" invaded Guatemala from Honduras to overthrow the Arbenz regime. Knowland, Smathers and McCarran were Johnson's chief supporters, and he himself in a Senate speech combined a highly simplistic view of the Monroe Doctrine with references to the Smith and McCarran Acts against Communism as if they made law for the hemisphere. Johnson said he was "proud" to have voted for both. The late Senator Langer, the only member of Congress to vote "no", said astutely, "we would like to know whether this is a situation of interference by the international Communist movement or interference by the United Fruit Company." After Arbenz was overthrown, the lands United Fruit lost in his agrarian reform were restored.

The Split in the OAS

In the Dominican crisis, as in that over Guatemala, we sought not only to prevent the UN from interfering but took unilateral action lest the OAS States fail to do our bidding. The OAS sessions on the Dominican Republic have been held in secret; it fears to let the people of Latin America hear what is said. Enough has leaked out to indicate that Venezuelan reluctance to go along with the United States nearly created a crisis within a crisis. The Venezuelan government fears that if the rightist military succeed in the Dominican Republic they will be encouraged to try a coup in Venezuela. Drew Pearson reported (*Washington Post*, May 11) that when the OAS voted a "peace force" in support of the U.S. Marines a cable was already on its way from Caracas instructing the Venezuelan delegate to vote "no." He had abstained. Since the resolution had carried only by one vote (the vote of a Dominican representing the defunct Reid Cabral regime), the Venezuelan "no" would have blocked it.

Similarly Virginia Prewett reported in the *Washington Daily News* (May 19) that one reason Johnson sent "his top team

The Suffering We Cause

"Five babies, including 5-month-old twins, were among the 14 people with whom we shared a half-hour of terror in the no-man's-land separating the forces of junta leader Gen. Antonio Imbert and those of rebel leader Col. Francisco Caamano Deno in the northwest industrial section of this embattled city. . . . We joined the rebel fighters, who were dressed in every tattered variety of civilian clothes, outside the house for several moments. They were angry, frustrated, but, it seemed, utterly determined men.

"We are not Communists," one of them said typically. 'Why must we suffer like this because the Yankees don't want us to have a constitutional government? Why must our families go hungry?' As we returned to the taxi and started off again toward the rear, they looked at us almost pleadingly—as if we had magic answers that could somehow spell an end to their suffering."

—Dan Kurzman from Santo Domingo in the *Washington Post*, May 18.

of fire-fighters" to Santo Domingo last week-end was because Venezuela began pressing the OAS for recognition of the constitutional forces. This apparently was the emergency which required McGeorge Bundy's trip to Santo Domingo. It may also explain the effort to bring about a coalition regime before Latin American pressure enabled the Bosch forces to win. Miss Prewett reported that there was a split in the OAS between the pro-Bosch forces favored by former Presidents Betancourt of Venezuela and Figueres of Costa Rica and former Governor Munoz Marin of Puerto Rico on the one hand and the military dictatorships of Paraguay, Guatemala and Nicaragua. The constitutionalists charged according to a New York Times dispatch May 19 from Santo Domingo "that the U.S. was willing to allow at least a near-victory by the Junta to bring pressure on them" to accept our hand-picked Cabinet. Caamano was elected by a majority of the last lawful Dominican Congress. Guzman, our choice for interim President was picked by Johnson at a secret meeting in the White House. The laying on of hands by LBJ is not the same as a democratic election.

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NEWSPAPER

I. F. Stone's Weekly. Second Class Postage Paid at Washington, D. C. Published every Monday except the last week in December and the first week in January and Bi-Weekly during July and August at 5618 Nebraska Ave., N.W., Washington, D. C. An independent weekly published and edited by I. F. Stone; Circulation Manager, Esther M. Stone. Subscription: \$5 in the U.S.; \$6 in Canada; \$10 elsewhere. Air Mail rates: \$15 to Europe; \$20 to Israel, Asia and Africa.

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