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Hiding The Truth on Nuclear Test Detection

Writing on the eve of the Geneva conference, a conscientious newspaperman feels a sense of anguish. It is as if, almost imperceptibly, the arms race were transforming our society; garrison state practices descend upon us softly like a warm but suffocating featherbed. The decision to resume atmospheric testing, which may have fateful consequences, is taken by Presidential proclamation; it is announced, not debated; its real motives are known only to a handful in a kind of American Politbureau. The country accepts it with only scattered protest; even organizations like the National Committee for A Sane Nuclear Policy are numb and dumb; it is disturbing that the Committee issued no statement on the President's decision. Like Tennyson's Light Brigade, it is not ours to reason why.

An Anglo-American Disagreement

In the final hours before the conference opened, a serious dispute was taking place between the British and American governments but the American public was little aware of it. The dispute was technical as well as political. It involved a difference of scientific opinion. The British view was based on the "very good results" (I cannot give the source but I can assure the reliability of that quotation) they achieved in monitoring our recent underground test series. This led them to believe that the inspection requirements for a new test ban cessation agreement could be revised downward radically. There are indications that some Americans in key places agree with them; I cannot without breaking confidences identify them. The Washington correspondent of *The Times* (London) reflected the views of one informed American source when he reported (March 7), prematurely and too optimistically, "The American view is that improvements in the science of detection can permit less physical intrusion on Soviet territory than was earlier held to be necessary. Detection is by no means perfect, but because underground testing, for which most of the machinery was devised, is no longer regarded as significant, it is prepared to modify further its demands for on site inspection and international control stations within the Soviet Union." The State Department correspondent of the *Washington Star*, Earl Voss, reflected the views of another American source when he reported (March 11), "One key scientist advising the American government reports that every one of the Nevada-New Mexico shots, even those below one kiloton, have produced warning signals which almost certainly would have been picked up by a test-ban inspection system." Why in a free society, if I may be forgiven this antiquarian phrase, should such information be leaked out only in eye-dropper proportions, noted only by a few careful readers of many papers, and open to evaluation only to those within the government or the press corps itself?

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Testing and the Balance of Power

"Geneva, March 11—The crucial fact to be recognized at the forthcoming disarmament conference is that Russia achieved a break-through during its last nuclear tests. Therefore . . . the U.S. must resume testing itself . . . The neutrals have to be reminded it is only because there is a balance of implied terror that they continue as independent states."

—C. L. Sulzberger, *New York Times*, March 12.

Mr. [Wm. H.] Bates (R. Mass.): I would like to go back to this question of nuclear testing. And I would like to get an assessment of the importance that you attach to it from a military point of view.

Secretary [of Defense] McNamara: [Deleted]. . . .

Mr. Bates: You don't think it is a grave matter of concern?

Secretary McNamara: Well it is difficult to say whether it is grave or not. [Statement off the record]. But I am just giving you my personal opinion. [Further statement off the record]. I don't know whether I have answered your question fully, but I hope so.

Mr. Bates: Well, a little bit differently than I expected. I know about the reasons for the tests. But I don't know of anyone on the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy [of which Bates is also a member—IFS] who doesn't think that this is of supreme importance to the survival of the Nation. You don't agree with that?

Secretary McNamara: I don't believe that they have considered the power we have if they consider this is of supreme importance. Maybe we are arguing over semantics here.

Mr. Bates: Well, it is now—since October 1958 that the moratorium went into effect, we have stayed still for all intents and purposes. We haven't tested.

Secretary McNamara: We haven't stayed still, however.

Mr. Bates: As far as testing is concerned.

Secretary McNamara: We have stayed still as far as testing, but we haven't stayed still on weapons technology and development.

Mr. Bates: But we don't know where you can go on the weight per unit of yield. That can be determined only by testing. You can extrapolate all you want, but until you have had testing you don't know what you are doing. I don't know any witnesses that have appeared before our committee that have any reservations whatever of the vital importance of conducting these tests.

Secretary McNamara: [Deleted]. I want to go on record that whether we test or don't test, we have a tremendous amount of nuclear power and we propose to continue to increase it and that is the purpose of this budget.

Mr. Bates: Well, let me put it this way. We had experts come before the committee who went this far. They said unless we conducted these tests, that the balance of power might well shift to the Russians. You don't agree with that statement?

Secretary McNamara: I do not.

—Before the House Armed Services Committee Jan. 25 in executive session, from pps. 3201-2 Hearings On Military Posture, just released after censorship.

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Another Method of Censorship

Many months ago the Senate disarmament subcommittee was assured that seismological information would not be classified. But the same result has been achieved by a different route. A report on the recent underground tests and on how far away they were detected has been prepared by the Coast and Geodetic Survey in the Department of Commerce but it was done on contract for the AEC's Livermore Laboratory. Coast and Geodetic says that since the work was done for another agency, it is not allowed to give out the results. The AEC, which has a bad record of hiding the facts on test detection as on radiation, will determine when and how the results will be made known. This is the blank wall we encountered when we tried to find out what the new shots had shown. But in respect to one of those shots, the Project Gnome shot in the salt deposits of New Mexico, the curtain had already been breached and we were able to learn a little more than previously reported in trying to track down the basis for the sensational story which appeared in the *New York Times* March 5, "New U.S. Detection Studies Add Barrier to Atom Pact" by John W. Finney, a report on which was crowded out of our last week's issue. As James A. Wechsler angrily noted in his column in the *New York Post* (March 6), this story appeared right after the first reports from London that the British government, on the basis of new scientific information, was prepared to propose "looser controls" at Geneva. It was destructive of such hopes to have America's leading paper at once appear with a story which began, "Extensive research in nuclear testing in Nevada in the last five months has confirmed the conclusions of U.S. scientists on the difficulties of detecting clandestine underground explosions of nuclear weapons."

Who Really Got Tricked?

Senator Humphrey: Mr. [Wm. C.] Foster [head of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency], I have been very intrigued by the comment of many Americans to the effect that we have been tricked for three and a half years by the Soviets in these nuclear test discussions . . . Now my question is this: do you think that we were ahead of the Soviet Union in nuclear technology, sophistication of weapons, variety, design and numbers, yield, et cetera, in 1958, let us say?

Mr. Foster: Yes, sir, I do.

Sen. Humphrey: Do our scientists and our weapons evaluation experts feel we have been ahead, let us say, until the recent Soviet tests?

Mr. Foster: Yes, sir, and I think they still feel in many areas we are ahead.

Sen. Humphrey: Well, wouldn't it be more reasonable then to assume that the Soviets have been tricked into these discussions, if you are going to use that nasty word "tricked"?

—Senate disarmament subcommittee March 8.

What was a reader to believe?

Part of the reason for our smothered feeling is the lack of enterprise and independence shown by our press in dealing with such contradictory reports. Any reporter is free to do what we have done. This was first of all to obtain from the Defense Department the actual text of the questions and answers on which Mr. Finney based his story, and the other was to check them with the seismologists at Coast and Geodetic Survey. Such inquiry showed (1) that though these answers were couched in double-talk designed to give as pessimistic an impression as possible they were not as pessimistic as Mr. Finney's story and (2) that the Defense Department answers, as cleared by AEC and State, were more pessimistic and less can-

JFK's 15 Arms Advisers: More Old Stuffed Shirts on the New Frontier

The basic conventionality of the Kennedy Administration's attitude toward disarmament is evident in its choice of the 15-member General Advisory Committee to the new U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. It is on the whole the usual collection of stuffed shirts to be found on umteen public committees, and it is weighted against disarmament.

From the labor movement, for example, the Administration picked George Meany, who belongs to the Adenauer school of cold warriors, rather than Walter Reuther, who is friendly to disarmament. Among the fellow members with whom Mr. Meany will find himself allied is Dean A. McGee, of Oklahoma City, president of Kerr-McGee Oil Industries. McGee and his partner, the multimillionaire Senator Kerr, have a big stake in the nuclear arms race. Their oil company, as the Weekly disclosed a year ago (Feb. 13, 1961), has three subsidiaries in uranium, one of them the largest of the AEC's 27 suppliers. This subsidiary, Kermac Nuclear Fuels, has contracts to sell the AEC almost a third of a billion dollars worth of uranium by 1965.

Three other members are clearly in the same pro arms race category. One is Roger M. Blough, chairman of the board of U.S. Steel, elevated to that post by the Morgan firm because it felt his predecessor, Fairless, had grown too liberal and chummy with labor. Mr. Blough was described to us by a reporter who knows him well as a man with a "profound contempt for the public interest" and "incredibly reactionary." U.S. Steel, too, has a stake in the arms race, not as great as in the pre-electronic past but still large.

The two others in this category are Thomas D. White, retired Air Force Chief of Staff, and Herbert F. York, now

Chancellor of the University of California, formerly head of research at the Defense Dept.

While these five have clear attachments to the arms race, only one of the 15 is strongly associated with the cause of disarmament and that is John J. McCloy. Of the two scientists named to the advisory group, one, George Kistiakowsky of Harvard, was Eisenhower's science adviser; he is an ultra-cautious man, who is said to be swinging emotionally over to "strong" policies. The other scientist, I. R. Rabi of Columbia, has spoken out against the arms race but not too often.

The two newspapermen on the panel are ultra-respectable though somewhat liberal. One is Ralph McGill of the Atlanta Constitution and the other John Cowles of the Minneapolis Star and Tribune. The member who looks most hopeful oddly enough was legal adviser under Dulles in the State Department; he is Herman Phleger, the San Francisco lawyer, and he is given credit for pushing the Antarctic Treaty through the government against heavy opposition. With him might stand Trevor Gardner, a former director of research for the Air Force, well informed and well-intentioned; he was described to me as "half for peace," a good batting average for a former Air Force man.

The others are the New York banker, Robert A. Lovett, a former Secretary of Defense; James A. Perkins of Carnegie Corporation; and the Rev. Edward A. Conway, Prof. of political science at Creighton University, Omaha. In a curious slip, Wm. C. Foster, chairman of the U.S. Arms Agency, referred to Father Creighton at a Senate disarmament subcommittee hearing March 8 as "head of the armament department" at Creighton. That should qualify him.

did than the conclusions reached by Coast and Geodetic at least with respect to Project Gnome, which has not been entirely blacked out by censorship.

Why Coast and Geodetic Was Encouraged

Leonard W. Murphy, chief seismologist of Coast and Geodetic Survey, told me his bureau regarded the results of Project Gnome as encouraging for two reasons. The first was that with few exceptions the 90-or-so stations which detected Project Gnome all reported a first compressional P-wave, which can be used to identify a nuclear explosion. The second was that, with the results, Coast and Geodetic had been able to work out a travel time curve with which to locate the explosion within a few tenths of a mile. This confirms earlier expert testimony that an inspection system could be "calibrated" to locate the scene of a buried explosion within limits narrow enough for successful inspection. Thus progress was registered on the two key problems of identification and location.

Perhaps most important of all, hidden away in the answer to Mr. Finney, but not discussed by him, was the revelation that the computations on which Dr. Edward Teller based his alarmist view that underground explosions could be "muffled" in big salt caverns turned out to be untrue in at least one significant respect. "The seismic wave from GNOME," the Defense Department answer to Mr. Finney said in a cryptic passage, "appear to have been somewhat larger than from Logan (5 kt in tuff) and somewhat smaller than Blanca (20 kt in tuff)." The Teller computation was that by exploding in salt, the impact of the blast would be muffled or diminished by a factor of three as compared with a blast in Nevada tuff. But it turned out that Project Gnome, the 5 kiloton salt shot, was actually magnified in many areas where it was received; its signal, as the answer to Mr. Finney admitted, was larger than a shot of the same size in tuff. Seismic stations as far away as Finland clearly registered the tell-tale first compressional P wave from it. As the answer to Mr. Finney said, with grudging understatement, "Seismic waves from GNOME were somewhat surprising to most seismologists" and the unexpectedly large recordings at many foreign stations "could be used for locating the epicenter in the same way that recordings within the U.S. could be used. They would perhaps also be useful for assisting in identifying the probable nature of the source." These were obscure admissions of the fact that a

Hopeful Clue Eludes Censorship

Mr. [Frank C.] Osmer, [Jr. R. N. J.]: What in your opinion is our relative standing at this time in that great race for the next big one, that is the development of a reasonably successful anti-missile missile?

Secretary [of Defense] McNamara: [Deleted by censor].

Mr. Osmer: I notice—

Secretary McNamara: I believe they are even farther from it.

—P.3217 recently released hearings on U.S. Military Posture before House Armed Services Committee.

shot as small as 5 kilotons could register location and identification clues as far as 7200 miles away. None of this was in Mr. Finney's story.

Special Task Force Proposed

Whatever happens at Geneva—and little is likely to be accomplished—the forces of peace must begin to organize for the next conference. When atmospheric tests by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. resume, the resultant fallout and tension will bring a new outcry for a new test cessation. We have to be ready to support that demand with more knowledge of the technicalities in which human hope can so easily be buried. There is at Coast and Geodetic a mine of information which independent seismologists could tap. There are first of all the seismographs of the recent test series from Coast and Geodetic's network of 23 stations which extend from Fairbanks, Alaska, south to the Antarctic, and as far outward as Hawaii and Guam. These seismographs—so I was assured—are not classified and may be examined by seismologists. The other set of records are the seismic reports which Coast and Geodetic gets from some 500 stations around the world, including Soviet stations from Prague through Moscow to Vladivostok. It seems too much to hope for that these records might provide a clue to Soviet detection of our underground shots but someone technically qualified ought to look at them, and at the British, Swedish, Finnish and Japanese reports. Can't peace organizations get up a task force of independent seismologists to make this study so as to provide clearer public understanding for fresh negotiations by the time both sides realize that testing cannot go on forever?

A Technical Journal Lifts the Curtain on the Truth About the Anti-Missile

"When the ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] first appeared on the scene, the problem of defending ourselves against it seemed relatively simple to define, at least, although exceedingly difficult to solve. By now, not even the problem is simple any more. . . .

"The threat is no longer the 'simple' ICBM. By now, we must assume, the enemy can launch many ballistic missiles—IRBMs [intermediate range missiles] as well as ICBMs—at us at one time, along with screens of sophisticated decoys. And these missiles may be launched from any of many land bases, from the air, from ships, from submarines under the sea. Even space-launched missiles may be soon added to the threat. The missiles themselves are sophisticated, too—the techniques are already available for changing the speed and course of their warheads in flight.

"Nor is this all. If the anti-ICBM weapons we are now working on will stop only the ICBMs the enemy has today, they are useless—they must stop the more advanced ICBMs the enemy will have tomorrow, when our counter weapons

are operational. . . .

"Though [the Army's Nike] Zeus is the only anti-ICBM weapon we have that is anywhere near operational status, there is considerable doubt that it will ever be produced. Not even if it proves it can do the job for which it was designed will its future be assured. It may already be obsolete in view of the technical advances made by the ICBM offense since it was started a little less than 4 years ago.

"Many of the decision makers in the Defense Department argue that Zeus is not flexible enough to be modified to meet even the enemy's estimated current offensive capability. They claim that it cannot be brought to the point where it will not be fooled by decoys, saturated by large-scale attacks or overwhelmed by satellite-launched ICBMs.

"Right now, Zeus is costing us a million dollars a day to develop. To produce it would cost a billion a year. To produce enough Zeus systems to defend about one-third of the U.S. population would cost some \$14 billion."

—Space Aeronautics, November 1961.

Editor of Worker Ordered to Jail; Government Suspects Communist Influence

"Leader of The Free World" Begins A New (and Sillier) Red Hunt

In his memorable series on the Soviet Union in the New York Times (Feb. 5 through 8), Harrison Salisbury wrote of the revival of liberal ideas among the best Russian youth. He said three events had shocked these idealists. One was Moscow's resumption of testing; the second was Nehru's invasion of Goa and the third was the renewed prosecution of the Communists in the United States under the McCarran Act.

If the President and the Attorney General wonder why so many students get false ideas of the United States, one reason is that these ideas are not entirely false. A country which claims to be the leader of the free world but imposes a form of outlawry on a radical party which operates freely elsewhere in the Western world (except West Germany) hardly fits the Jeffersonian image.

Names They Already Know

Here in the District of Columbia the wheels are beginning to grind. Philip Bart, alleged to be the organizational secretary of the Communist Party, is the first to go to jail under the McCarran Act; sentenced for contempt in refusing, on proffer of personal immunity, to tell a grand jury the names of other officers.

What makes the Bart affair look silly is that the government itself, in opposing the Party's motion to dismiss the indictment against it for failure to register under the McCarran Act, said "as both the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court observed in the Party case, the officers have never attempted to conceal their membership." If so, why jail one top Party official for refusing to name the others, when they're already known?

A similar offer of immunity in return for testimony was rejected by James E. Jackson, editor of The Worker, and he too was sentenced to jail in civil contempt by Federal Judge Alexander Holtzoff. The sentence has just been stayed pending appeal by the Court of Appeals, where Judges Edgerton, Fahy and Burger heard the case.

The same Court, with Judges Bazelon and Burger sitting, had earlier refused a stay in the Bart case. Perhaps the freedom of the press issue in the Jackson case made the difference.

Walter In Orbit Over Scales

"Mr. Speaker, a bleeding-heart campaign has been launched to bring about Presidential clemency for Junius Scales, former leader of the Communist Party's Carolinas district. To date, Scales has served only five months of a 6-year prison sentence for violating the membership clause of the Smith Act. . . . Clemency-for-Scales articles are appearing in leftwing publications. . . . Editorials in the New York Times and the Washington Post, two Goliaths of the weeping willow world, have jumped on the Scales bandwagon . . .

"What are the reasons given? . . . The first one I mentioned was that Scales is the only person the Government has been able to prosecute successfully for violation of the Smith Act's membership clause. This, to me, is a meaningless argument. Just because Col. John Glenn is the only American to have orbited the earth, does that mean his accomplishment should be discounted?"

—Chairman Walter of House Un-American, in Cong. Record March 7. The campaign for Scales is based on the fact that, though serving time as a "member", he broke with the Party after Hungary.

Among the questions which Jackson had refused to answer were whether the editorial policies of The Worker reflected the viewpoint of the Communist Party and whether Communist leaders had ever suggested "the subject matter of The Worker's editorials." Even without the FBI and the CIA, the government might have suspected those editorials weren't being slipped in by the U. S. Chamber of Commerce.

Jackson's lawyer, Joseph Forer, told the Court this was the first time in American history an editor had been ordered to jail for refusing to discuss the editorial policies of his paper. Judge Edgerton asked U.S. Attorney David C. Acheson if this were true. Acheson said editors had been sent to jail under the Sedition Act in the Eighteenth Century but he did not know that any of them had been sentenced for civil contempt in refusing to answer grand jury questions about their editorial policies. Judge Edgerton commented dryly that anyway that was a long time ago.

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