

I. F. Stone's Weekly

VOL. VIII, NO. 34

SEPTEMBER 26, 1960



WASHINGTON, D. C.

15 CENTS

Imagine Lumumba Partners With Rockefeller

United Nations, N.Y., Sept. 20

The United Nations is flooded with reporters, and the reporters are flooded with documents, but nobody seems to know what is really going on. Major areas of activity in the Congo crisis manage to stay hidden behind curtains few can penetrate. In the United Nations, as in our own Congress, much of the essential bargaining is done in lobbies, offices and committee rooms, never recorded and rarely reported. The formal resolutions which emerge bear only a distant resemblance to the pulsating reality. A prime unanswered question here, for example, is what price was paid the African-Asian bloc for saving Mr. Hammarskjold from the Russians at the special emergency session just ended. Another area in which little is known covers the activities of those powerful financial interests in Brussels, London and New York which have a rich stake in Katanga and do not intend to allow it to be overwhelmed by Russian ambition and African insurgency. The U.S. press treats the private interests in the Congo question as Mid-Victorian English novelists treated sex, as something nice people don't talk about. With us, the bedroom is no longer sacred but the board room is. Newspapers which pry into all sorts of personal intimacies stop short as if by taboo at the panelled doors of the executive suites of Rockefeller Center and Wall Street. Yet what good clean journalistic fun it would be to know what the Rockefeller interests—not without connections in government—are doing behind the scenes to stall off the dreadful possibility that Patrice Lumumba might show up one of these days in one of their best board rooms and draw up a chair.

Who Will Vote the Congo's Stock in UMHK?

A crucial issue in the Congo affair is what happens to the stock which the Congo Government under the Belgians held in the *Union Minière du Haut Katanga*. This amounted to 22.5 percent of the total shares in this vast mining operation, the world's largest producer of cobalt and uranium and the third largest producer of copper. If this stock goes to the provincial government of Katanga, as the Belgians and their allies are determined that it shall, the stock will be in hands they can control. But if the stock goes to the central government, the new Republic of the Congo will sit as a major—perhaps the largest single—shareholder in the country's most lucrative business, ready without intervention or nationalization Cuban style to take a hand in the operations and the profits. There a Lumumba would sit with the Rockefellers in a new kind of mixed public-private partnership, for the Rockefellers have a large and growing interest in *Union Minière du Haut Katanga*, and are now Belgium's most powerful allies in the struggle to maintain control of the Congo.

"No Real Political Power" — They Just Control Everything

Elisabethville [capital of Katanga], Sept. 19—In the province of Katanga, the great mineral treasury of the Congo, a few thousand Belgians still control just about everything, but they have no real political power. . . .

"In Government offices there is a Belgian adviser sitting with every important Katanga official. When foreigners approach Katanga officials they are usually referred to the Belgian aides. All the official 'spokesmen' of the Government are Belgians. . . .

"Belgians attached to Government offices draw up most of the official papers and their advice is usually taken. But they give advice not orders."

—A. M. Rosenthal, in *New York Times*, Sept. 20.

This appears from a financial study of the mining company in the *London Observer* (July 10) which reported "it is said even now that Rockefeller buying is putting a floor under the price of U.M.H.K.," the "even now" referring to independence, the mutiny and the armed Belgian intervention which followed. "For the Rockefellers, and anyone else with a long purse and strong nerves," this account added, "this may yet be a brilliant speculation. The ore is magnificent, and so is the organization; the only doubt is political." It would be naive to suppose that the Rockefeller interests are not trying to resolve that doubt.

To see in perspective the tangled and shadowy conflict now being played out in Leopoldville and New York, it is useful to sketch in the picture of U.M.H.K. This company's mining concessions in the upper Katanga cover 13,000 square miles. It employs, according to *Standard & Poor's*, 2,216 Europeans and 19,651 Africans. The present tense is proper since *Moody's* for August 30 reported, "despite continued political crisis in the Congo" the mines were "back in full production" after having being closed down "during the Army revolt in July." Things can't be going too badly at the moment despite the excitement elsewhere, because *Le Monde's* (Sept. 19) last weekly survey of the Bourse shows that U.M.H.K. stock rose about 10 percent during the week ended Sept. 16. Even in the prosy language of *Standard & Poor's* financial manual one can see how U.M.H.K. must dominate the landscape of its province. It is described as having "24 affiliates in varied fields—hydro-electric, railways, coal, housing construction and real estate, chemicals (sulphuric acid), flour mills, forestry, mineral and geological research, metallurgy, explosives, cement, health and welfare, insurance, banking and nuclear energy research." (After all, the bombs

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This Little Noticed Speech to the Security Council By Ghana Best Sums Up...

Those who would see the Congo crisis through the eyes of the people who live there rather than through those of Washington or Moscow can find no better guide than the speech—excerpted here—to the Security Council Sept. 16 by Mr. Quaison-Sackey, the gifted representative of Ghana, which has assumed the leadership of uncommitted Africa. This speech was the background for the 17-nation Afro-Asian resolution approved by the special session of the General Assembly Sept. 19. It shows the anxiety of the new States to navigate between the two great Power blocs, their dissatisfaction with the UN command in the Congo but their defense of Mr. Hammarskjöld against Soviet charges which threaten to disrupt the organization which is still their hope of liberation from colonialism and cold war.—IFS

"I wish to thank you, Mr. President, and the other members of this great Council for giving me and my government this opportunity to state our views on the current situation in the Republic of the Congo, a situation which has been changing from day to day and in fact from hour to hour, as if there is some big hand which is bent on diverting attention from the main problems occasioned by incursions being made by Mr. Tshombe and his Belgian advisers into the very foundations of the sovereignty of the Republic of the Congo. . . .

"My Government was the first Government to be approached by the Congolese Government for direct military assistance; if we preferred to channel such assistance through the United Nations, it was because . . . the alternative for Ghana and other independent States was to intervene directly to get the Belgians out of the Congo. That would definitely have had the most serious repercussions.

What Some UN Members Forget

"It is agreed that the primary objective of the Security Council is to help the Congolese Central Government and people to safeguard their independence and territorial integrity. However, in spite of their concurrence in this decision, certain Members of our Organization find its implications hard to accept. . . .

"In his fourth report, the Secretary General has suggested that emphasis be put on the protection of the civilian population in the spirit of the Declaration of Human Rights and the Convention on Genocide. With this suggestion, of course, my Government cannot but agree. Some clarification, however is obviously necessary when it is suggested, as a corollary, that this may necessitate a temporary disarming of military units which are an obstacle to the re-establishment of law and order.

"There is and there can only be one national army in the Congo and this army, the Armée Nationale Congolaise, is the only Congolaise force that can be recognized by the United States. Anybody who raises a private army, either on his own initiative or at the prodding of foreign vested interests, and employs that armed force without the authority of the Central Government of the Congo, or against that Government, is no different from a mutineer and should be treated as such. It is these elements that must be dis-

Belgium Congolese Democracy!

"The Soviet representative has charged Belgium with conspiracy against the Congolese Government. He also accused us of kindling flames of civil war. In the eyes of the representative of the Soviet Union, which ignores freedom of the press or of speech, any political manifestation easily becomes a conspiracy, or even civil war. The political regime of the Congo is not one of a totalitarian state. It is a parliamentary democracy where difference of opinion may be expressed and freely opposed."

—Mr. de Thier, Belgium, Security Council, Sept. 16.

Atomic Base in Congo

"The Belgians are still in the bases of Kamina and Kitona for strategic reasons. . . . The French newspaper, Le Monde, of 25 August revealed to us exactly what Kamina was. It said: 'The Belgian military base at Kamina, which should be placed under UN control, was built to resist atomic attack. The airfield can be used by heavy bombers with a radius of 8,000 kilometers [5,000 miles]. With equipment, it cost 7 billion Belgian francs [\$140 million dollars]. It still holds 2,000 Belgian officials and 600 technicians. . . . Kamina is, therefore, not only the most important of the Congolese bases but also, potentially, an international base. . . . Its characteristics are those of NATO airfields. . . . That is why the Belgians cling to this base. That is why Belgium was able to obtain such support. . . . While military bases remain in Africa . . . our continent . . . will know no peace and no security."

—Mr. Caba, Guinea, Security Council, Sept. 16.

armed—of course, without bloodshed, if possible. This applies not only to bands of soldiers not directly subordinated to the Central Government who commit arbitrary acts of violence but also, and more importantly to the so-called army of Katanga, a mercenary force officered by foreigners and directed against the very foundations of the Congolese State particularly the armed bands at the disposal of Mr. Tshombe and Mr. Kalonji. . . .

"I suggest that the Security Council should address itself specifically to this question of continued arms deliveries by the Belgians to Mr. Tshombe and the fact that units of the so-called Katanga army and police are officered by Belgians. I believe that this issue should be dealt with separately and should not be coupled with the issue of the Central Government receiving aid from outside sources. . . .

"The United Nations, adhering to its principle of non-intervention between the Central Government and the secessionists, precludes itself from supplying to the legitimate Government of the Congo the necessary means for transporting its troops in its efforts to maintain law and order in the entire territory of the Congo, including Katanga. Also, while the Leopoldville radio station has been closed down on the ground that conflict may thereby be averted, and while the Central Government has, therefore, no chance of explaining its position, the Brazzaville radio, which belongs to a country very much disposed towards certain persons [Kasavabu—IFS] involved in the political conflict of the Republic of the Congo, is reported to be broadcasting and providing facilities on behalf of the secessionist elements. At the same time, Belgium is supplying arms and officer personnel for the forces of these elements.

"In this connection I wish to quote a statement issued by my Government today, which was carried by the London Daily Mail of 9 September:

"Ghana Government accepts as substantially correct the account given in this Daily Mail issue of Friday, 9 September, of the extent to which the Belgian government is supporting the Bakwanga regime in Katanga. Since 11 July Belgium has flown in over a hundred tons of arms, including mortars, sub-machine guns and FM automatic rifles. Twenty-five Belgian Air Force planes with their crews have been placed at the disposal of the Tshombe Government. Eighty-nine Belgian officers and NCO's [non-commissioned officers] have been formally seconded to the Tshombe forces and 326 Belgian officers and NCO's are now serving in the Tshombe army as volunteers. This action by Belgium is in complete disregard of the Security Council resolutions. The Government of Ghana cannot believe that Belgium would act in this fashion unless it had been assured of some outside support. If this is so, the situation is one of great gravity in that it implies that one at least of the permanent

... The New Africa's Attitude Toward the UN and the Soviets in the Congo

members of the Security Council is assisting Belgium to deny the orders of the Council.'

"It is rather difficult, in the face of such actions, to complain if the legitimate Government of the Congo felt compelled to seek help from outside in order to be able to establish its authority and to deal with those who, under Belgian protection and with Belgian help, continue to defy its authority and to work for the dismemberment of the State. Surely no one here can deny the Central Government the right to carry out its legitimate task of establishing its authority.

"We recognize, however, that such help can be dangerous. We in Ghana reiterate our support for the principle that, wherever possible, all aid to the newly independent and under-developed nations should be channelled through the United Nations. . . . We have always taken the view that a multilateral UN aid program is the best hope of getting East and West to co-operate to eradicate disease, poverty, hunger and ignorance in large areas of the world. We have always felt that such a program offers the best hope of arresting the so-called cold war. . . .

Nkrumah's Warning to the UN

"Mr. President, allow me to quote from a broadcast made on 7 September 1960 by my President, Osagyefo Kwame Nkrumah: 'The policy of my Government is to keep the cold war out of Africa. . . . Our objects, however, may be frustrated by those powers who have a positive interest in the division and balkanization of Africa. . . . Law and order can only be restored if the Government of the Congo Republic, which invited the UN to enter the Congo and which was formed in accordance with the constitution and with the support of the Congolese Parliament, is actively supported by the UN. The UN will become discredited if it allows itself to be used as a cover for those who would spread confusion in the Congo Republic in order to strangle its independence.'

"The aim of the UN military and technical assistance, therefore, in my view and in the view of the Ghana government, should be to support the legally constituted Government of the Congo. . . . The aim of the UN effort in the Congo is not to bolster the ideological preoccupations of this or that group of Powers; nor is it to prevent the Congolese Government and people from developing normal and friendly relations with all Members of the UN.

"The principle of non-intervention, as interpreted by the Secretary-General and applied to the operations of the UN force in the Congo, has now come up against difficulties. To the Government of Ghana, this application of this doctrine of non-intervention in the light of the Security Council resolutions has brought about much misapprehension and misunderstanding. . . . But the President of Ghana has always been honest in expressing his concern or requesting clarifications from the appropriate quarters. To us the office of the Secretary-General of our world Organization is very dear, and my President would like me to appeal to this Council to refrain from all personal attacks on Mr. Hammarskjold. The clear vision of this man, his merited rank, his superior eloquence, his splendid qualities, his emi-

Poland Twits The West

"It is rather surprising that some representatives in this Council who usually attach so much weight to the parliamentary system prevailing in this countries do not recognize, in fact entirely ignore, the parliamentary machinery of other states. . . . The Prime Minister [Lumumba] of the Central Government of the Republic of the Congo has repeatedly, during the last few days, gained the vote of confidence from the Parliament of the Congo. What else is required to prove the lawfulness of a government?"

—Mr. Lewandowski, Poland, pleading with Security Council Sept. 14 to hear Lumumba's representative.

Why Tshombe Likes Mobutu

"Elisabethville [Katanga], The Congo, Sept. 18—Congolese government soldiers received orders today to withdraw from the secessionist states of Katanga and South Kasai. . . . But a Belgian officer attached to Mr. Kalonji's tiny army said exultantly that South Kasai would be free of the central government's soldiers in a few days. . . . The orders from Leopoldville picked up by radio here apparently came from Col. Joseph Mobutu, army chief of staff, who seized power in the capital last week. . . .

"Meanwhile, Moise Tshombe, President of Katanga, sent a message to his two representatives in Brazzaville, in the former French Congo, to assure Colonel Mobutu of his backing. Mr. Tshombe told his representatives that Colonel Mobutu, President Kasavubu and Premier Ileo represented the best in Congo opinion and politics."

—New York Times, Sept. 19.

nent services, the vast place he fills in the eyes of mankind, must embolden us to pay tribute to him for his great services in the cause of peace. . . .

"Everything seems to be in a state of flux, and it might be as well if the principle of non-intervention were clearly defined and not applied circumstantially. The Security Council should state clearly that, until such time as the Congolese people themselves decide to alter their constitutional arrangements, the law and order which the Council is pledged to maintain can be none other than that embodied in the *loi fondamentale* of the Republic of the Congo and as represented by the Central Government of the Congo. . . .

"With your permission, I will now make a few general observations on the present constitutional situation in the Congo. It was indeed a matter of great regret to the Government of Ghana that Mr. Kanza [representing Lumumba] was not seated at this table. By refusing to seat Mr. Kanza, a representative of the legal central Government of the Congo, this Council has, alas, strengthened the hands of Mr. Kasavubu and others who have shown contempt for the *loi fondamentale*. . . .

"It will be recalled that in February this year a round-table conference was held in Brussels at which certain resolutions were agreed and adopted by all parties in the Congo, including those elements that are now cutting separatist capers. On the basis of and co-extensively with these resolutions, the Belgian Parliament passed a fundamental law for the constitution of the Republic. In accordance with this constitution, general elections were held, and Mr. Lumumba, who secured the requisite parliamentary majority, became Prime Minister.

"The letter of this constitution only allows the President to dismiss a Government if it is defeated in the Chambers [of Parliament]. Quite apart from the technical meaning of the constitution, it is also clear from resolution 3 of the Brussels conference that the ministers are responsible to Parliament and not to the President and can be dismissed only in the event of a vote of non-confidence. . . .

"It is correct, as the Secretary-General mentioned in his statement, that the President [Kasavubu] has the right under article 22 to revoke the mandate of the Prime Minister [Lumumba], but I would point out, with your permission, that this right is subject to article 14, which says that all powers must be exercised in the manner established by law and could only be exercised if a vote of non-confidence passed, which is not the case at present, when an illegal Government headed by Mr. Ileo is invoked. . . .

"The obvious course for the UN in the meantime is to put its authority behind the compromise proposed by both chambers [of the Parliament], that the *status quo* be preserved, with Mr. Kasavubu as President and Mr. Lumumba as Prime Minister.

The Spanish Republic, Too, Had the Benefits of "Non-Intervention"

(Continued from Page One)

which fell on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were made from the uranium of Katanga). Without additional investment, from revaluations and reserves, the capital assets of this company have risen from one billion Belgian francs (\$20,000,000) in 1947 to 10 billion Belgian francs (\$200,000,000) in May 1960, a vivid example of what cold war and nuclear arms race could do for a business in the right line. Earnings in the same happy period rose from \$8 per share in 1947 to \$56.93 per share in 1959, and as Nelson Rockefeller was saying just the other day on TV (*Open Hearing*, Sept. 4), "I think freedom is indivisible. . . . We have got to be ready to fight for it whether it is in Korea or Hungary or Congo." Here freedom takes on dimensions undreamed of by such rustic theoreticians as Jefferson or Locke.

Africans Still Prefer the UN to Moscow

To attain the objective of a Congo governed in a way which will be satisfactory to these private interests something very similar to the farce of non-intervention in the Spanish Civil War has been played out behind the facade of the United Nations. While the UN command has taken up a neutral non-interventionist position between the central government and the secessionist provinces, the Belgians have been able to consolidate their control in Katanga and in the diamond mining area of South Kasai and are now reaching out to establish control at the center in Leopoldville, if necessary through a military dictatorship. But the parallel with Spain can easily be pressed too far. There are differences which are vital. One is the existence of a United Nations organization in which the Asian-African bloc now holds the balance between the Communist and capitalist powers. The UN is their one hope of obtaining aid without losing their independence to either side. Though the Africans, like the other neutrals, are discontented with the UN's course in the Congo and its failure to work with the central government of Lumumba as established by the legally elected Parliament, they still see in Mr. Hammarskjöld a friend and have no desire to become dependent on the Russians in a sharply split world where Africa

As in The Old Shell Game

"An even more ingenious scheme, which may not be accepted by the Congolese, has also been suggested. The idea was that the Congolese should vest their holdings in the mining and other companies in a joint Belgo-Congolese corporation, and in return the Belgians would pay so many millions a year into it. The result would be a first-class borrower on the international market, plenty of funds for the Congo—and effective Belgian control over the alienated shares."

—*The Observer* (London) July 10; *Mammon in Brussels: Haute Finance du Haut Katanga*.

might find itself the first battleground of a new world war. They showed their power in the emergency session of the General Assembly when they forced the Russians not only to abstain from voting against their 17-nation resolution setting up a special UN fund for the Congo but to vote separately in favor of Paragraph 6 which calls on all States "to refrain from the direct and indirect provision of arms or other materials of war and military personnel and other assistance for military purposes in the Congo" except through the United Nations.

At the same time the African bloc used Soviet intransigence to force the Western powers to inch forward a little in the direction of supporting the central Congolese government. The Russians did the African bloc a favor by vetoing the weak Ceylon-Tunisia resolution in the Security Council; the fact that only Liberia and Tunisia could be persuaded to speak up for it in the Security Council was indicative. The 17-nation resolution framed under the leadership of Ghana in the special session for the first time asks the Secretary General "to assist the Central Government of the Congo" in restoring law and order "throughout the territory of the Republic of the Congo and to safeguard its unity." Whether and to what degree this mandate will be carried into action remains to be seen. Here it would be essential to know what assurances if any were given the African States by Mr. Hammarskjöld—and the U. S.—for their support.

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I. F. Stone's Weekly. Entered as Second Class Matter at Washington, D. C., under the Act of March 3, 1879. Post-dated Mondays but published every Thursday except the last two Thursdays of August and December at 5618 Nebraska Ave., N. W., Washington 15, D. C. An independent weekly published and edited by I. F. Stone; Circulation Manager, Esther M. Stone. Subscription: \$5 in the U. S.; \$6 in Canada; \$10 elsewhere. Air Mail rates: \$15 to Europe; \$20 to Israel, Asia and Africa