

# I. F. Stone's Bi-Weekly

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## Must We Wait for Blood to Be Shed?

Two notable trips took place in the past fortnight. Gordon Cooper orbited the earth 22 times without mishap and President Kennedy visited the South, making three speeches, without once uttering the word "Negro" or mentioning Birmingham. The two feats were not strictly comparable. The former was technological while the latter might be described as a triumph of reticence, but both set records. Two of Mr. Kennedy's talks were in Alabama, where police dogs have been bitten by Negroes recently but Mr. Kennedy avoided offense to either dog or Negro lovers. In his speech at Muscle Shoals, he confined himself to the TVA, and in his speech at Huntsville, to the nation's space program, offering moral leadership on both issues.

### Like A Certain Predecessor

Mr. Kennedy's discretion in Alabama recalled one of his predecessors, Dwight Eisenhower, who also showed a remarkable equanimity in the midst of racial rioting, as Mr. Kennedy often remarked in his election campaign. In Mr. Kennedy's third speech, across the border in Tennessee, which is half Southern, Mr. Kennedy half touched on the race issue. Like General Eisenhower he made his main theme the importance of law and order, but he did not harp on the subject. At the very beginning of his speech Mr. Kennedy noted, with exemplary delicacy, that "This Nation is now engaged in a continuing debate about the rights of a portion of its citizens." Toward the end he ventured to assert that while no one could "deny the complexity of the problems involved", no one could "gainsay the fact that the determination to secure those rights is in the highest traditions of American freedom." In between he talked about Cordell Hull, J. Percy Priest, Commodore Vanderbilt, Jefferson and John Adams with quotations from Goethe and Aristotle. He quoted so copiously from the latter on the problem of the Olympic Games, that a confused listener might have imagined that maybe he was exercised over discrimination against the Spartans. One sentence in Mr. Kennedy's Nashville address stood out as another example of that mellifluous counterpoint affected by his speech writers. "For liberty without learning is in peril," Mr. Kennedy declared lyrically, "and learning without liberty is in vain." The applicability to Birmingham was not immediately clear but the epigram should give equal pause to Bull Connor and the Rev. Martin Luther King. . . .

There may be tragedy around the corner. Only the Negro knows what savagery lies barely below the surface among Southern whites. Only the Negro knows what murderous resentments have piled up among his own people. It would take very little to set off a chain of racial conflagrations North

### Only Way Now To Save Jim Crow

The logical answer of the white supremacists to the Supreme Court's sit-in decisions is to stage sit-ins of their own in the legislatures of Mississippi, Alabama and other Southern States until all Jim Crow laws have been repealed. The moral of the decisions is that Jim Crowism in restaurants and lunch counters can only be enforced where there are no Jim Crow laws and officials make no statements, as they did in New Orleans, to encourage discrimination. Otherwise, as the Court ruled, the refusal to serve Negroes is so linked with State action as to run afoul of the 14th amendment, which guarantees the equal protection of the laws. Only where there is no official Jim Crow policy may owners of private businesses, under these rulings, exercise their right to refuse to serve some of their customers. To this muddled acceptance of a private right to discriminate, we prefer the clear reasoning of Mr. Justice Douglas's concurring opinion. "When the doors of a business are open to the public," he wrote, "they must be open to all regardless of race if apartheid is not to become engrained in our public places." This will some day be the law.

and South. The Birmingham demonstrations are tailing off into disillusion. The moderate whites there, as elsewhere in the South, have shown themselves spineless. Their insistence that they had promised to hire only one Negro as a sales clerk in one store left the Negro moderates out on a limb. The decision to expel or suspend 1,081 Negro students because they demonstrated for their rights was brutal, and Martin Luther King's reaction to it weak. Given Negro bitterness and State police brutality and anything can happen.

The national leadership ought to be as big as the danger. Two steps could give Negroes some hope. One would be a Presidential announcement that a special squad of Federal investigators—not FBI men, the Negroes don't trust them\*—were being sent South to prepare civil rights prosecutions in the wave of beatings, shootings and unlawful arrests by police officials during the past two years. The other would be a White House conference of leaders from both races North and South to map an end to racial discrimination altogether. Must we wait for blood to be shed?

May 21

\* "Colored Birminghamians frankly said they did not have too much confidence in FBI agents stationed in Birmingham. 'They go fishing and play weekend baseball with these local cops,' one observer said, 'you know they aren't going to do anything to embarrass their friends.'"

—*Afro-American*, May 14.

"The wording of the announcement [that FBI men were 'on the scene and offering assistance'] suggested they would act only at the request of, and in cooperation with, local officials."

—*New York Times*, May 13.

## The Mystery of The Three Suddenly Cancelled Nevada Tests, Two of Them Atmospheric

### Was This An Intrigue by AEC and Pentagon to Blow Up Test Ban Hopes?

Though ours is supposed to be an open society, The Case of the Three Cancelled Nuclear Tests indicates that not only the public but even the President knows too little about what really goes on in our government. At his press conference on May 8, Mr. Kennedy said he was not hopeful about a test ban agreement and feared that "perhaps the genie is out of the bottle and we'll never get it back in again." But he thought a new round of testing, i.e. atmospheric testing "would be a great disaster."

#### Like the Poor Unmarried Mother

Mr. Kennedy would hardly have spoken in this way if he had known that the Atomic Energy Commission and the Defense Department that very afternoon were issuing a press release announcing the resumption of atmospheric testing. It is true that the one full atmospheric nuclear test involved was only, as the unmarried girl said of her baby, a little one. But the announcement brought an instant sour reaction in New York, where the UN General Assembly was convening a special session, and in Geneva, where angry neutrals talked of bringing the matter before the UN, especially since our underground tests this year had already put us in violation of a resolution passed by the Assembly last year (with U.S. concurrence) asking all countries to refrain from nuclear tests after January 1, 1963.

The joint announcement by AEC and Defense was worded very trickily. It did not speak of atmospheric tests at all. It spoke of three "sub-kiloton detonations" to be set off in Nevada this month. It said that two of these, one nuclear and the other chemical but "with a short-lived radioactive tracer", would be "detonated as ground bursts". The other nuclear device would be set off "in a shallow underground emplacement." Such shallow underground explosions often burst and vent their radioactivity into the atmosphere. "Most of the radioactive particles produced by the nuclear detonations," the press release went on reassuringly, "are expected to fall back to earth inside the Test Site." As for that which fell outside, "precautions will be taken," it said, "to hold off-site radiation well below established safety criteria." The release also said "the two surface detonations"—again avoiding the term atmospheric—"will provide comparative information on the effects of nuclear and chemical high explosives."

Except for the *New York Herald-Tribune*, most newspapers and wire services missed the significance of this release, as its wording intended them to. Few caught on that this meant resumption of testing in the atmosphere, with all the risk of provoking the Russians to join in. The *Herald-Tribune* May 9 front paged a story by Don Irwin, "The Test Ban Genie Is Out—We'll Fire Two." Radio Moscow warned in an English broadcast May 12, "By beginning a new series of atmospheric nuclear blasts, the U.S. is imposing on the world a new round in the atomic arms race. However," it added, "one thing is clear. The USSR is not going to stand idly by watching the U.S. perfect its nuclear weapons. . . ."

It is difficult to believe that AEC and Defense would venture on an atmospheric test without White House clearance. It is possible that just as the wording of the announcement fooled most of the press, the details may also have been cal-

#### Why Cheating Is Difficult

"Under a test ban agreement, the probabilities work against the potential violator, not for him. The violator does not wish to be caught an average number of times or a certain percentage of the time. Since the whole point of cheating is ruined the very first time the violator is caught, he must take the most extreme sensitivity reading on record and then add a margin to that. But he must go even further. If you are using your own equipment [for detection], the violator never knows how good it is. He must assume it is at least as good as his—and then add another safety margin to that. He must beware of lucky or rare pickups by your side and defectors on his. By this time, his tests are so small, his precautions so costly, his security needs so great and the stakes of getting caught so high, that the cheating game may not be worth the candle—it costs too much to play for what one can hope to gain."

—Proxmire (D. Wis.) in a notable Senate speech May 17 advocating a nuclear test ban agreement.

culated to slip past scrutiny by White House staff. "Many high level American political advisers," Murray Marder reported in the *Washington Post* May 15, "were caught by surprise to read that the U.S. was going to conduct a nuclear test above ground." On April 24 Kennedy and Macmillan had sent Khrushchev a letter urging action on a test ban. It hardly made sense, before he replied, to announce atmospheric testing on May 8 and give the Soviet military and the Kremlin hard-liners another chance to argue that the West was insincere and Khrushchev too trusting. In any case, on May 13, after a reply reached the White House from Khrushchev, the AEC and the Defense Department jointly announced cancellation of tests. No explanation was given. If the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy were the independent watchdog it was supposed to be, it would investigate this strange affair. Was this a bureaucratic intrigue by those in the AEC and the Pentagon who want resumed atmospheric testing to precipitate a new round and blow up the nuclear test talks?

Neither the press nor White House officials are discussing this affair honestly. We call attention to an interview with the President's Special Assistant for Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy, which was published in the *Washington Star* May 19. Three other newspapers—the *Detroit News*, the *Newark News* and the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*—held the interview jointly with the *Star*. None of them had their facts straight, as indicated by their final question, "Why did the President cancel three *underground* nuclear test shots?"

Instead of correcting the error, Mr. Bundy withheld the fact that two of these shots were to have been in the atmosphere. "It became apparent," he replied, "that there was a real chance that the Soviet Union might be going to large-scale atmospheric testing again and might have had considerable propaganda success in pretending that the reason for that serious decision was this very small set of quite unimportant U.S. tests. They would be useful," he continued, "but they are not urgent in any major sense. In this situation, the possible international political effects became more significant than the immediate advantage of holding the tests, so they will not be conducted." This was hardly the whole truth.

## Full Text of Premier Castro's Interview With ABC-Television

## Castro Says He Needs Soviet "Technicians" Till Assured of Peace

*Because it opens the door to reconciliation with the U.S. and because it was so swiftly brushed under the rug by our press, we thought our readers would like to see for themselves the full text of the interview Premier Fidel Castro of Cuba gave Lisa Howard of ABC-TV as broadcast May 10. It strengthens our belief that the peace movement should press our government for two steps toward better relations with Cuba. If Lawyer Donovan could successfully negotiate release of prisoners (including CIA men), why can't he go back and explore (1) on what terms Cuba would compensate U.S. property owners and (2) on what terms it would be willing to negotiate demilitarization of the island, as proposed by the Cuban Council of Ministers to the UN last September. Of course recognition, resumption of trade and guarantees against U.S. aggression would have to be part of a settlement but this is how we ended our quarrel with Cardenas after he seized U.S. oil properties in the late 30's. A demilitarized Cuba would end fears of a Russian base on our doorstep.*

*We are happy to see that similar proposals were made by Norman Thomas in a recent letter to the President. This letter also recalled that last Nov. 27, after Mikoyan left Cuba, the Cuban newspaper, Revolucion, organ of the Fidelista movement, offered to accept on-site inspection by the UN if we in return would allow similar UN inspection of "anti-Castro training camps on U.S. soil for mercenaries, spies and saboteurs." Thomas asked the President, "Would you not even now earnestly explore this possibility of backing up your own position against military intervention by effective agreement for two-sided UN inspection—almost certainly more effective inside Cuba than our continuing air reconnaissance?" Thomas said "This plan would leave no excuse for the presence of Russian military in Cuba" and "could speed the setting up of a nuclear free zone in Latin America such as five of our neighbors requested."*

*Finally as the crowning point of negotiation, the veteran Socialist leader suggested, "after the denuclearization of Cuba and the withdrawal of the Russian military force, might you not propose to turn over our Guantanamo base to be made some sort of a hemispheric center for health and recreation?"*

LISA HOWARD: Doctor Castro, were the missiles placed in Cuba because Khrushchev wanted them there or because you asked for them?

In other words, in this situation where did the initiative lie?

PREMIER FIDEL CASTRO OF CUBA: Tell her that I do not feel that this is the right moment to hold a detailed discussion on those historic events.

However, she must also understand that at the same time I am extremely interested that all those details should become known; but tell her the following:

After a few days the Soviet and the Cuban governments both realized that we had to take certain measures because of the imminence of an invasion of the country that we felt had been planned and was going to be carried out. These measures had to come from the idea of persuading the aggressors that an invasion of Cuba would inevitably lead to a third World War.

It was on the strength of that conviction that we took the de facto measures we took—we did not waste time with mere words—we merely had to stop the possibility of aggression. From that point of view you can say that it was simultaneous action on the part of both governments.

HOWARD: Doctor Castro, looking back on the October crisis with hindsight, do you think it was wise to have permitted the missiles to be placed on Cuban soil in the first place?

CASTRO: Tell her that looking backwards and placing ourselves in the same circumstances as those of the time, I still feel that it was correct.

HOWARD: Why?

CASTRO: I had already told you earlier that we began with the need to take certain measures in order to force the United States to put aside their ideas of invading Cuba.

The fact that aggression was being prepared was made obvious later and was proved by no less a person than the Chairman of the counter-revolutionary council himself. Surely that is the best proof that anyone could expect to offer.

HOWARD: What is the purpose of the Soviet troops that now remain on Cuban soil? Do you . . . Do you really feel that this large a military presence is necessary for the defense of the island?

CASTRO: Tell her that if they call troops the technicians that are still in Cuba at this moment, that's an entirely different thing.

But you must explain to her that these experts and these technicians are here in our interest in the interest of Cuba. We are having both our personnel and our armed forces trained by these technicians.

I consider, and you must make her understand this, that in the present circumstances, and until we are truly and sincerely assured of a policy of peace towards us, we will have need of those technicians to train our personnel and our armed forces.

HOWARD: Are you telling me, Doctor Castro, that there are no Soviet troops and armaments on Cuban soil?

## For Peace Between USSR and China

CASTRO: You call Soviet troops; we call technicians. You understand?

And really they are training our troops. Is clear? Really they are training our troops. They are the instructors of our troops. That is the truth.

HOWARD: And they are not Soviet troops themselves?

CASTRO: They are Soviet technicians. I think that if we are attacked those technicians are going to fight with us against any aggressor.

HOWARD: No member of the Communist bloc can ignore the ever-widening ideological schism between Red China and Soviet Russia, with Mao Tse-tung's emphasis on war as a useful instrument of national policy, and Mr. Khrushchev's conviction that the world must develop along lines of peaceful coexistence.

As between these two schools of thought where do you stand, sir?

CASTRO: Yes, it is true. There are certain differences between the points of view of the leaders of the Soviet Union and the leaders of the People's Republic of China.

But I do not believe that those differences of view are in any way different from those that exist between, for example, DeGaulle or Kennedy. I believe that there is no absolute or insoluble contradiction between the views expressed by the Soviet Union and the views expressed by the Peoples Republic of China. And I do not believe for one minute, nor could I accept or be convinced, that the policies of China are intended to set up war as part of a national policy.

Since that is what I believe, then obviously our position must be to struggle in order to strengthen and improve the relations between these two great countries of the Socialist camp.

That is our position.

HOWARD: It has often been reported that your alliance with the Communists inside Cuba is a precarious one. And in January of 1962 you denounced the Cuban Communists for shunting aside the Fidelistas and taking all the top posts for themselves.

What is the situation now today in Cuba between the Fidelistas and the old line Communists?

CASTRO: Tell her that as the revolution advances the unity



## Denies Political Strings Attached to Aid from Soviet Union

of all the revolutionaries becomes greater and stronger every day.

The criticisms that we leveled at first against the sectarian positions that existed in the country were intended merely to overcome and to correct certain mistakes that at that time divided us.

Once we've overcome those mistakes then the unity among all the revolutionaries in Cuba today is greater than it ever was before.

I have heard that in the United States they speak many times about division between old and young communists. I can tell you that it is only a theory . . . a theory. That is not true. If somebody in the United States is thinking to solve our problem based in that division, is a mistake. Do you understand? And do you think that your . . . the people of United States will understand my English?

HOWARD: I think they will. Dr. Castro, in an interview in *Le Monde*, you criticized the leaders in the Soviet satellite countries for their total subservience to Moscow. Are you able to be any more independent when you are almost totally dependent on Moscow for your economic survival?

CASTRO: Tell her that I don't know whether she's aware of the fact that when those interviews were published in the French newspaper *Le Monde* I made a clarification right away. I stated that I had given no interview to any reporter of that newspaper.

### Castro Claims He Was Misunderstood

We did hold an informal conversation at the home of the Director of the newspaper *Revolucion* and during that conversation we talked of many subjects.

But there were no translators present while we were talking and since the reporter did not know Spanish very well, many of the subjects that we did refer to in our conversation were misunderstood by the reporter and he then published them in a completely different way from the way in which we had discussed them at the home of the director of the newspaper. It was that misunderstanding on his part that misled the readers.

HOWARD: Then I shall rephrase my question.

CASTRO: Really I rejected . . .

HOWARD: Let me just ask this then, do you feel . . . I say, I will rephrase my question and ask do you feel that Cuba has any chance of being independent of Moscow when you are almost totally dependent on Moscow for your economic survival?

CASTRO: Tell her that as far as we are concerned the Soviet Union never attached any political conditions whatsoever to the economic assistance she offers us.

It is true we received and we are still receiving assistance, but this is assistance that is basically economic and it comes primarily from the Soviet Union, and we are extremely grateful for the help.

But, I repeat, that assistance has never been sent to us with any conditions.

You can tell her too, that in the United States they use certain slogans, certain cliches, certain ideas that they accept almost as though they were axioms or truisms.

But I believe that what is thought in the United States and the way things are analyzed there will finally lead them to understand exactly how and why Cuba is acting as she is. We are merely and completely exercising our rights to self-determination.

HOWARD: Cuba now finds itself isolated in the hemisphere. No longer on speaking terms with most Latin American countries; the victim of an economic blockade; and with almost all of your support coming from ports six and seven thousand miles away. Can you, Doctor Castro, possibly continue to exist as a viable economy in this isolated atmosphere?

CASTRO: Yes, it is true, it is entirely true. We are the victims of a great economic blockade. We are the victims of a general program of isolation on the part of a powerful

nation. But, anyway, despite all this we have met the difficulties. We have overcome many of these obstacles and despite all this, again, we are sure that we will manage to get ahead.

HOWARD: Doctor Castro, since you assumed power nearly 300,000 people have fled the island, and the recent emigrants have been doctors, lawyers, teachers, as well as workers. How do you account for this exodus, and the exodus that is still continuing?

CASTRO: Tell her that I think her figures are, well, shall we say, exaggerated. Not that many have left the island.

Nor is it true that they were all rich or all poor. The majority of the Cubans that have left the island were of the higher and middle-classes. They were people who in the past occupied high posts.

But furthermore, remember that from Cuba to the United States there has always been a very great current of emigration. However, before the revolution there was a limit set to the number of Cubans that could enter your country. After the revolution there was no limit. There was no quota to the Cuban emigration to the States.

I am convinced that if the doors of all the other Latin American republics were to be allowed to open for completely free emigration to the United States of America more people would leave those countries than have so far left Cuba for the United States.

I'll go further, I'll give you an example. Take Puerto Rico for instance. The United States constantly argues and says that in Puerto Rico they enjoy a very high standard of living, that there is set up a very sound social and political system, and yet we know that more than one million Puerto Ricans have fled from their island to the United States of America.

Now, if we're going to judge the system or the state of a country on the strength of the number of persons that leave or escape from that country to go somewhere else, then we must realize that Puerto Rico is the worst country of all.

HOWARD: But perhaps I should have phrased it differently. Many of the most recent emigrants—and I saw many of them in Miami—were not people of money; and many of them had originally been *with* the revolution. How do you explain that emigration?

### Some Americans Emigrated, Too, In 1776

CASTRO: Well, because there are some people who desire to emigrate to the United States, in search of a better standard of living perhaps. And also, there are cases of persons, who because of disagreements with the revolution, decided to leave the Island to go to foreign countries.

But in many cases that argument is a mere pretext. The political pretext is merely added. The true reason underlying their emigration is economic.

Now, I can assure you that those who left the island before the revolution were purely the poorer classes. That was prior to the revolution. The emigration that followed the revolution, on the whole, is the emigration of the higher classes.

When the revolution occurred in the United States of America, for example, don't forget, there were many Americans who left your country and who went to Canada. They were people who didn't like the American way of life. They were people who didn't agree with the independence of the United States.

HOWARD: Dr. Castro, the United States and other nations of the OAS are deeply concerned about the exporting of your revolution to other nations in the hemisphere, the training of subversive agents, the sending of subversive material throughout the hemisphere, and, in fact, the San Jose meeting pledged to stop the flow of men, funds, arms and propaganda to other nations of the hemisphere from Cuba.

Why do you feel at this early and very difficult stage of your own development that it is necessary to export your revolution to other nations throughout Latin America?

## Willing to Discuss Compensation for U.S. Property Owners

CASTRO: Tell her that I thought it was the other way around. I had thought that it was those countries that were more concerned with exporting counterrevolution to Cuba rather than we to them.

Tell her, too, that there is no proof in existence that we have sent weapons or arms to any other country of Latin America in order to start revolutions there.

On the other hand, we do have thousands of proofs that the arms and the weapons sent by the United States and many other countries into Cuba have all been intended to raise counterrevolutions here in Cuba. In our Island. That is the truth of the story.

Ask her why they always look at things from a different angle? If they want to know what we think we'll tell them. We think that revolutions cannot be exported. We believe that revolutions either do occur or they don't occur. If conditions of an objective nature are conducive to the revolution then the revolution will take place in that country.

Furthermore, there has also to be an adequate degree of political awareness in the people of a country so that they are able to carry out a revolution. But that you cannot export anymore than you can export counterrevolutions.

Now I ask myself a question. If a country feels that it has the right to export counterrevolutions what right has that country to deny another country equal rights to export revolutions?

### Revolution Not Exportable

HOWARD: The point is, are you exporting counterrevolution? The San Jose meeting pledged to stop the flow of arms, men, funds and material, subversive, from Cuba to other nations.

Now why do you think they made such a pledge? Are you exporting revolution or are you not exporting revolution?

CASTRO: We cannot be exporting something that cannot be exported.

HOWARD: So your answer is that you are not training men and you are not sending arms or material to other countries to create revolution?

CASTRO: Well there is one thing you must bear in mind. She spoke of propaganda. That's one thing. We do have radio stations. We do have speeches of the revolutionary leaders and information from Cuba itself and we make all this known in Latin America.

But this is something very similar to what occurs with the radio stations in the United States in Florida for example and many other parts of the country where you broadcast programs where you publish where you make known the points of view of your country of the United States of America.

And when all is said and done you know we do not possess the enormous resources of the United States government, nor do we possess the training centers that the United States has so we cannot compete with your country in the training of people from all over Latin America.

HOWARD: But as a dedicated Marxist-Leninist don't you feel that it's important and necessary to export your revolution? Isn't that part of your philosophy?

CASTRO: What I think is that the idea ought to be defended if you like the idea . . . and it is what you do, too.

And your idea and the ideas of the United States, your ways of living . . . many of your ideas didn't come from Europe?

HOWARD: There's a body of liberal opinion in the United States which contends that you turned to Soviet Russia because you had no alternative, because by 1960 the United States had closed its doors to you. And they believe that if the United States could have accepted the expropriations with, of course, a pledge by you for compensation, you would have remained with the West, or at least neutral.

Are they correct? Or was your revolution inevitably going to turn in this radical a direction?

CASTRO: Tell her that it is true that when the United

States suspended the sugar quota of Cuba, when the United States closed all the doors to trade between Cuba and the United States, Cuba had no other alternative from the economic standpoint than to tighten its economic relations with the Soviet Union.

She now wants to know what would have happened if those measures had not been taken; if the United States had accepted expropriation. Well, I don't know. But I don't believe that you can answer a question like that just categorically.

We can't know exactly how events would have followed if such a stand had been taken by her country. But I do believe, and of this I'm convinced, that relations would have been very different from what they are now. They certainly would not have been the same.

Then she wants to know whether our revolution would have been a radical revolution. I believe it would have been. It was going to be a radical revolution. But, naturally, I believe, that it was the hostile attitude of the United States that contributed to making it more radical.

HOWARD: Then you're saying that in the very beginning you did not intend to break off relations with the United States.

CASTRO: No.

HOWARD: Do you, in fact, ever intend to issue compensation for the expropriated lands and businesses?

CASTRO: To whom?

HOWARD: To the United States companies.

CASTRO: Ah, the United States companies! Because we have compensated many Cubans—businessmen. We have compensated them.

And in respect, in regards to the American interests, do they want to speak with us about that? If they want to speak with us about indemnification, in honorable conditions for Cuba and for the United States, we can speak.

HOWARD: This is a question you are willing to discuss?

CASTRO: Yes.

HOWARD: Before your revolution succeeded, Dr. Castro you often spoke of that revolution and the aims of that revolution in terms of liberty and freedom. You pledged elections within eighteen months, and you pledged to uphold the rights of opposition parties even during the transitional stage. But there have been no free elections and there are no opposition parties.

Why, Mr. Prime Minister, did you create a revolution so completely different from the one that you promised?

### The Promises He Kept

CASTRO: Tell her that we made a revolution . . . one that has meant freedom for the exploited peoples of our island . . . for the peoples who had no schools, who had no hospitals, who had no employment or jobs, who did not possess the land they worked. We did not plan and we did not carry out a revolution granting freedom for the exploiters nor for the privileged classes.

We promised our people agrarian reforms—we've carried that promise out. We promised them urban reforms. We've lived up to that promise, too. And we promised that we would wipe out illiteracy, and that promise we have also fulfilled.

HOWARD: But what about free elections and what about opposition parties? Because that was part of your pledge, too.

CASTRO: In your point of view that is the only way to freedom and we are trying to find different ways . . .

HOWARD: No, no I'm quoting you . . . I'm quoting you . . . those were your words in the Sierra Maestra. You said there will be elections within eighteen months, opposition parties during the transitional stage. These were your words, not mine.

CASTRO: But the situation changed. The situation changed. Because since the beginning we have been under condition of war against us. Not a normal situation.

## Castro Praises Kennedy for Ending Attacks Against Cuba

And the situation of a revolution, if you analyze in the history all the revolutions—French revolution and Soviet revolution and the . . . all the revolutions in the history, you can see that the situation changed very much. And new conditions appeared.

In Cuba while we were doing the revolution new situations appeared. I think we have walked long distance, long distance in the revolution, and your idea about freedoms are not the only idea that exist.

HOWARD: Do you intend eventually to have free elections and opposition parties and a free press?

CASTRO: Well, you know . . . not in the bourgeois concept of elections. We have a revolutionary concept. And I believe that for those false Democratic institutions to exist—well well—they can't really exist in the middle of a state of exploitation. They simply cannot exist.

Ignorance and want can exist. You have first of all to liquidate one in order to allow true conditions of freedom really to exist.

We simply don't use the same blueprint.

HOWARD: Basically I was wondering did it inevitably have to go in the direction with the communist bloc? If the situation had been different at a particular point—might you have not gone with Soviet Russia?

CASTRO: Well, I think that the radicalization make us to seek the friendship of the Soviet Union. It was our very own necessity that led us to it. Our needs made us, forced us to improve our relations with the Soviet Union.

### Sees Rapprochement Possible

Anyway, we truly believed and we felt that our country should enjoy relations with all countries, with all nations and we should enjoy all types of relations—diplomatic relations—political relations—commercial relations—but it was the attitude of the United States towards us that forced us to this. The United States only wanted one single type of relations, fundamentally economic.

HOWARD: There has been a great deal of conjecture as to precisely when you became a Communist.

In 1960, as late as 1960, you were still saying that you were not a Communist and that you felt that Communism violated basic freedoms.

But then on December 2nd, 1961, you declared that you were a Marxist-Leninist. Why and when did you change your mind about Communism?

CASTRO: Tell her that the ideas of Marx have influenced and today have great influence all over the world . . . including among men, statesmen, politicians who don't call themselves Communists nor Marxists. At least they haven't done so publicly.

Many of his ideas have been quoted and accepted. I received my first impressions of Marx—

HOWARD: My question was . . . why Dr. Castro changed his mind . . . why he changed his mind about Communism?

CASTRO: Well, tell her that from the time when I was a student when I first began to read the textbooks of Marx, I could see the influence of Marx and his ideas. Although, at the time, I was not a Communist.

I did, however, have a growing conviction of the advantages of the socialist system as against the ideas of capitalist systems. And then in my mind too there took place a process of development of the idea. But what contributed most to my change was the revolution itself—the experience we gathered during the revolution itself. And, of course, especially all that we learned from the United States of America. How a capitalist and powerful country treats a weak and an underdeveloped nation. And, comparing that with the way a social country, like the Soviet Union behaved towards our underdeveloped nation.

HOWARD: Dr. Castro, do you feel there is any basis for a return to normal relations with the United States and Cuba with you as Prime Minister? And do you desire such a rapprochement?

CASTRO: I think it is possible the United States government wish and in that case we would be agreed to speak and to find the basis.

HOWARD: What conditions?

CASTRO: It is not only our matter.

Oh! The fine points.

For example, the conditions ought to be discussed. But I have not studied that possibility. But I think that as a basis the points that Cuba established when the crisis.

And I think that something has been advanced. I think the United States has given some steps in the way of peace and I have looked at the steps with good eyes.

HOWARD: Do you think right now with the exchange of your prisoners and our prisoners who were down here in Cuba that these recent events show that there is a beginning of a rapprochement?

CASTRO: It is the beginning. . . . It is possible if we can use it, if the United States wants it, it is the beginning of better relations. Tell her that it's a way of diminishing tension. That it's one way—and just as all the other steps that the United States government has given are other steps—like stopping the piratical attacks against Cuba—All these are steps in the right direction.

I believe that they are wise and intelligent steps. Because the enemies of Kennedy want to force him into a corner . . . into an abyss, and that abyss is the case of war with Cuba.

HOWARD: If the United States was willing to end the blockade in exchange for a withdrawal of all Soviet troops, or, however you call them, technicians, . . . and armaments from Cuban soil. And an end to the exporting of your revolution from here to other nations in the hemisphere . . . would you be willing to agree to these two things.

CASTRO: Tell her that I have already answered her regarding the exporting of revolutions. And I have also spoken to her about the question of technicians. But I think that all these problems . . . all these problems of the technicians . . . of the Soviet technicians are of interest to us—to the Soviet Union. They're of interest to the United States of America. And, of course, they're also . . . to Cuba, of great interest. They can be discussed. And we should discuss them among all three of us.

HOWARD: Are you anxious to sit down and talk to Kennedy?

### Wants Three Way Discussion

CASTRO: I don't think it is good—the United States wants to discuss it with the Soviet Union without us. To discuss without us . . . without us with the Soviet Union. Tell her I think we must discuss all these problems between all of us.

HOWARD: Then you would like to sit down and talk with Kennedy?

CASTRO: I cannot answer it . . . if I don't know one thing about that . . . about what President Kennedy. . . .

HOWARD: In other words you must know what President Kennedy thinks?

CASTRO: (nods).

HOWARD: Mr. Prime Minister, do you think it would be possible some day, in the future, for you to steer a neutral course . . . to become the Tito of the Caribbean?

CASTRO: Tell her that our ideal is not neutralism . . . but peace. When there is peace among all countries . . . when there are no blocs, then there will be no neutralism . . . that is our ideal. But I don't certainly want to set myself up as any Tito of the Caribbean area.

HOWARD: Mr. Prime Minister, if you could live over again the last five years would you do things differently?

CASTRO: I think now we have more experience. It is possible that we could do better. But I think with the same intentions.

Somebody asked it to (Benjamin) Franklin . . . something like that. He said he would live again how he had lived. And that is my answer.



## Conservative Jurist Sets Up Guide Lines That Would Cripple Witch Hunting

# Court Reverses First Two SACB Registration Orders Against Party "Fronts"

In the long and bitter fight waged in the late 40's to prevent passage of the Mundt-Nixon bill, which became the Internal Security Act of 1950, its sponsors were forced to make one concession after another to allay criticism. A footnote to the decision just handed down by the U.S. Court of Appeals here in the case of the National Council of Soviet American Friendship recalls one of these. Nixon, then a Congressman, told the House that his bill even required that when the Subversive Activities Control Order ordered any organization to be registered as a Communist front, the Court of Appeals "must find that the decision by the board is sustained by a preponderance of the evidence, a standard which I may say," Nixon continued, "goes much further than any law on the books governing appeals from administrative bodies."

### The Court Takes Them Literally

Now the Court of Appeals, in its first two rulings on Communist "fronts," is taking these and similar safeguards in the statute at their face value, and applying them. As a result the first two decisions deal an almost mortal blow to the "front" provisions of the Act. The decisions not only reverse registration orders by the Board but set up judicial guide-lines which must severely limit its witch hunting activities.

The first decision, against the defunct Labor Youth League (see box below), rules that the Board may not register organizations which no longer exist. This should lift a pall of anxiety from persons who belonged to them in the past, and remove the fears of exposure which the FBI and the Immigration Service have used to create and coerce informers. The second decision, in the National Council case, sets up such strict evidentiary standards that the Board will be unable to blacklist organizations merely because their viewpoints parallel "party line." The decisions are given added weight by the Judge who wrote them. Senior Judge Prettyman is one of the most respected conservatives on the Federal bench. He spoke for a unanimous panel of three, the other two being Chief Judge Bazelon, a liberal, and Judge Danaher, a conservative.

Judge Prettyman ruled that since, as its sponsors claimed, this was not meant to be "a punitive statute for past affairs", the government must prove that an organization is *presently* a front in order to make a registration order stick. It must also prove, as the statute requires, that the organization is "directed, dominated or controlled" by the Communist Party.

### Curbing The Witch Hunters

"The theory of the statute respecting Communist fronts is that the Communists disguise their true objectives and foster organizations with declared objectives which are attractive. Thus, almost by definition, many members of a Communist front are unsympathetic to Communist aims or Communist philosophy....

"Is a person who was a member of the Communist Party in 1942 or 1944 to be presumed to remain a member in 1951-3? The former were war years, in which the U. S. vigorously sought the continued help of Soviet Russia. . . . To presume that merely because a person was a Party member in the years of the war he continued to be a member after 1950, paying dues and subject to Party discipline, would be unrealistic, contrary to the probable factual situation, and unjust. . . .

"The rudimentary elements of justice deny that a person can be found formally and officially to be a member of the Communist Party merely upon the statement of one person that another person told him so. . . . Finding these individuals to be Party members is not the mere assignment of a colloquial appellation. The imagination runs riot if we contemplate the results of a ruling that, if a highly placed member or officer of some organization says so-and-so is a member of that entity, such a statement relayed to the witness stand by a third person, without more, is acceptable proof. . . . Promoters are notoriously optimistic about the membership of the organizations they sponsor."

—National Council of American-Soviet Friendship v Subversive Activities Control Board.

The evidence must be more than hearsay and the fact that certain persons were Communists in the war years will not support the presumption that they remained so in the changed circumstances of the 50's. In addition to reading the statute strictly, the Court regarded with astringent and skeptical eye the testimony of a whole squad of well-known FBI informers headed by Louis Budenz. Judge Prettyman found their evidence of direct Party control "insubstantial." He declined therefore to infer control from the parallel between the National Council's views and those of the Communist Party. This strict standard of proof should doom the hopes of the Act's sponsors. They hoped that, using "proof by parallelism", the Subversive Activities Control Board would be able to blacklist many kinds of radical and liberal organizations, denying their members the right to travel and to work in government or defense plants.

### Why The Court Refused to Order the Registration of A Defunct 'Front'

"Meaningless in many ways though the formal listing of a non-existent organization on the register would be, the people who had in years past been members . . . would be enveloped in a cloud, faced with the possibility of drastic events if some Government official, or some unneighborly neighbor, or some uncordial fellow employee should choose to accuse them of holding illegally a Government or defense plant job. The [Subversive Activities Control] Board says that if sanctions under this statute are sought against a person, alleging him to be a member of a Communist front, he can defend in any criminal action brought against him; he can show he is not a member. But the application of the sanctions does not always depend upon criminal prosecution.

A discharge from a job, a refusal of a passport, or a refusal of a job applied for do not involve criminal proceeding."

—Judge Prettyman in *Labor Youth League v. Subversive Activities Control Board*. The reasoning by which the Court reversed the Board's order to register the defunct Labor Youth League would seem to apply also to six other defunct alleged "front" organizations against which orders to register are pending on appeal. These are the Civil Rights Congress, the Jefferson School of Social Science, the California Labor School, the Washington Pension Union, the Colorado Committee to Protect Civil Liberties and the American Peace Crusade.

**AFL-CIO Goes to Bat Against Bill Allowing Discharges Without Hearing****Debate on NSA Bill Shows Diminished Fear of HUAC in The House**

A declining fear of the Un-American Activities Committee may be seen in the fight waged on the floor of the House the other day against HR 334, a bill sponsored by Chairman Walter and HUAC. When this bill came up in the closing days of the last session, only 24 members voted against it. It was too late for action in the Senate and died with adjournment. This time the opposition was almost doubled: 40 members voted 'Nay' and four others were paired against it. There is a chance to block passage in the Senate.

**An "Eavesdropping" Agency**

The bill is a bill to regulate the hiring and firing of employees by the National Security Agency. The NSA's operations, as one sponsor of the bill put it, "are so highly sensitive that no outsider can actually describe its activities." The hearings on the bill were so secret that even members of Congress were refused access to the transcript. The NSA is, from journalistic accounts, a gigantic electronic "eavesdropping" apparatus for listening in on Soviet communications. This made it all the more shocking when two employees, Bernon F. Mitchell and Wm. H. Martin, both sex deviants, turned up as defectors in Moscow in August, 1960.

It turned out that these two men had been hired without a full field investigation, and it was obvious that NSA's internal surveillance was inefficient; a shakeup followed the news of their defection. There was no opposition to the bill's provision making full field investigations mandatory. Opposition arose to a provision giving the Secretary of Defense summary power to dismiss any NSA employee without a hearing of any kind.

Pressure from government employee organizations, which suffered from summary loyalty-security procedures, led the AFL-CIO this year to oppose the bill for the first time. Three senior Democrats, Moss (*Cal.*), Holifield (*Cal.*) and Dingell (*Mich.*) sent out a round robin against this provision. There was no evidence to show that both men could not have been fired under existing procedures if their sexual deviations had been discovered in time. These existing procedures are summary enough: employees in sensitive positions have no right to

**The 44 Who Said 'No' to HUAC**

Of the 40 who voted against HR 334 the Walter-HUAC bill, four were Republicans—Lindsay and Robison of New York, Curtis (Mo.) and Alger (Tex.). Of the Democrats, 13 were from California: Brown, Cameron, Cohelan, Corman, Edwards, Sisk, Hawkins, Holifield, King, Moss, Roosevelt, Roybal and Sisk; 5 from New York: Celler, Dulski, Farbstein, Gilbert and Ryan; 3 from Minnesota: Fraser, Olson and Staebler; 2 from Oregon: Mrs. Green and Duncan; 2 from Michigan: Dingell and Nedzi; 2 from Hawaii: Gill and Matsunaga; 2 from Maryland: Long and Sickles; 2 from Wisconsin: Kastnermeier and Reuss. The others were Karsten (Mo.), O'Hara (Ill.), Gonzales (Tex.), Ashley (Ohio) and Moorhead (Pa.) In addition four Congressmen were paired against the bill: Multer (D) NY, Mosher (R) Ohio, Mathias (R) Md., and MacGregor (R) Minn. Suggestion to readers who are their constituents: Why not write and praise them for it?

confront accusers. The fault lay with NSA slackness, not with lack of power to fire.

It is an index of the changing climate that there was no objection in either House or Senate when this same power of summary dismissal was given the Director of the CIA in 1947. Perhaps what aroused so much opposition this time was the spectacle of a Committee, which is supposed to be the watchdog of true Americanism, coming forward with a measure which denies an accused person safeguards of any kind. Even in the case of a super-secret agency, it was too much to have HUAC implying that it would somehow be un-American to allow an accused employee to know the charges against him.

Some kind of prize should go to Mr. Waggoner of Louisiana for his answer in the debate to those who objected "that people are going to be dismissed without being informed of what their crimes might possibly be." Said Mr. Waggoner, "It is my firm opinion that a man guilty of subversion need not be told because he knows full well to begin with for what he is being dismissed." If Kafka were still alive, he could sue the Congressman for plagiarism.

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