

I. F. Stone's Bi-Weekly

VOL. XI, NO. 4

FEBRUARY 4, 1963



WASHINGTON, D. C.

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End of the Russo-American 'Century'

Anybody who opposes American policy is, by our definition, insane. So de Gaulle has now joined Castro in Washington's booby hatch. Even the ordinarily urbane *Economist* speaks of his scheme for a French-dominated Western Europe as "demented." The truth is that France, like Cuba, and with France most of Western Europe, wants to be free to control its own destiny independently of U.S. policy. De Gaulle's revolt in the West, like Mao's revolt in the East, signals a historic change, the breakup of the Eastern and Western blocs we have known since the Second World War, the beginning of a new configuration in world politics, the end of a Russo-American "century" that has lasted characteristically, in this era of swift military technological change, all of 17 years. And as the blocs break up, Moscow and Washington both to inch their way toward a settlement on Berlin and nuclear testing. We are on the threshold of a new era.

Decline Of The Holy War Mystique

Moscow has been slow to respond to the Western split, as we have been slow to respond to the Eastern, because both capitals have been alike in their naive view of world affairs. An ideological haze, there of a vulgarized Marxism, here of a semi-mythical "free enterprise," has made it difficult for either capital to understand what history so plainly teaches—that national interests and not ideologies are the main springs of the relations between nations, and that their alliances and friendships ebb and fall like the tides of the sea with the changes in their internal and external needs. This calm perspective, which Richelieu knew and de Gaulle applies, is difficult for people to grasp who have been brought up on the holy war mystique with which both Moscow and Washington have invested their quarrels. Not the least important aspect of the coming change is that it may develop saner ways of looking at the world.

The breakup of the blocs is not due to the intransigence of de Gaulle. It is due to two changes in the sphere of military technology. One is the slow spread of nuclear weapons to new nations despite the effort of the two nuclear superpowers to maintain a monopoly on their respective sides. The resentment France feels at our unwillingness to help her into the nuclear club must be similar to that which China feels at the equally uncomradely attitude of Moscow when asked to share its nuclear secrets. France has, nonetheless, achieved the bomb, and China soon will. Whatever the immediate military significance, the psychological impact is not to be underestimated. Possession of The Bomb is the status symbol of world politics; just as France impressed Germany with her achievement, so Peking will impress Tokyo. Closer relations between China and Japan, like those between Germany and France, are in the cards and will also run athwart America's Great Design. This Great Design, when astringently exam-

Tired of the Cold War

"From the point of view of the U.S., it is clearly in our interests to welcome negotiations on Berlin, on Germany, or indeed on any and all European problems in which we are involved. In the absence of a more stable situation in Berlin and hence in Europe, the prospects at best can only be for a continued drain on our resources for many years, without clear indication of how or when this drain will be ended. . . .

"... the increases in Common Market tariffs on agricultural products, as against former European national tariffs, carry grave implications for the foreign trade of the U.S. Agricultural exports constitute a major element of export to Western Europe and a major source of exchange earnings. . . . These tendencies in the Common Market, moreover, take on added significance in the light of an expanding trade between Western Europe and the Communist nations of Eastern Europe. . . .

"If there are grounds for concern with European attitudes toward foreign aid, even more serious is the European reluctance to increase contributions to the common defense of the West under NATO . . . if the Europeans believe that peace can be sustained without the addition of the promised European divisions . . . there is no reason to reject the possibility that it can be maintained with fewer American divisions in Europe. . . .

"Finally, inasmuch as there is little likelihood of Western Europe adopting trade inhibitions comparable to our own, we should consider equalizing the commercial opportunities of our own people in Eastern Europe, particularly in the realm of agricultural commodities and, in this connection, reexamine both Executive procedures and pertinent legislation."

—*Berlin In A Changing Europe: A Report made to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at the President's request by Majority Leader Mansfield and Senators Boggs (Del.), Pell (R.I.) and Smith (Mass) Jan. 28.*

ined, is nothing more than perpetual containment and cold war. The secondary powers East and West are sick of both. There are signs (see box on this page) that we are, too.

The second technological change is the obsolescence of the liquid fuel intermediate range missiles we set up in Western Europe and their replacement by Polaris submarines. The IRBM's we are now removing from Turkey, Italy and Britain were originally established, like Moscow's in Cuba, to overcome an unfavorable gap in intercontinental missiles. Their removal from Italy and Turkey has a double significance. From one point of view, it may be seen as a response in kind to the removal of the Soviet missiles from Cuba. The Turks were as attached to their missiles as the Cubans were; the Americans manning them were, like the Russians manning those in Cuba, a guarantee that any attack by the superpower neighbor

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would bring the other superpower at once into the conflict. Only a few months ago the Turks were protesting against any deal equating their bases with Cuba's. Now they are suddenly to be removed, ostensibly to be replaced by a multinational Polaris force. But the Associated Press in the first report on the missile evacuation (*Washington Star*, Jan. 24) admitted that this force would not be ready "until close to 1970." In the meantime, the *AP* quickly added, "the U.S. has more than enough long range missile power to shield the alliance." This is what Russia told the Cubans. The fact is that both the missiles in Turkey and the missiles in Cuba were of a kind suitable only for a first strike. Their withdrawal on both sides eases tension, even at the expense of making smaller allies feel less secure.

Ready For a Fortress America

The other aspect of the missiles removal is of more long range significance. The development of the ICBMs and the Polaris means that we no longer need European bases. The earlier feeling of Atlantic Community comfortably idealized the fact that we had to put our troops and missiles in Europe as forward bases of containment against the Soviet Union. Technology has made such forward bases vulnerable to Soviet attack and unnecessary for American strategy. Militarily speaking, we are ready to be a Fortress America, whose long range missiles and widely ranging submarines can cover the globe from our own emplacements and bases. So it is important to notice that de Gaulle's declaration of independence from the United States came just at the time when we became technologically independent, in a military sense, from Western Europe. At the same time Western Europe, thanks to its amazing recovery and the Common Market, became economically independent of the United States. The most dramatic evidence of this may be seen in the figures on comparative gold holdings given in the last report of the Council of Economic Advisers to the President. At the end of 1948 the U.S. held 71 percent of the free world's gold and Western Europe only 15 percent. By June of last year our share of the gold supply had fallen to 40 percent, theirs had risen to 44 percent. The six countries of the Common Market between them have surpassed the U.S. in volume of exports and imports combined. Its population, only slightly less than ours,

Liberty, Like Charity . . .

If the Procurator of the Soviet Union were asked to speak on civil liberties and devoted himself exclusively to denouncing their infraction in the United States, he would evoke snorts of derision. This—in reverse—is what Attorney General Robert Kennedy did in his address before the 10th anniversary of the Fund for the Republic's Centre for the Study of Democratic Institutions. The talk was to be on Civil Liberties and the Cold War, but at the last minute he changed this to Civil Rights and the Cold War. He did speak out strongly against violations of civil liberties, but only in the Soviet Union, South Africa and Ghana. He said not one word about their decline at home, or our own need for a refresher in Jeffersonianism. What he had to say of the Soviet Union's failings was quite true if—like his jokes—hardly new. But only to talk of the mote in the other fellow's eye was less than Christian in a speech so well larded with references to God. One of the luncheon guests summed up the disappointment when he said, amid the weak spatter of barely polite applause, "Well, we've just won another victory in the cold war."

now represents the largest single trading bloc in the world.

The interests of the Common Market coincide with those of the United States and Britain neither in the economic nor in the political sphere, much less in the military. From a military point of view, both the French and the Germans resent our pressure on them to raise the number of their conventional troops; they see themselves as expendable foot-soldiers in a nuclear army. From an economic point of view, the United States, the British Commonwealth and France are competitors in agriculture. France would like to utilize the common market, first to expand its farm production (at the expense of the surpluses we are already producing) and secondly to gain a preferred position in the West European market for Algeria and the tropical products of the French speaking Africans (at the expense of Latin America). Politically, de Gaulle has long resented Anglo-American domination. We turned down his proposal for a 3-power directorate over NATO in 1957 and he has been on an independent line ever since. His biggest argument now for covert German cooperation is that a deal between Kennedy and Khrushchev would freeze a divided Germany permanently; Moscow

Timely Reminder: The Efficiency of the Defense We're Getting for \$50 Billion-A-Year

In an interview with David Kraslow of the *Knight Newspapers*, Attorney General Robert Kennedy disclosed that no U.S. air cover of the Bay of Pigs invasion was ever promised or planned. The Attorney General was a member of the 4-man commission which investigated the abortive attack on Cuba. This contradicts the many now-it-can-be-told accounts that the failure was due to a last-minute order countermanding plans for air cover. The Bay of Pigs debacle, the Attorney General told Mr. Kraslow, could not be attributed to "any single factor. There were several major mistakes. Victory was never close." Yet the basic plan, as the Attorney General said in an interview with the *U.S. News & World Report*, was "approved by our military, the Pentagon, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as the CIA." The failure was the failure of our military and intelligence bureaucracy.

This bureaucracy, if not the largest, is certainly the most expensive of its kind in history. The new budget estimates sent Congress a few days before these interviews were published show that we are now spending more than \$50 bil-

lions a year on it. In fiscal '64 this will reach \$56 billions, \$20 billions more than ten years earlier. In those ten years we will have spent more than \$400 billions on our military establishment. How much additionally has gone to the CIA is a secret. We suspect it wasn't skimpy.

Yet this enormous machine could not competently plan a military task as easy as the invasion of an island only 90 miles away, its skies open to constant surveillance, its shores easily infiltrated by agents, its communications readily monitored, its weapons then only the cast-offs we gave Batista and he left behind. The Generals and the spy chiefs whose pictures smile or glower at us regularly from the covers of our big magazines turned out to be better at press agency than war. "What if such botched planning," the *Washington Star* asked in an editorial, "had formed the basis for a major U.S. military operation? We would be lucky if anyone had gotten out alive." There is no doubt the \$50 billions a year we give the Pentagon could do a lot of damage. The doubt is how many of us would be around when it had gotten through with our defense.

would never relinquish East Germany to a U.S. dominated Atlantic Community but might do so to a genuine Third Force, especially if the Common Market offered trade advantages to the Eastern bloc. Beyond that lies his old dream of a Europe united from the Atlantic to the Urals, and he sees this coming with the split between Moscow and Peking.

British Hostility to Common Market

The question of Britain's adhesion to the Common Market has been vastly oversimplified in this country. If de Gaulle hadn't rejected Britain, it is quite likely that Britain would soon have rejected the Common Market. Few seem to recall that three British elder statesmen, Lord Avon (Anthony Eden), Earl Attlee (Clement Attlee) and the Marquess of Salisbury only a few months ago opposed Britain's entry into the Common Market, that virtually every British farm, business and labor organization had come out against joining and that Gaitskell was about to exploit British national and imperial feeling by making opposition to the Common Market Labor's main theme in the next elections. "It means the end of 1,000 years of history and the end of the Commonwealth," Gaitskell said of joining the Common Market in a radio address last September. Macmillan's Conservatives were badly split on the question. Now Macmillan can have the best of all possible worlds—de Gaulle rather than Britain has taken the onus of breaking up the talks, the Conservatives are united again, and London can utilize American resentment against France to solidify that "special relationship" with Washington which the British prize and de Gaulle resents.

There has been oversimplification, too, in our press reports of opposition to de Gaulle from his European partners. In the 16 months of negotiation over Britain's entry, they have been unanimously opposed to the concessions Britain asked. The talks had made little progress on the three main questions of a common tariff, a common agricultural policy and what to do about Britain's partners in the Commonwealth and in the European Free Trade Association, the so-called "Outer Seven."

No Place for Kowalski

We regret the acceptance by former Congressman Frank Kowalski (D. Conn) of an appointment by the President to the Subversive Activities Control Board. This is a kangaroo court set up by Congress over President Truman's veto as a means of blacklisting radicals and radical organizations. A liberal like Mr. Kowalski can only dignify it by his presence; he cannot hope to change its character. Its built-in verdicts and its potential for thought control helped to turn one of Mr. Kowalski's predecessors on the board, Harry Cain, from a McCarthyite into a crusader for the Bill of Rights. Only once before has a liberal been appointed to the SACB. This was when Truman named a maverick Republican from Indiana, Charles M. La Follette, to the first Board in October, 1950. La Follette, a former Congressman, was already a marked man with the Rightists for his exposure of Nazis in German industry as a military governor in the Reich. His appointment was killed by the Internal Security Committee of the Senate, then under Pat McCarran. McCarran refused to report the nomination to the Senate for confirmation, and with the close of Congress in October, 1951, La Follette's interim appointment ended. Maybe Eastland will do the same for Kowalski. He deserves a better fate and a more decent job.

De Gaulle's point that admission of Britain with all its worldwide connections would fundamentally change the nature of the European Common Market can hardly be disputed. Nor can one deny that our hostility to allowing European neutrals like Sweden and Switzerland into the Common Market and our anxiety to get Britain in reflects a desire to tie any European combination securely to us politically. Finally the "interdependence" Kennedy offered Europe in his July 4 speech last year turned out in the Cuban crisis to be a one-way street. When we felt our vital interests involved, we took the world to the brink of nuclear war without consulting our allies. But when Britain and France felt their vital interests endangered in Nasser's seizure of the Suez Canal, we joined hands

Three Prize Exhibits: What Anti-Castro Fanaticism Is Doing to the U.S.

There may be some dispute as to what Castro is doing to Cuba. There can be none as to what he is doing to the U.S. We offer three items. One was the release by the Senate Internal Security Committee of hearings charmingly entitled, "Attempts of Pro-Castro Forces to Pervert the American Press." This contains rather wild charges made by a Cuban refugee against six American journalists who visited Cuba, and reached conclusions too friendly to Castro. The effect is to put U.S. newspapermen on notice that this Senatorial Big Brother is listening. Any observations in Cuba which do not fit the preconceptions of Chairman Eastland or Vice Chairman Dodd may result in the issuance of subpoenas. This puts a "handle with care" sign on freedom of the press.

The second item is the news that the Medical Aid to Cuba Committee is dissolving. The reason given is that the \$25,000,000 in medical supplies given Castro as part of the ransom for the Bay of Pigs prisoners makes its work unnecessary. The truth is that the going over given this group by the House Un-American Activities Committee was enough to frighten away much of its support. Though medical supplies were not included in the U.S. embargo on Cuba for humanitarian reasons, the Cubans had no dollars with which to buy them. The Committee sought to raise the dollars only to find that humanitarianism even when ostensibly government policy was un-American. Melitta del

Villar acquitted herself before the Committee with a wit and courage which has been matched only by Dagmar Wilson of the Women's Strike for Peace. But the damage was done.

The third item is the ruling handed down by Judge Edward Weinfeld in New York in the Santiesteban case. This is the case of the Cuban diplomat who was arrested on charges of sabotage November 16 with a burst of melodramatic publicity. This is the first case in which the U.S. has instituted criminal proceedings against a member of another country's mission to the United Nations. The accused was arrested even though he had entered this country on a diplomatic passport to which the State Department had affixed its visa. The effect of the decision is to cast doubt on the immunity of all members of diplomatic missions to the UN below the rank of Ambassador, though international law customarily grants such immunity to an Ambassador's staff and entourage. If the UN were in Moscow and this was the ruling of a Soviet court, the uproar of outrage is easy to imagine. Here the decision is taken for granted. There hasn't been a peep of protest out of the UN. Santiesteban, in lieu of \$50,000 bail, is still in jail where it is impossible to prepare safely for his coming trial since in too many cases our government has wire-tapped conversations of lawyer and client when held on prison premises. This is the example we set of justice.

Only Way to Prevent the Spread of Nuclear Weapons

with Russia to stop them lest Arab resentment endanger our oil holdings in the Middle East. From these two traumatic experiences stem the desire of both the British and French to have an "independent nuclear deterrent" and our own unwillingness to encourage this lest they then obtain the power to blackmail us, by threatening to precipitate a nuclear war unless we support them.

The Myth That We're For Free Trade

From a longer range world point of view, de Gaulle's narrow nationalism is, of course, wrong. But we can only hope to change it when we set a better example. We do not seem to realize what a strange spectacle we make in the role of a crusader for freer world trade: no country in the world wraps its industrial and agricultural producers in so many protectionist featherbeds. Under our "Buy American" policies we have been paying 35% more for aluminum and 30% more for steel than foreign bidders offered. NATO awards in Europe are made to the lowest bidder but here the armed forces give domestic suppliers an advantage which—in the case of the Navy—runs up to 50%. While Secretary of Agriculture Freeman has been scolding the Common Market for shutting out U.S. farm products, he has been pleading at home for higher tariffs on cotton textiles and for curtailing imports of woolens. In the middle of last year's free trade crusade for the Trade Expansion bill, the White House struck a blow at Belgian industry by a 100% increase in tariffs on woolen carpets and glass. As seen from abroad our "Food for Peace" program is a dumping operation at the expense of foreign agriculture. Indeed our enthusiasm for the Common Market has begun to wane sharply with its restrictions on U.S. farm products. Angry anti de Gaulle speeches by Morse and Fulbright last week were triggered off in part at least by restrictions on apples (Oregon) and poultry (Arkansas).

To the resentment over our protectionism must be added the ill will engendered by our effort to impose political restrictions on East-West trade, as in our recent campaign against German and Japanese steel for the Soviet oil pipeline system; here our policy is the tool of the oil trust in its effort to keep out cheaper Soviet oil. Not until we free our own trade from all kinds of restrictions, political and economic, can we expect other countries to forego protectionism.

Working Class Victory

The great filibusters of the past have been all-night sessions of the Senate, in which mavericks held the floor with the stubborn endurance of five-day bike racers. No such vigor marks the current Southern filibuster against any change in the cloture rule. In checking back on the first ten days of this year's filibuster, we found that the shortest session was 3 hours and 21 minutes; the longest, 5 hours and 55 minutes. The leadership and the forces in favor of a change in the rule allow this leisurely pace which suits the majestic Bourbons of the South. This is how one wages a fight about which one does not really care. When the liberals filibustered last July against the Communications Satellite bill, the Senate was worked a 12-hour day. This year the average session during the first ten days was 4.9 hours. Thus the Senate became the first section of the American working class to achieve a 25-hour week. Our congratulations.

Much the same is true when we come to the problem of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. The Soviet agreement to permit two or three inspections a year has given new impetus to a nuclear test ban. But even if an agreement is reached it will not automatically solve the Nth country problem. China will not give up testing without political negotiations. Recognition and an atom free Pacific would certainly be part of Peking's price. In Europe our offer of that Rube Goldbergian device, a multilateral Polaris force with polyglot crews and a committee for each trigger, will not long put off the evil day of new nuclear Nth powers. France is on her own; China soon will be; Sweden, Switzerland and Israel are on their way. So long as neither the U.S. nor the USSR are willing to say that they will never use the nuclear bomb first, but reserve the right to strike with it if they consider vital interests at stake, how can other nations be asked to forego the weapon? In any alliance, the power which has the nuclear weapon is the boss; it can determine life or death for all the rest. This is, what de Gaulle sees. What he does not see is that thermonuclear power has made the whole system of nation states obsolete and suicidal. The only way Washington and Moscow can prevent the spread of these weapons is to relinquish them before it is too late.

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