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How Kennedy Could Rejuvenate His Administration

For a few hours at least, to short wave listeners in Latin America and elsewhere, it seemed last week that the U.S. was about to initiate a fresh beginning in Cuba policy. Station WURL in New York which broadcasts on short wave in Spanish and Portuguese to Latin America, carried this story: Its reporter, Leopold Aragon, said he went up to Adlai Stevenson after his talk at the National Press Club here last Monday and told Mr. Stevenson that in Havana two weeks earlier Fidel Castro had recalled President Kennedy's inaugural remark about never fearing to negotiate and said that he nevertheless seemed afraid to negotiate with Cuba. According to Mr. Aragon, Mr. Stevenson replied that we're not afraid to negotiate with Castro. "Any time Fidel Castro wants to negotiate with us," Mr. Stevenson was quoted as having said, "all he needs to do is to send an emissary to Washington and let us reopen our Embassy in Havana. He closed the Embassy. He broke contact with us. You can tell Castro we'll negotiate any time he's ready to negotiate in good faith." Mr. Aragon claims that this statement was made in the presence of Secretary of Labor Goldberg and of the president of the Press Club who were leaving the dais with Stevenson when the reporter approached them.

All We Ask is Unconditional Surrender

This story was also broadcast here in Washington late the same afternoon on WTTG, and created the hope that we were at last ready to break out of our stale rigidity on Cuba. But when one reporter reached what he described as "a high administration source" he was told that there had been no change in policy, and that Castro would have to divest himself of his military and political ties with the Soviet bloc before the U.S. would consider renewing relations. By this unrealistic formula, of course, Castro would have to give up the ties on which he now depends for arms, oil and a sugar market before being at all sure that he would be offered alternative sources of supply and markets by us. This is tantamount to a request for his unconditional surrender. Next morning before going into an executive session with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Mr. Stevenson entered a general denial of the Aragon story to a UPI man. The denial seemed to settle it until the State Department later in the day at its press briefing confused the picture again by giving out a somewhat different version. Its spokesman said that what Mr. Stevenson had meant was that the U.S. is ready to negotiate with Cuba on such "strictly bilateral matters" as trade and expropriation of American property, but it would not negotiate "the question of Cuba becoming a beachhead for communism in this hemisphere." Despite the murky rhetoric this, too, sounded a little promising. But our own effort to obtain elucidation in another source dealing with Cuban policy elicited the answer that whatever Mr. Stevenson

Adlai Switches on Arms for Latins

Q. What's the role of the military in the Latin American picture and should the U.S. aid in the accomplishment of this role?

A. I have a feeling that this one came from Congress (laughter). I must say that when I came back from Latin America a year ago I was shocked by the extent to which the proportion of the national budgets went for military expenditures. This time I felt somewhat different. The problems of internal security are very great. For the most part the military, which has often been the bulwark of dictatorship and often been the instrument of dictatorship, are showing increasing signs of responsibility, of democratic conviction. And, of course, in a number of countries at least they represent the conservative solid secure foundation of any regime.

It's again a subject that is extremely difficult to generalize about. My own feeling is that as a matter of policy we should help them to man and arm sufficient forces for internal security because the crisis has not yet been reached. For external security or for any major external activity or for any major contribution to the hemispheric defense, I think they are unnecessary.

—Stevenson at the National Press Club June 29

might have said there was no disposition to engage in bilateral talks of any kind, except that of course if Castro wanted to send an emissary to offer compensation for American properties he could do so.

To match this icy attitude one has to go back to the days of Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby who believed that the Russian revolution would slink away abashed and disappear if only treated with the right degree of disdain. It seems to be an axiom of American foreign policy that the right way to deal with a revolution is to pretend as long as possible that it does not exist. It took 16 years before we recognized Soviet Russia. Only now, 12 years after the Chinese Revolution, we are sending up trial balloons about the possibility of granting Peking equal status in the UN Assembly with Taipei while Chiang keeps the seat on the Security Council, presumably on the theory that Communist China is on a small island known as Asia just off the shores of Formosa. Intervention having failed in China as it once failed in Russia, the bright young men of the New Frontier are falling back on the mouldy doctrines of non-recognition and containment to deal with Castro. Even if we can't keep China out of the UN much longer maybe we can solace ourselves by expelling Castro from the OAS. American foreign policy makers would feel bereft if they could not be unrealistic somewhere in the world.

My own feeling is that President Kennedy would find
(Continued on Page Four)

If Only There Were Some Way to Reach the Russian People With This Message...

I venture to say that Mr. Khrushchov made as unpleasant an impression on many Russians as he did on many friends of peace in the West by appearing in the uniform of a Lieutenant General for his Kremlin speech of June 21 and by the complacent way in which he discussed resumption of nuclear testing.

Mr. Khrushchov's overwhelming popularity within Russia and in many of the Soviet states reflects the fact that he has to some degree brought about an opening of Russia's windows on the West, a relaxation of tensions, and a lightening of the heavy hand which marked the Stalin period. His search for peace, as well as his warm and earthy personality, have won him popular affection at home.

It's Not Nikita the General They Love

But for a civilian leader to don a General's uniform, and to hang a row of decorations on his chest, is to dramatize his readiness for war, not his search for peace. The simplest Russian must have felt a certain chill to see Nikita Sergeyevich in uniform, suddenly become a General, and as many Russians as Westerners must have wondered just why Berlin was worth the gamble of a World War.

We are accustomed in the West to hearing our more light headed Generals and our American Legionnaires talk of war as if this were still 1914 or 1939, i.e. of periods in which war, though terrible enough, was still feasible and some semblance of victory still possible. It was indeed strange to hear Mr. Khrushchov begin to talk the same way.

Much that the Soviet Chairman had to say of the West was true. It is true that "the ruling circles of capitalist countries lack the courage to say openly they are against disarmament. They pretend that they are ready to negotiate. . . ." (*New York Times*, June 22.) It is true that "Hitlerite Generals not only command the Bundeswehr but they hold key posts in NATO and command French and British soldiers whose fathers fought against the Hitlerite invaders. . . . West German militarists have received rocket weapons and are demanding atomic weapons" (*The Times*, London, June 22).

But it is also true that in every strata of Western society, including the military, there is a growing number of men who realize that the arms race hastens to a dead end for

No Evidence of Cheating

Mr. [Robert] McCORMICK [NBC News]: Well, if the Russians do not want a treaty—and it seems fairly clear they don't—isn't that an indication that they are not cheating on us? If they are cheating obviously they would be making a lot of progress while we were doing nothing.

Ambassador [Arthur H.] DEAN [Chairman U.S. delegation nuclear test ban talks]: Well, all I can say is that we have examined very, very carefully in an effort to get evidence that they are testing. We can't find any evidence that they are, but then of course you can't prove the universal negative that they are not.

—Meet the Press, June 25

all mankind, and look about them for a way out. Mr. Kennedy is of this mind, and so are many of the men he has brought into the government with him. Mr. Khrushchov's speech in discussing the nuclear arms negotiations hardly did justice to this hopeful element in the West, nor gave his Soviet listeners any real idea of the differences between the two sides, of the sudden change in the Soviet position in calling for control by *troika*, or of the many months of patient negotiation and agreement frustrated by it.

On the contrary Mr. Khrushchov went on to prepare the public mind in the Soviet Union for resumption of tests in the tone and the terms we are accustomed to hear from our own Pentagon people and their satellite scientists. Here are his words:

Quite a few devices which need practical testing have been developed in the Soviet Union. This testing, of course, will increase the fighting power of our armed forces and enable us to develop even better atomic and nuclear bombs, enable us to improve the technology of their manufacture.

If in reply to the resumption of nuclear tests by the Western powers we did not start testing our weapons we would damage the defense potential of our country and of the entire Socialist community.

This passage is worth close study. In the first place neither here nor anywhere else in his speech is there any reference to the danger of fallout from resumed testing. He does not even say, as some of our people do, that he will keep testing below the ground or in outer space to reduce fallout. The one wholly effective place to test new weapons

The Spirit of Tolstoy Cries Out Again From Behind the Facade of a Soviet Man

"Many things I have seen have strengthened my conviction of the merits of socialism as a social system and made me realize keenly once again the significance of our Revolution for the progress of ordinary people.

"Other things, however, have forced me to the conclusion that there are a number of very fundamental irregularities in the home and foreign policy of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union under your leadership which I cannot bring myself to accept.

"I am unable any longer to continue to subscribe to the doctrine of a merciless and irreconcilable class and anti-religious struggle, carried to holocaustic lengths, which forms a foundation stone of Communist teaching, both theoretical and political.

"I am possessed by the conviction that every kind of intolerance towards any kind of person, be it even for the sake of the loftiest ideals, is nothing but a tremendous

anachronism in our atomic and space age, which has come upon us so suddenly—an anachronism which can only be explained by the existence of a certain time-gap between human thinking and reality.

"I am profoundly convinced, Nikita Sergeyevich, that only through the greatest tolerance towards all heterodox individuals, including even those whose thought is hostile, is the only means of salvation for humanity from mass fratricide and degeneration—both physical and moral—and that no alternative exists in our age. . . ."

—From a letter to Chairman Khrushchov by Oleg Lenchevsky, a Russian engineer who went to England in April on a Unesco fellowship in his own field of saline water conversion and decided he could no longer remain a member of the Communist Party. He was granted asylum in England. His letter and story were published by Edward Crankshaw in the *London Observer* June 25.

... Renewed Testing for "Better" Weapons Will Only Increase Our Mutual Peril

is in the atmosphere and apparently it is atmospheric testing which the Soviet Union will resume if "the Western powers" begin testing again. The attitude toward the earth's atmosphere is the same as that of our military men—that is, a right to pollute it is assumed—and Mr. Khrushchov is as unconcerned as they are about the effect on world opinion.

The peace forces in the West have stressed the existence of weapons so monstrous that they already endanger all mankind and of stockpiles that can do the job of destruction several times over. But here is Mr. Khrushchov talking of testing "to develop *even better* atomic and nuclear bombs" and arguing like our military men that not to resume testing "would damage the defense potential of our country."

The "Better" the Bombs the Worse Off We All Are

The truth is, of course, that the "better" the bombs become the more insecure become both our countries and the world. We would both be better off without the A bomb and the H bomb. And if "even better" bombs are now possible we would both be better off if the plans for them could be buried and forgotten.

A speed up in the development of new monsters and of the arms race will damage the defense potential of both our countries. The risks in a resumed arms race are far greater for the Soviet Union than the risks of espionage Mr. Khrushchov emphasized in his speech. But the Soviet listener was not given the facts on which to make an evaluation of his own.

The proposed nuclear test treaty would not open the Soviet Union to unlimited inspection. Even without the *troika* veto, it embodies severe restrictions. A limited number of inspections a year, carried out under restricted circumstances, holds out some dangers of espionage but so do the inspections which the Soviet Union would be empowered to make in the West. And on both sides the risks of espionage are vastly inflated compared to the risks of resumed testing, of the increased tension this will generate, and of the spread in nuclear weapons to other countries this will bring about.

Like other critics of American policy, I am often quoted in the Soviet press and radio. I wish it were possible for us, who are neither capitalist warmongers nor enemies of

Senator Dodd's Moral Standards

Senator Thomas J. Dodd in a letter to the New York Times June 26 calling for a resumption of nuclear testing said "communism is utterly without humanity or moral scruples." An item in the Congressional Record a few days earlier (June 21) throws some light on the Senator's own standards. It shows that in 1957 and 1958, his last two years as a Congressman from Connecticut, he received \$24,999.96 (1957) and \$41,666.62 (1958) from Guatemala as its agent. Guatemala was dependent on American aid and support. It paid Dodd in each of these years more money than he was getting as a member of the House, which was \$22,500 a year. He was in a position to help mould American policy in favor of his foreign client. This is probably the only occasion in American history in which a Congressman was at the same time on the payroll of a foreign government. Some months after his election to the Senate, Fulbright in an angry colloquy with Dodd brought this to the attention of the Senate. However, this was stricken from the Record. The fact may be found recorded there now on page 10227 in a complete list of persons registered under the foreign agents registration act for the years 1955 to 1959. Senator Schoepel (R. Kan.) put this list into the Record in order to attack David Lilienthal, who works for Iran's development board.

socialism, to get a chance to argue this case before the Soviet public, to reach our Russian brothers. The nuclear test treaty represents what may well be the last chance for mankind. Our new President could still get a treaty past the Senate. On this foundation we could hope to move forward, despite hostility and vested interest, to the more difficult problems of general and total disarmament and of the system of world law they require.

The sudden injection of the *troika* issue may well reflect the desire of the Soviet military bureaucracy—like ours—to resume testing, and their hope of provoking us into testing first. It has suddenly strengthened all the enemies of disarmament and peace on our side, while taking the heart out of the peace forces everywhere. This upsurge of nationalistic military thinking in the Kremlin was painfully symbolized for us all by Nikita Sergeyevich's sudden emergence, be-medalled, as Lieut. Gen. N. S. Khrushchov.

SANE Offers Troika Compromise and Proposes Assembly Meet on Nuclear Impasse

The National Committee for A Sane Nuclear Policy released an open letter to President Kennedy June 22 on the impasse in the nuclear test talks, but it was ignored by the press. The letter, over the signatures of Clarence Pickett and Homer A. Jack approved the test ban treaty tabled by the U.S. and the U.K. at Geneva April 18. It urged continued negotiation at Geneva and no resumption of testing except under UN control or surveillance by the British and the Russians. It offered the following compromise for the *troika* arrangement:

"a. The administrator of the test-ban organization should explicitly be a national of a neutral state. b. Under the single administrator there should be three deputy administrators (a *troika*) who would work closely with the administrator and be appointed one from the USSR side, one from the US-UK side, and one from the neutral side. c. The administrator could be replaced at any time during his three year term of office for unsatisfactory performance

by a vote of six or seven nations of the 11-nation control commission. d. The inspection system should be explicitly veto-free, including the on-site inspections within each nation's annual quota."

The letter suggested that if the talks at Geneva reach a dead end, the U.S. should move for a special meeting of the UN Assembly. It said this would be preferable either to an indefinite adjournment or to merging the test ban talks with the general disarmament negotiations. It expressed the hope that the McCloy-Zorin talks would result in full disarmament negotiations beginning July 31 and that the U.S. at that time would present "an imaginative set of proposals" leading toward "total disarmament down to police levels."

The letter praised the President for resisting pressure to resume testing and declared that "even if the U.S. tests nuclear devices for peaceful uses or for seismic research, this would be quickly misinterpreted.

A New Collective Assault on Castro Will Hurt Us in Latin America

(Continued from Page One)

more support than he realizes if he were to reverse policy on Cuba. The Cuban fiasco broke the new Administration morally; it hasn't been the same since. I believe its moral regeneration could be found in going back bravely to the Cuban issue, and making a wholly fresh start. The first step it seems to me is to reinstate the tractors deal; we'll look like cheapskates if we let a few million dollars stand in the way. If we can spend \$45,000,000 on an invasion of Cuba, we can spend \$28,000,000 to bail out the men who went there to carry out our policy. To let the deal fall through is to embitter the Cuban exiles, and to make it look as if we care more for a few dollars than for the men who were our instruments. The next step is to resume relations with Castro, and to negotiate a package deal on resumption of sugar sales and compensation for American properties. If the U.S. made peace with Cuba, it would be worth more than anything else we could do to better our Latin American relations. It would mean that we demonstrated the hard and honest way our proclaimed belief in self-determination and our desire henceforth to abide by the principle of non-intervention. Castro is the greatest force in the hemisphere for the social and economic reform in which we claim to believe, and we ought to bring him over to our side and work with him. Only so can we guide the coming Latin social revolution into channels hostile neither to the U.S. nor to free principles. If Mr. Kennedy made such an about face, he would demonstrate qualities of leadership that would restore world respect and his own self-confidence and revitalize the forces at home which looked so eagerly to the New Frontier for a fresh start.

Adlai Being Taken Into Camp

Unfortunately I see no prospect of any change in policy. Mr. Stevenson's performance at the press club in reporting on his trip to Latin America was discouraging. He's the best we have and it's not good enough. I have just finished reading Morris H. Rubin's somber report in *The Progressive* for June "Latin America: Dynamite on Our Doorstep" and against that background there were moments when Adlai seemed downright inane, as for example—when he said "we

Morse Protests Latin Arms Aid

"I wish to say for the benefit of the President of the United States that in my judgment if he insists upon his proposal to lift the ceiling in regard to American military aid to Latin America, we will pay dearly in many parts of Latin America so far as America's prestige is concerned, and we shall play directly into the hands of the Communists throughout Latin America. . . .

"I am not a military strategist, but when I listen to the generals from the Pentagon on this point I doubt that they are, either. . . . Have we not learned anything from our past aid for so-called internal security? Have we not learned yet that the use of American arms for such purposes in the past in Latin America has caused governments to topple and has created one of the major arguments used against us as the imperialist of the North?"

—Morse (D. Ore.) in the Senate June 20

and Western ideals have no firmer friends than the present government of Peru." Nothing could serve more effectively to discredit "Western ideals" than the friendship of the Peruvian oligarchy. The underlying drift of his remarks points to a new Cuban fiasco. The plan whose outlines were visible in his talk is first to hold the economic conference in Uruguay and then when the Latin leaders have been lined up by promises of aid, to launch measures for collective action against Cuba. Mr. Stevenson thinks it "quite possible" that after the Alliance for Progress meeting in Montevideo "there will be strong leadership in Latin America to deal with this new form of outside intervention." This, and Mr. Stevenson's change of heart in favor of expanded military aid (see boxes on pages one and four), indicate how thoroughly he is being taken over by the conventional-minded in Washington. Behind all the talk of social reform are preparations for a new collective assault of some kind on Cuba. This attempt if made will sharply polarize the hemisphere to our disadvantage, setting the masses and the intellectuals against us and forcing us to rely more and more on the military. This way lies a second and greater disaster in the colossal stupidity of our David and Goliath contest with Castro.

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