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Senate Foreign Relations on Why Khrushchev Changed His Mind, Pps. 3-6

Republican Silly Season on Capitol Hill as Test Ban Debate Opens

Sen. (Jack) Miller (R. Iowa)—Mr. President, first I should like to ask the Senator whether the Soviet Union has ratified the treaty.

Sen. (Wm.) Fulbright (D. Ark.)—They have signed it. I do not know that they have ratified it as such. Of course, they do not have the same procedures that we have. . . .

Sen. MILLER—The point I wish to make is that I have seen nothing reported to the effect that the Presidium of the Soviet Union has ratified the treaty. . . .

Sen. FULBRIGHT—Since the Senator raised the question, my assistant, who keeps up with these matters, says that the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet has approved the treaty, but it has not yet been deposited. . . .

Sen. MILLER—As I understand it, until the treaty has been consummated by a deposit or an exchange of the documents, it would be possible for the Soviets merely to withhold the filing of the document. . . .

Sen. FULBRIGHT—What harm does the Senator think would come to us if the Soviets should withhold such filing?

Sen. MILLER—Its effect would be to leave us up in the air. . . . It would be possible for the Soviets to sit on the treaty for 6 months or 1 year or 5 years.

Sen. FULBRIGHT—Does the Senator mean that under the circumstances, the United States would be inhibited from testing or doing as we pleased?

Sen. MILLER—We would be, so far as the other signatories of the treaty are concerned.

—On the Senate floor, September 9.

I. F. Stone's Bi-Weekly

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How It Hurts U.S. Security If The Soviets Stop Testing!

As the test ban debate began, the contrast was striking between the country and the Senate. In the scientific community, the only scientist who could be found to support Dr. Edward Teller was his close associate, Dr. John Foster of Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, long a Teller stronghold. The newly formed National Committee Against the Treaty of Moscow turned out to be another of those rightist front letterhead organizations (see p. 7 "A Chiang Kai-shek Press Agent Helps Launch an Anti-Test Ban Committee"). Its membership is bare of any scientist; all it could attract were some old China Lobby hands and the usual anti-Communist and ex-Communist stalwarts who serve as the Marxist-Leninist theoreticians of Birchism-Goldwaterism. It is only in the Senate that the anti-test ban forces were able to mobilize respectables like Russell of Georgia and Stennis of Mississippi; the political psychoanalyst will suspect that these Southerners reflect a regional feeling, like Peking's, that the treaty is somehow a racist plot, though of course in the reverse direction. Except for Goldwater, the Republicans are nervous about opposing the treaty so strong is sentiment for it. Even so, many Republicans and some Democrats like Jackson of Washington are hoping that something will yet turn up to give them an excuse to vote against it.

Stennis "Bombshell" a Dud

The level of the debate shaping up in the world's greatest deliberative assembly is foreshadowed in the box at the top of this page. The calibre of the opposition was evident in the Stennis committee report, the long awaited bombshell which turned out to be a veritable Nike-Zeus of a dud. Its exaggerations were too much even for Symington and Saltonstall; they filed their separate disagreements. But Jackson and Margaret Chase Smith went along unblushingly with Stennis, Strom Thurmond and Barry Goldwater. Though they admit the testimony was unanimous in asserting that we had "a clear and commanding lead in nuclear weapons systems over any one or any combination of potential enemies" they managed to raise alarm. The results don't look as good in the text as in the headlines. The ingenuity they were compelled to exercise is demonstrated by the climactic eighth point in their statement of the supposed military disadvantages to the U.S. This, which deserves some kind of prize, is that "the treaty will deny to the U.S. a valuable source of information on Soviet nuclear weapons capabilities" because "the analysis of radioactive debris generated by nuclear explosions has long been a source of basic intelligence on Soviet nuclear weapons programs" and this will be shut off if the Russians —with sinister fidelity to their word—cease testing bombs in the atmosphere!

Maybe if Goldwater stops being so mean to Castro, Fidel will unseal those caves and try out a few off Miami.

So One Way to Keep The Vietcong Poorly Armed Would Be to Slow Down the War

"American military men have maintained in official briefings that the war effort against the Communists has not suffered so far despite the political turmoil going on in the country. . . . Figures on the number of contacts with the enemy and on losses on both sides are officially stated to be close to the weekly average for this year. One spokesman noted that these averages continued to show a Vietcong lead in weapons captured. Roughly the figures show that for every two weapons captured by Government forces, the Communists capture three. About one-fourth of the weapons lost by the Vietcong, however, are home-made ones inferior to those they capture from the government."

—From Saigon, the New York Times, Sept. 1.

From the Picnic Atmosphere of the March to More Sober and Basic Perspectives

Civil Rights Movement Moves Back Toward Socialism For Answers

The March is over, but it will never be forgotten. Every one who was there had his own special moment. Mine was to stand in the early morning inside the Union Terminal and watch the thousands pouring in from New York and Pittsburgh and Chicago, and suddenly to feel no longer alone in this hot-house capital but as if out in the country people did care. Of the Marchers themselves, I along with almost every other observer was impressed with their gentle sweetness, a tribute to the Negro people, who have managed by humor and faith amid so much suffering not to be soured.

The Treadmarks of Oppression

For me the heroes of the March, or heroines, were the gnarled old colored ladies on tired feet and comfortably broken shoes, the kind who walked into history in Montgomery. Amid the well dressed middle class Negroes and their white sympathizers were many black folk misshapen by malnutrition and hard work. They carried upon them a story more plainly writ than any banner. These were, literally, the downtrodden and the treadmarks of oppression were visible upon their faces. They sang, "We shall not be moved." But those who saw them—and what life had done to them—were moved.

Then it was a pleasure to see amid the Marchers so many old-time radicals, the unquenchables of so many vanished movements, many of them long ago forced out of jobs and pulpits, now joyously turning up again, with the feeling that they were at last part of a mass upsurge, no longer lonely relics.

With Lincoln behind them, and those eager thousands before them, the speakers at the Memorial were inevitably dwarfed and on the whole disappointing. None—not even Martin Luther King, who is a little too saccharine for my taste—broke through to the kind of simple purity of utterance the place and the occasion called for. The price of having so many respectables on the bandwagon was to mute Negro militancy—John Lewis of SNCC had to tone down his speech under pressure from Archbishop O'Boyle—and the rally turned into one of support for the Kennedy civil rights program. Somehow on that lovely day, in that picnic atmosphere, the Negro's anguish never found full expression.

Far superior to anything at the Monument were the discussions I heard next day at a civil rights conference called by the Socialist Party. On that dismal rainy morning-after, in a dark union hall in the Negro section, I heard A. Philip Randolph speak with an eloquence and a humanity few can achieve. When he spoke of the abolitionists, and of the heroes of the Reconstruction, it was with a filial piety and an immediacy that made them live again. One felt the presence of a great American. He reminded the black nationalists gently that "we must not forget that the civil rights revolution was begun by white people as well as black at a time when the winds of hate were sweeping the country." He reminded the moderates that political equality was not enough. "The white sharecroppers of the South," he pointed out, "have full civil rights but live in bleakest poverty." One began to understand what was meant by a march for "jobs and freedom." For most Negroes, civil rights alone will only be the right to join the underprivileged whites. "We must liberate not only ourselves," Mr. Randolph said, "but our white brothers and sisters."

The direction in which full emancipation lies was indicated when Mr. Randolph spoke of the need to extend the public sector of the economy. His brilliant assistant on the March, Bayard Rustin, urged an economic Master Plan to deal with the technological unemployment that weighs so heavily on the Negro and threatens to create a permanently depressed class of whites and blacks living precariously on the edges of an otherwise affluent society. It was clear from the discussion that neither tax cuts nor public works nor job training (for what jobs?) would solve the problem while automation with giant steps made so many workers obsolete. The Civil Rights movement, Mr. Rustin said, could not get beyond a certain level unless it merged into a broader plan of social change.

In that ill-lighted hall, amid the assorted young students and venerables like Norman Thomas, socialism took on fresh meaning and revived urgency. It was not accidental that so many of those who ran the March turned out to be members or fellow travellers of the Socialist Party. One saw that for the lower third of our society, white as well as black, the search for answers must lead them back—though Americans still start nervously at the very word—toward socialism.

Quite A Confession

"I have always contended that the so-called disadvantage of the Negro was no greater than that of the white at the bottom of our economic heap, and I am convinced that the 20 million Negroes in this country are better off insofar as educational facilities, income and dropouts in school are concerned than are the 20 million whites who are at the very bottom of our economic heap."

—Sen. Russell (D. Geo.), on Meet the Press Aug. 11.

The Pap in JFK's Pep Talk for Business, "If You Fail, America Fails"

In a pep talk for the big business crowd, written for the September issue of Nation's Business, Mr. Kennedy wrote "If you fail, America fails." This seems to us dangerous pap. Every time the business crowd has failed in the past, America has succeeded. The Panic of 1907 reformed the banking system. The stock market crash of 1929 led to the New Deal. There is no reason why America should fail if big business fails again, as it is failing.

The extent of that failure, and of Mr. Kennedy's, was visible in his major emphasis on tax reform to provide a better climate for investment. The investment climate could hardly be better. Corporate profits in the second quarter of this year were the highest ever.

The gap between the mounting prosperity at the top and the growing hopelessness at the bottom of our society will not be closed by making big business even more profitable. Nor will it be remedied simply by government spending. Fifty billion a year is already being pumped into the economy for arms without giving us full employment. The need is for measures of public planning more radical than anything American society has ever seen. This way, again, America can succeed when big business fails.

Test Ban Supplement

From the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report on the Test Ban Treaty

Why Did Khrushchev Change His Mind on A Limited Ban?

In this special 4-page supplement we present the text of the political analysis and the conclusions from the report made by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the test ban treaty, and an excerpt (on p. 5) from the eloquent speech with which Majority Leader Mansfield opened debate on its ratification. A fuller public understanding is important to pave the way for further steps toward disarmament and we'd be glad to send copies of this issue, with this historic report in it, free to any of your friends or neighbors if you will send stamped self-addressed envelopes.

The limited test ban is an American proposal. Its substance was first offered by President Eisenhower, who, with British support, proposed in a letter to Chairman Khrushchev on April 13, 1959, a prohibition on atmospheric tests up to 50 kilometers. On-site inspections would not have been required. Mr. Khrushchev rejected the President's proposal on the ground that it would not attain the basic goal of "preventing the production of new and ever more destructive types of nuclear weapons." The Soviet Government held this position until July 1963 when it agreed to the three-environment treaty before the Senate.

Why has the Soviet Union accepted what heretofore it has consistently rejected?

The question is relevant and important, but any evaluation of Soviet motives is necessarily speculative. It is generally felt that the decision arose from a number of considerations, most of them related. First, the large Soviet tests series of 1961 and 1962 provided some assurance that the Soviet Union could accept the technological consequences of a test ban treaty. Although it is difficult for one power to evaluate the technological knowledge of another power, Soviet scientists presumably are confident that in many critical areas of nuclear weaponry they have achieved a rough technical parity with the United States.

The Sobering Cuban Crisis

Second, the Cuban missile crisis of the fall 1962 was almost certainly a sobering experience. Nuclear war abruptly became less an abstract possibility than one of harsh immediacy. As Secretary of State Rusk told the committee:

> **During this past year, for the first time in history, nuclear powers had to look at a nuclear exchange as an operational matter. Men had a chance to peer into the pit of the inferno.**

Third is the Sino-Soviet schism, to which the question of nuclear warfare is closely related. Should the objectives of international communism be gained through war and military supremacy or by other less hazardous means? In part, this appears to be a doctrinal struggle between the established church adjusting its policies to shifting tides and new requirements, and the isolated church militant. Perhaps in larger part, the struggle transcends ideology and reflects an inevitable conflict of interests between a united and expansionist China and one of her historic antagonists, Russia. The quarrel has, of course, created new issues and new problems throughout the Communist world. It is widely believed that Chairman Khrushchev, communism's apostle of coexistence, required some kind of tangible expression of his policy as a practical political matter. The test ban treaty is popular, not only in the Soviet Union, but also in the East European satellites, which recently have shown signs of restiveness and slightly more independence of close Soviet control. Thus, the limited test ban could strengthen Mr. Khrushchev's political base, both at home and throughout most of his empire.

Fourth, the social and political ferment in the Soviet Union may have encouraged the Soviet leadership to reach an agreement that would allow some diversion of resources away from nuclear weapons development and toward the consumer goods area.* The burden of the arms competition has had a depressing effect on Soviet economic growth. In the past 5 years, Soviet military investment has risen significantly, while the rate of increase in the gross national product has dipped sharply. A cause and effect relationship has been indicated.

Finally, Soviet leadership seems to share Washington's concern with the problem of proliferation of nuclear weapons. The treaty provides no guarantee against proliferation; however, leaving aside France (already a nuclear power) and mainland China, it should strongly inhibit the spread of nuclear weapons. The committee heard testimony that a number of countries have the human and material resources to develop nuclear weapons over the next decade. But as the Secretary of State told the committee:

> **Most of the countries with the capacity and incentive * * * have already announced that they will accept the self-denying ordinance of the treaty. While this does not guarantee that they will never become nuclear powers, their renunciation of atmospheric testing will act as a deterrent by making it much more difficult and expensive for them to develop nuclear weapons.**

Secure Second-Strike

For the United States, the rationale of the treaty has not changed significantly since the first proposal of this kind was put forward in 1959. The balance of risks in a limited test ban—possible advantages and disadvantages to the United States and, indeed, to Western civilization—appears to favor the treaty. U.S. strategic forces are superior to the Soviet Union's; whatever progress Soviet science may have made in improving Soviet weapon capabilities, a nuclear attack against the United States on any scale would assure the devastation of the Soviet Union in a retaliatory blow. The security of the United States and its allies rests ultimately with this second-strike capability.

The treaty is a recognition of the hazard posed by an unlimited continuation of the nuclear arms race over an indefinite period. As the arms increase in variety, number, refinement, and destructive power, so presumably will the danger that they might be used, either by accident or design. This is a prospect that confronts the United States and the Soviet Union quite impartially, and one upon which their interests meet.

*** "Communism cannot be depicted as a table laid with empty plates and occupied by highly conscious and completely equal people. To invite people to such communism is tantamount to inviting people to eat soup with a fork." Nikita Khrushchev's opening speech to the Communist Party Central Committee Plenum, March 5, 1962.**

CONCLUSIONS

The committee finds the balance of risks weighted in favor of the treaty. It is possible that by testing underground the Soviet Union will slowly erase the technological lead the United States possesses in some critical areas of nuclear development. But it is equally true, as the hearings indicated, that this gap could be closed much more rapidly if unrestricted testing were continued. In short, the effect of the treaty will be to slow the rate and significantly increase the expense of Soviet progress in those technological areas in which the United States has superiority, while confirming such progress as both sides may achieve to the underground environment, where the United States has a broad advantage thanks to its experience. In that light, now would seem to be a good time to stop.

For the United States, the returns on further atmospheric nuclear testing appear to have sharply diminshed. Much of what remains to be learned can be achieved underground. Admittedly, further information on weapons effects would be useful and would simplify certain design problems. However, the United States and the Soviet Union appear to face roughly comparable uncertainties and difficulties in this rather broad area.

Teller's Dissent

Dr. Teller dissented from the general view, saying:

To acquire more knowledge in order to know how to defend ourselves, this, I would suggest, is not quite properly called an arms race. This treaty will not prevent the arms race. It will stimulate it. This treaty is not directed against the arms race. This treaty is directed against knowledge, our knowledge.

The committee disagrees. The treaty *is* directed against the arms race. The refinement of nuclear weapons is the explicit purpose of the pursuit of knowledge of this kind. All such knowledge is relative. Perhaps the ultimate knowledge of nuclear ballistic missiles—at least, the only certain test of the missile systems—would mean launching a large salvo of ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads over a distance of several thousand miles and intercepting these weapons with anti-ballistic missiles, also equipped with warheads.

An unrestricted competition to develop offensive systems that will continue to remain technologically far in advance of defensive systems, and, conversely, to strive for defensive missiles that can close this gap, would amount to an arms race. Of that there can be little doubt.

Dr. Bradbury told the committee:

I am somewhat dubious that one can ever find out in practice all that one would ideally like to know and one may have to rely on simply what one has found out and what one can extrapolate from existing experimental knowledge.

It is not feasible frankly to take an existing ballistic missile site, a Titan site, and drop a 10-megaton bomb over it. I don't think you would like it or anybody else would. Unless you do that experiment, you can always say, "I will not know exactly what will happen." You have to rely on what you can deduce now on strictly precise experiments, and my general feeling is * * * that I would be willing to take the risk that we now can take with existing knowledge, although admittedly one is taking a risk. * * * I doubt that you would ever know all that you possibly could know.

Dr. York expressed similar concern about a relentless competition for constantly improved and more refined arms:

It is my view that the problem posed to both sides by this dilemma of steadily increasing military power and steadily decreasing national security has no technical solution. If we continue to look for solutions in the area of science and technology only, the result will be a steady and inexorable worsening of this situation.

I am optimistic that there is a solution to this dilemma: I am pessimistic only insofar as I believe that there is absolutely no solution to be found within the areas of science and technology.

Replying to a question he added:

*** * * I am concerned primarily about the fact that * * * *if we do not do anything about the arms race, the* security of the United States will just get steadily worse, will get less.**

No Security In Arms Race

Dr. Kistiakowsky's statement also reflected this concern:

I do not believe that we or any other nation can find any real security in a continuing arms race. It is now evident that the United States and the Soviet Union each have the capability to deliver an utterly devastating attack on each other. To talk of winning such a conflict is to misuse the language; only a Pyrrhic victory could be achieved in a nuclear war. Under the present conditions of unrestrained arms race it is certain that the numbers of warheads each side might deliver will increase, as will their yields. Perhaps even more threatening is the prospect of an increasingly large number of countries having nuclear weapons, with the concomitant increase in the probability that some will be used and that uncontrolled escalation will follow.

On the Ending of the Last Test Ban

"In 1958, an informal and unofficial moratorium on nuclear testing by the U.S., Britain and the Soviet Union began. Technically, it ended on Dec. 29, 1959, when President Eisenhower stated that the U.S. considered itself 'free to resume nuclear weapons testing' subject to advance notification of such intention. In fact, the moratorium ended on Sept. 1, 1961, when the Soviet Union, after what must have been a long and secret preparation, commenced an intensive series of atmospheric nuclear weapons tests. In response, the U.S. began testing underground 2 weeks later and resumed atmospheric nuclear testing in April 1962."

—The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Report, p. 2.

From Norman Thomas's Statement on the Treaty to Senate Foreign Relations

"Critics of the treaty (declare) that 'You can't trust the Russians'. . . . As a matter of sorry fact, nothing in history warrants a belief that you can trust the disinterested good faith of any national government in relation to others outside of what it thinks is in the national interest.

"I assume the treaty will be ratified. But if it should be ratified in the carping political spirit of Gov. Nelson Rockefeller, for example, much of its advantage will be lost. . . .

"I know that your recommendations, and certainly the Senate debate, will emphasize safeguards against military risks. I profoundly hope that you Senators will not do this at the price of a querulous and exaggerated suspicion which will detract from the value of the treaty and its usefulness as a first step to further progress."

—Test Ban Hearings, Pps. 985-7.

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Dr. Brown was asked whether he regarded the treaty as an arms limitation agreement, and he replied:

> **It does limit arms development. It does not reduce armaments but it does reduce arms development. I believe that unless we get some kind of arms limitation as well as maintaining our own military capability the next 10 years are going to see further degradation in everyone's security as other nations obtain nuclear weapons, less responsible ones than have them now, I think that will make everyone less secure.**
>
> **I don't say this treaty is going to solve that or produce the millenium, but I think in the absence of this treaty, which has represented the first step, no one can go on to anything else.**

The committee, no less than the President, believes that no treaty however much it may be to the advantage of all, however tightly it may be worded, can provide absolute security against the risks of deception and evasion. But it can, if it is sufficiently effective in its enforcement and if it is sufficiently in the interests of its signers, offer far more security and far fewer risks than an unabated, uncontrolled, unpredictable arms race.

An Identity of Interests

The committee believes that the treaty reflects an identity of interests in the specific area of containing the arms competition. Both the United States and the Soviet Union appear to have a sober appreciation of the hazard implicit in the continuation of such a competition between the world's two great powers over an indefinite period of time. Both appear to be persuaded that the limited treaty will not appreciably affect the balance of military power; also, the clear political advantages it offers will strengthen the national security of each. First, the treaty will inhibit the proliferation of nuclear weapons, thus reducing the danger of accidental or catalytic nuclear war, as well as nuclear war by design. The committee was impressed that by the day it approved the treaty 82 nations had acceded. Leaving aside France, already a nuclear power, and mainland China, this number includes all those countries thought to have the capacity and/or incentive to develop nuclear weapons.

Second, the treaty has already deepened and complicated the divisions within the Communist orbit; this, on balance, represents a net gain for the rest of the world. It bears heavily on the position of China, communism's second-ranking and most militant power. China is expected to explode a nuclear device in the near future, possibly next year. Although the distance from there to even a crude nuclear weapons system is considerable, the event will nevertheless impress Asians deely with Chinese strength and potential. But the unwillingness to sign this treaty, together with a generally defiant attitude, may further isolate China from her Asian neighbors and, of course, from the rest of the world as well. This, in turn, should encourage greater resistance to Chinese expansionist policies. The treaty would also seem to formalize, and thus simplify, the unwillingness of the Soviet Union to assist China's nuclear development program.

This identity of United States and Soviet interest in limiting the arms race is a reflection of what Dr. Shulman, one of the foremost American authorities on the Soviet Union, described as the "limited adversary relationship" between the two powers. He said:

> *** * * We are engaged in an extremely serious conflict but it is neither total nor absolute. In certain aspects of our confrontation, the security of each side is interlocked with the security of the other. It is therefore possible to have some measures which the Soviet leaders feel may serve their interests, and which we, for reasons of our own, regard as in our interests as well * * *.**
>
> **Since 1954 there has been a very considerable evolution of the Soviet appreciation of the effect of nuclear war * * * an increasing sobriety, and this has a deep effect on the Soviet attitude. Within the past year and a half there has been a substantial increase in the discussion in Soviet journals of what in this country is called arms control, and what the Soviets call partial measures of disarmament.**

On Khrushchev's Mind and Mood

SENATOR PASTORE. The one impression I got in the hour that we spent with Khrushchev in Moscow was the fact that he was not exactly a man of peace but he was afraid of a nuclear war.

SENATOR SPARKMAN. What did he talk about the most?

SENATOR PASTORE. He talked about coffins. He said this will be a world of coffins. And one big impression I got was that he knows how terrible a nuclear war is or might be, and I think he wants to avoid it as much as we do.

—Nuclear Test Ban Hearings, Page 342.

That Fallacious Faith in the Magic of Military-Nuclear Technology

"One detects in the few articulate opponents of this Treaty, a consistent theme which suggests a basis for the remaining doubts and hesitancies. It is, apparently, the belief that our scientific-military complex is so superior to all others that if not subjected to any limitation as to nuclear testing, it will produce an amazing advance in military-nuclear technology. The complex, it is suggested, will achieve some incredible breakthrough so as to widen, once and for all, the gap as between ourselves and the Soviet Union.

"Have we not in reality followed precisely such a course since the first atomic bombs in the New Mexico flats and over Hiroshima and Nagasaki?

"And what has happened, Mr. President? We began in 1945 with the atomic bomb, with what we believed was the decisive gap, the ultimate gap. By 1949, four years later, the Russians began to close that gap with their first atomic test. In 1952, we opened what we believed was the decisive gap, the ultimate gap, with the first explosion of the immensely more powerful hydrogen bomb. And by 1953, nine months later, that gap too began to close in a Soviet test of a similar type of weapon.

"So we must ask ourselves, Mr. President, what has happened in all these years of unrestricted testing? Has the gap widened with the free rein which has been allowed to the scientific-industrial-military complex? Have we gained the absolute advantage, the ultimate advantage which will guarantee the nation's security? The truth is that the gap has not widened. On the contrary, it has narrowed almost to the vanishing point.

"Once no nation, except ourselves, could have inflicted on any other, tens of millions of nuclear deaths in a matter of hours. Now, we ourselves, no less than others, are subject to a catastrophe of this magnitude. We have provided not security for the nation but only insurance that if our civilization is put to the nuclear torch by any hand, others will be consumed in the same stupendous blaze."

—Mansfield (Mont.) in the Senate, Sept. 5.

Dr. Shulman explained further that—

the (Soviet) shift to "peaceful coexistence" emphasis, originally a tactical alteration, has been evolving and deepening into a policy directed to power-bloc politics rather than toward social revolution. At the 20th, 21st and 22nd party congresses, and in the new Communist Party program, this policy has acquired doctrinal underpinnings, related to the possibility of a peaceful transition to socialism, and the noninevitability of war * * *.

Dr. Shulman believes that the deep changes at work in the Soviet Union derive—

not from the proletariat, but from nationalism, which is fragmenting the polarization of power, from technology, which is increasing the destructiveness of war; and from the continued industrial transformation of the advanced industrial states, which has if anything increased their power and their prosperity. What the Chinese Communists are now attacking as "revisionism" is in fact an effort by the Soviet leadership, perhaps not wholly consciously, to adapt its policies to this reality.

These changes are in part accountable to Western strength and determination and, as such, reflect credit on the basic postwar policies we have followed. Thus, it is critically important—for this and other reasons—that the solidarity and determination of the Western alliance be maintained. We have seen the tendency of the alliance to loosen whenever the Soviet threat appears to have receded somewhat. An easing of cold war tensions would impose new stresses on the relationships between the Western nations; the treaty should lead to even stronger efforts to improve these relationships and the institutions through which the West seeks to promote unity of purpose and policy.

What Europe Must Recognize

This will be difficult. For the United States it means that decisions affecting the future of Western Europe must be made with West European participation. Thus, the United States must find and maintain a delicate but true political balance, and avoid giving even the impression that it may be unilaterally disposing of major questions dividing East and West. Europeans for their part, must recognize that such questions are not static, but changing. Also, Europeans, in order to play their role, will hopefully maintain the pace of the movement toward regional and supranational solutions to their major tasks, recognizing that these have grown too large for any one of Europe's sovereign powers to contain. In short, the movement toward European unity and Atlantic partnership that has been gathering force since World War II should proceed unaffected by the rise and fall in the temperature of the cold war.

A good part of the committee's time and attention during the hearings was devoted to military considerations. This treaty does bear, though perhaps not heavily, on the military balance. But its thrust is political. And among other things, it illustrates that military considerations cannot be divorced from political considerations; they are inseparable, especially in the nuclear age. The maintenance of a strong military position is clearly essential to the national security of the United States. But exclusive, or excessive, reliance on military considerations could undermine national security by encouraging comparable military efforts by others, thereby strengthening the destabilizing forces adrift in the world, possibly creating new ones.

This treaty offers the prospect of a gradual lessening of tensions, of a start toward the progressive elimination of the danger of nuclear war. Thus, the committee (by a vote of 16 to 1) recommends that the Senate give its advice and consent to the ratification of the pending treaty.

—The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Report of The Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

On Keeping the War Labs Manned

"Some concern was expressed over the ability to maintain the vitality of the laboratories with a limited test ban in force. Among others, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Dr. Glenn T. Seaborg, provided reassurance on this score. In response to questions, Dr. Seaborg observed that "we didn't lose very many scientists from the Commission's laboratories during the 3-year moratorium on testing. He added that the problem would be eased under the test ban treaty because of the continuance of underground testing.

"Dr. York, a former director of the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, stated that laboratory personnel grew by 50 percent during a period that roughly coincided with the moratorium."

—Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Report, Page 19.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff Insisted on A Swift and Easy Escape Clause

"Any party can withdraw from the treaty 'if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.' This is a remarkably flexible provision. According to Secretary of Defense McNamara, the original withdrawal provision was 'modified specifically' to take account of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

"Secretary of State Rusk emphasized, and the committee understands, that the language of Article IV is sufficiently permissive to enable the United States to denounce and withdraw from the treaty whenever its security interests might be adversely affected by activities pertinent to the treaty. This means that in addition to possible violations by the Soviet Union, the U.S. could abrogate the treaty if nonsignatories or even other [sic] signatories, should test clandestinely or otherwise engage in nuclear experiments deemed prejudicial to U.S. national security."

—Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Report, P. 7.

The draft treaty for a limited test ban submitted by the U.S. and Britain to the Geneva arms conference on Aug. 27 of last year was more guarded. It provided that if any party to the treaty determined that some other party had violated its terms, or that unidentified nuclear explosions had occurred, or that a State not party to the Treaty (like China or France) had conducted explosions which might jeopardize the national security of the complaining member, it could call for a conference of all signatories.

After the conference, or 60 days after it had been requested, the complaining member could on 60 days notice withdraw from the Treaty if it felt this necessary "for its national security." The draft said "The notice of the withdrawal shall be accompanied by a detailed statement of the reasons for the withdrawal."

Under the treaty as it now stands a signatory can withdraw without giving its reasons or calling a conference. This is broad enough to allow resumed testing any time a nation's laboratories develop some promising new monster.

New Leader's Demand for A Correction Leads Us Up A Curious Madison Avenue Trail

A Chiang Kai-Shek Press Agent Helps Launch an Anti-Test Ban Committee

While we were on vacation, an angry letter from Myron Kolatch, executive editor of *The New Leader,* arrived at our office protesting that we had done an injustice to his bi-weekly in our July 22 issue by reprinting testimony before the Fulbright lobby investigation. Mr. Kolatch claims that the witnesses, Hamilton Wright, Sr., and Jr., were wrong in testifying that they gave $3,000 to *The New Leader* to pay for publication of an article on China.

It turns out that the Wrights, who were public relations men for Chiang Kai-shek, did not give the money directly to *The New Leader* but to Marvin Liebman, another Chiang press agent, who in turn passed it on to *The New Leader.*

The Evidence Was Indisputable

We learned from another newspaperman who was assigned to write a correction for his own paper that Mr. Kolatch, in good faith, on Mr. Liebman's assurances, first denied that the money had ever come from the Wright organization. Mr. Liebman, however, admitted that this was the source of the money after the Wrights furnished the reporter with the number of the check. We hope that the experience will make *The New Leader* wary of relations with Mr. Liebman.

Mr. Liebman's office at 79 Madison Avenue in New York is the headquarters of an extraordinarily long list of right wing organizations. The latest to make its appearance was the National Committee Against The Treaty of Moscow which placed a full page ad in *The Washington Post* against the nuclear test ban treaty Sept. 5. The signers were mainly from Buckley's *National Review* plus such assorted characters as Spruille Braden, Max Yergan, Russell Kirk, Karl Wittfogel and Admirals Ben Moreel and C. M. Cooke.

Among the other organizations which operate out of Mr. Liebman's public relations firm are the Committee of One Million Against the Admission of Communist China to the United Nations (of which he is secretary), the American Committee for Aid to Katanga Freedom Fighters, the American Afro-Asian Educational Exchange (which circulated the New Leader article on China the Wrights helped to finance), the American Jewish League Against Communism, Inc., the Emergency Committee for Chinese Refugees and the Committee for the Monroe Doctrine.

In addition Dr. Fred C. Schwarz of the Christian Anti-Communist Crusade used Mr. Liebman's office during the former's unsuccessful venture into New York in 1962. Mr. Liebman also helped to organize Young Americans for Freedom, and for a time Douglas Caddy as national director of YAF ran the organization from a desk in Mr. Liebman's office. It is, as one can see, a busy place.

One of the other businesses with which Mr. Liebman is associated at the Madison Avenue address is Communications Distribution, Inc. The kind of communications it distributes may be gathered from the June, 1962, issue of the John Birch Society magazine, *American Opinion,* which carried a two page layout of the film "Nightmare in Red" and a one page description of "The War In Katanga" by Ernest van den Haag, "being distributed by Communications Distribution, Inc., in behalf of The American Committee for Aid to Katanga Freedom Fighters." These are Moshe Tshombe's boys.

Another of these films was advertised in the May 7, 1963, issue of *The National Review* offering a Communications Distribution product called "A Generation Awakes," the story of Young Americans for Freedom. The ad begins, "Are You Looking at the Next President? You may be when you see Barry Goldwater in a new moving picture. . . ."

Mr. Liebman was a member of the Young Communist League and the Communist Party from 1938 to 1945. Since leaving, he has flowered. Richard Dudman touches on his career in his book, "Men of the Far Right" published two years ago. It is a pity the Fulbright investigation did not question Liebman as well as the Wrights.

First Possible Signs of An Olive Branch from Washington to Peking?

A first cautious olive branch in the direction of Peking is seen by some informed persons here in Washington in the concluding paragraphs of a speech made in Hawaii August 20 by Roger Hilsman, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs.

Mr. Hilsman ended a review of U.S. policy in the Pacific by saying that while the Chinese Communists had condemned the nuclear test ban treaty as a "dirty fraud," the American government hoped that "an awareness of the clear benefits to all mankind of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty will eventually bring the leadership in Peiping to change their approach and their attitude." This was not the tone of irreconcilable hostility.

The Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs went on to quote that portion of President Kennedy's address at American University in which he said we must "persevere in the search for peace in the hope of constructive changes" inside the bloc. This would seem in this context to extend to Peking the same possibility of peaceful negotiation as Moscow.

Mr. Hilsman ended by saying that there did not appear to be "any immediate likelihood" of such constructive changes "on the Mainland of China." But he was confident "that the lasting values we seek, for ourselves and for the peoples of the Pacific, will prevail over the dogmas of war and struggle." The language is safely ambiguous but different from the language of a crusade to liberate China, much less to restore Chiang Kai-shek.

Another sign which points in a sober direction may be seen in a speech made by Majority Leader Mansfield in the Senate Sept. 6 on the Chinese-Russian "Convergence" in Asia. After surveying the long history of Sino-Russian border disputes, Senator Mansfield said "it would be unwise to dismiss the likelihood of a growth of tension at various points of contact along the thousand miles of this vague frontier." He said "Some might anticipate with relish the prospects of these clashes, even if they were nuclear."

"But that, Mr. President," Mansfield told the Senate, "would be a most distorted view of nuclear realities and contemporary international relations. For if the flames of a great nuclear conflagration are lit, it will matter little who holds the match or where in the world it is struck. Even the vastness of Central Asia would be insufficient to contain the holocaust or to confine it to the two massive Communist powers of Eurasia."

This differs reassuringly from the foolish view which regards the isolation of China and the possibility of Sino-Russian war as a boon to the rest of mankind.

De Gaulle Offers A Way to Get U.S. Off the Hook in Vietnam

How much better informed the French are on Vietnamese affairs than we Americans. Several days before the news leaked from Saigon that Ngo Dinh Nhu's private pagoda-raiding troops were on the CIA payroll, we heard from French sources in Washington that Nhu—for all his anti-Americanism—was the beneficiary of close CIA ties.

The First Revolt in CIA

The news leak marks a further stage in the deterioration of the Vietnamese regime. It means that revolt has spread from Vietnam's usually docile Buddhist monks to the ranks of the CIA itself. The leak showed that the CIA men on the spot were all but unanimously against further payment of U.S. funds to these special troops, a kind of Vietnamese SS, and took the mutinous step of spilling the story to U.S. newsmen in Saigon when the monthly stipend of $250,000 was paid on schedule. Vietnam's may not be the first revolt in history led by Buddhist monks—though it is the first we ever heard of—but this is certainly the first mutiny by CIA men. Conditions must be pretty bad when our own trained anti-Communist cloak-and-dagger men find U.S. policies more than they can take.

Mr. Kennedy's two TV interviews on the Vietnam situation, first on CBS and then on NBC, showed him at his unguarded worst—the cold fish in the man was plain as day. Not one word of sympathy for Vietnam's monks or students. Not one word of moral indignation over their mistreatment. All he could say was that it was "unwise." He talked as if the Vietnamese affair were part of some ideological game of touch football we had to win. *His* cliches—and ours as a nation—are showing. How much longer will we refuse to see that the struggle for freedom in Vietnam is now against Diem and against us?

If we were wise, instead of weakly stubborn, we would welcome de Gaulle's initiative as a means of getting us off the hook and providing a graceful way out. De Gaulle's right to speak, we forget, is solidly based on France's membership in SEATO and its signature on the 1954 accords which ended the war in Indochina, accords we have broken by blocking the free elections they promised and sending troops into the area.

Next Asian Explosion?

"How many Americans are aware that Chiang's remnant Chinese army has ruled Taiwan by martial law ever since it arrived in 1949? How many Americans know that their military aid program enables Chiang's soldiers to rig and control elections? How many Americans know that while Taiwanese make up about 75 percent of Chiang's army, virtually all of its top ranking officers are Chinese, that half of this army is stationed on the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu as much to keep these men away from home as for any other reason, and that the Taiwanese soldiers on Taiwan itself are not issued live ammunition? In short, we shall eventually face the same specter in Taiwan that we are now facing in South Vietnam. In my judgment the time is long overdue for drastically reducing military aid to Taiwan."

—Abridged from a speech in the Senate Sept. 4 by Morse (D. Ore.) which few if any papers reported. The Senator put into the Congressional Record an article from the current Harper's Magazine by Albert Axelbank, who was United Press International bureau manager in Formosa from late 1960 to the middle of 1962, on the police state regime in Formosa.

It seems that privately de Gaulle warned our government against this course two years ago when our military intervention began. His stand is not new, his course has been consistent. He cold-shouldered attempts by Diem and Nhu to make official visits to France. He has consistently backed Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia's efforts to establish peace in the area by its neutralization.

A series of recent articles in *Le Monde* by one of its editors just back from both parts of Vietnam showed that Diem has brought all his opponents close together, that a coalition for a deneutralized South Vietnam is politically possible and that the hard pressed North Vietnamese regime would like to resume its traditional trade with the South (coal for rice) and open its doors toward the West, particularly France where it already has a commercial mission.

On April 6, 1954, Kennedy rose on the Senate floor to tell France "the blunt truth" that it could not win in Indochina against a hostile people. That's all de Gaulle is saying now.

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