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The Ultimate Weapon Illusion and the Ultimate Weapon

We Americans are not a warlike people. We are accustomed to think in terms of gadgets and money. When we have a problem we think of solving it with "the best that money will buy," i.e. the best mechanical contrivance designed to solve that problem. We think of war in the same way, and it is natural, therefore, that we should look for a contrivance so good that it would be the "ultimate weapon," finally solving the problem of war.

This ultimate weapon notion first made its appearance on the eve of World War II in the idea of victory by airpower. After Hiroshima and Nagasaki we thought of the atom bomb as the "ultimate weapon," so destructive that its terror would police the world. The next candidate was the hydrogen bomb and soon after it the intercontinental ballistic missile with an H-bomb warhead. Now the word being spread outward from State Department and Atomic Energy Commission—but curiously enough to a much more limited degree from the Pentagon, which is closer to war and less simple-minded about it—is that the new ultimate weapon would be an anti-missile missile, which could stop and destroy the ICBM in mid-course. We are being told that we dare not negotiate disarmament and cease nuclear testing until we have it, this final and ultimate It, which will make us secure.

The Rabbit's Foot in Mechanical Guise

This idea of the anti-missile missile also appears in the Rockefeller Brothers Fund report which we discuss on pages two and three. With it goes the companion idea that if someone else gets the ultimate weapon before we do, we will be in mortal peril. They will press the button and we will be destroyed. This is basically a civilian view of war, since war is a bloody non-mechanical not-so-easy business which ends with foot soldiers slogging it out in the mud, and it is also a superstitious view, akin to a belief in talismans like the rabbit's foot. Between the two companion appeals to fear and superstition—"we'd better not negotiate until we buy that magic new weapon and we'd better watch out or They will get it first"—disarmament may be stymied.

It is important to attack the ultimate weapon delusion on two planes, the general and the specific. On the general plane, it is clear that the trouble with ultimate weapons is that they don't stay ultimate very long. What one side discovers first, the other side soon has, too, and then both seek to end the stalemate with some new wonder or anti-wonder. There is always a new ultimate weapon just around the corner, and eventually they all turn out not to be ultimate after all. Postponing arms negotiations until we get the ultimate weapon means postponing them until the millenium, which is indeed the preferred date of the State Department, the AEC

and most of the Pentagon.

On the specific plane of this particular new ultimate weapon, the anti-missile missile, there is already reason to suspect—some three years and eight billion dollars before we even get it—that it is a good deal less than ultimate. The anti-missile missile depends on the current weakness of the ballistic missile. A ballistic missile, once catapulted into the air, follows a fixed course or trajectory. The entire curve can be plotted, once part of it is charted. Theoretically—because of this weakness—it should be possible by building enormously complex radar, mechanical computer and electronic firing devices to plot the track of an ICBM within a few minutes of its launching and then fire off an anti-missile missile to cross that path and destroy the ICBM in the skies before it can reach its target. Since it would only take an ICBM a half hour between the U. S. and the U. S. S. R., the mechanism would have to be faster than anything man ever conceived. It would take not just money but the diversion of much limited scientific energy and brainpower to perform this tremendously difficult technological feat.

Why They're So Anxious To Man The Rocket

But—and this is the crucial But—what if the course of a ballistic missile could somehow be changed in mid-flight? Then all these calculations would misfire. What if the ICBM could start off aimed apparently at one spot and then veer off unexpectedly to hit another? We don't want to burden the reader with technical details but this is now a possibility. (See London *Sunday Times*, Dec. 15; article on Manned Rocket Aircraft in the November issue of *Missiles and Rockets* and Scripps-Howard writer Jim Lucas's interview in the Washington *Daily News* January 2 with Major General John W. Sessums, Jr., vice commander of the Air Research and Development Command who warned that the U. S. "could make a serious mistake" if it invests heavily in the anti-missile missile as an "ultimate" defense against the ICBM). By adding fins for "boost-glide" control or by manning the rocket, its trajectory could be changed in mid-course and the anti-missile missile evaded. Here, indeed, lies the military significance of the current race to put a man on the rocket.

We do not bring all this up to argue for one form of defense or another. That is for the military experts. We only bring it up to show that long before we can build this (as yet non-existent) new Ultimate Weapon, we can already see its Ultimacy challenged and made obsolete. To argue for postponement of arms talks until we have this new Wonder-Monster is only another way of arguing for a perpetual electronic arms race with all its crushing cost and inevitable catastrophe.

Timed for Opening of Congress and to Stymie Drive for New Talks

The Rockefeller Report Casts Doubts on Any Kind of World Disarmament . . .

The bleakest portion of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund report on the arms problem is also the portion to which least attention has been paid. This is its discussion of disarmament. Perhaps this is because the disarmament section was glossed over rapidly in the prepared summary, and most newspapermen probably depended on the summary. It was the text of this summary rather than of the full report itself which the *New York Times* reprinted. The striking omission from the summary was the opposition to any ban on nuclear testing.

The report breaks the subject of disarmament down into four parts and devotes itself to arguing that little progress is possible on any of them. The four, as it outlines them, are the reduction of forces, the control of arms, the prevention of surprise attack and the end of nuclear testing. Not only the stress but the content is negative. Here, from the report itself, is the essence of the discussion.

Reduction and control of arms: "difficult to negotiate because it seeks to compare unlike quantities. What for example is the relationship between the U. S. Strategic Air Command and the ability of Soviet ground forces to overrun nearby countries? . . . If the United States disbanded its Strategic Air Command, it would take a decade at least to reconstitute. The Soviet Union can demobilize parts of its vast army and still retain the ability to reassemble it. . . ." As for nuclear arms, "so much fissionable material has been produced and it is so easily hidden that no control scheme could completely guarantee against a violation."

How Police the Laboratories?

And if that isn't pessimism enough, here is the *coup de grace*: "A reduction of armaments is not meaningful unless it contains safeguards against violations of the agreement. But effective control has been complicated by the increasingly rapid advance of technology. Scientific research and development can decide the armament race. Hence no reduction in standing armies, however scrupulously carried out, can protect a nation against a technological development which drastically changes the strategic balance. The fact that so much of the armaments race occurs in laboratories makes control and inspection more and more complex. It is difficult to find something when one does not know what one is looking for."

What about preventing surprise attack? The report is equally dubious about that. "In the age of the Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile, which is close upon us," the report says, "the maximum warning time afforded by even a perfect inspection system will be half an hour, the period of time the missile will be in transit. Under such circumstances, even a fool proof inspection system will tell largely what is already known: that the opponent possesses the capability to launch a devastating attack on very short notice and with a minimum of warning."

"Said To Be" Hazardous

Nuclear Testing: On this, the report echoes all the familiar arguments of the Atomic Energy Commission. "Nuclear tests are *said to be*," the report admits, "a hazard to the health of all people and of generations yet unborn; and they are *represented* as leading to ever more horrible weapons" but "there

is much evidence to indicate that past tests have had a much smaller effect on public health than any other biological effects to which mankind is constantly exposed." (Italics added).

Then there reappears the idea put forward last Fall by Mr. Dulles at the UN General Assembly, that to ban nuclear tests would be positively injurious to the cause of making war more humane.

A Bomb That Discriminates

"As long as the production of fissionable material continues," the Rockefeller report argues, "an end of weapons testing would probably ensure that any future war would take the most extreme form. It would have to be fought with weapons in their present state of development and past tests on both sides have concentrated on the most powerful devices. Conversely, since the most destructive weapons have already been tested, further tests will enable us to use nuclear arms in a more discriminating manner . . . may enable us to reduce radioactive fallout to the point where we will become increasingly able to confine any war which may be forced upon us to our opponent's war machine. And it may make possible the development of nuclear anti-aircraft or anti-missile weapons."

Any hope? We must always "stand ready," the report says, "to negotiate on the issues that divide the world including disarmament." But until the Soviet Union has shown a greater willingness to settle these disputes on terms other than her own . . . we must keep our nuclear powder dry. On the other hand even if the Soviet Union was prepared to settle those issues on our terms, the best the report can offer — again echoing the State Department — is "There are many problems such as German unification or Soviet subversive activities in the Middle East which, if resolved, would greatly ease tensions and thus *almost automatically* bring about a reduction of arms." (Italics added).

Seduction and Slavery

All this is garnished with a phase which recalls the melodrama of the 1890's and the rhetoric of every war. We must not, the report warns, "be seduced by Soviet slogans which in the past have used these negotiations as a means to disarm their intended victims. The nature of disarmament must be understood if peace and not slavery is to result from efforts to attain it. . . ."

The only glimmer of hope in the report is on finding some means to keep war limited, but even here the way is blocked by the Soviet Union, which apparently wants to maintain the view that war is necessarily dangerous! "It seems doubtful," is how the report puts it, "that ground rules for the conduct of limited war could be established by mutual agreement, since in order to undermine the will to resist, the Soviet Union has every interest in painting the consequences of resistance in the direst terms."

The report's one proposal is that we make a unilateral declaration to give "an indication of some of the steps we propose to follow to achieve the goal of reducing non-combatant casualties, such as a decision to use weapons without substantial fall-out effects" in the hope that this would "give an opponent a strong incentive to follow suit."

Wants Limited War Machine to Make Intervention Safe in the Nuclear Age

... And Asks Heavier Arms Expenditures to Protect Investments Abroad

All this pessimism about disarmament and this yearning for limited nuclear war will be familiar to readers of Dr. Henry A. Kissinger's book, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*. It is not at all surprising to find that Dr. Kissinger was in charge of preparing this new report as director of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund project nor that the Rockefeller panel which worked on it interlocks with the panel at the Council on Foreign Relations from whose discussions the Kissinger argument for limited nuclear war developed. Six men—Frank Altschul, Gordon Dean, Roswell L. Gilpatric, General James McCormack, the late Frank C. Nash and Carroll L. Wilson—served on both panels.

Allen W. Dulles, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, has long been a leading figure in the Council on Foreign Relations, which set up the earlier limited war study group. The new panel, according to the *New York Times* (Jan. 6) "took testimony from officials in the State and Defense Departments and the Central Intelligence Agency." The nature of the direction, of these briefings ("testimony"), of the auspices and of the personnel channelled the conclusions into a replica of well known State Department and Atomic Energy Commission views.

Only Cold War Minds Represented

No one who speaks as Stassen, Kennan or Bradley does was on the panel. The only scientist on it was Dr. Edward Teller; the only newspaperman, Henry W. Luce. Both have long seen eye to eye with the Dulles brothers, and the Dulles brothers with the Rockefeller brothers. David Rockefeller is a vice president of the Council on Foreign Relations and served on the earlier "limited nuclear war" panel it set up.

The most damaging aspect of the report to the Rockefeller interests themselves is its stress on the need to deal with what it calls "non-overt" aggressions. These are defined by the report (p. 33) as "transformations which are made to appear, insofar as possible, as not aggression at all. These 'concealed wars' may appear as internal revolution or civil war. . . ." In short this is a plea for military means to deal with internal changes threatening American business interests abroad.

"Massive Retaliation" Now Feared

There seems to be a close relationship between a desire to provide a means for American military intervention against

social revolution and the desire to find a means for waging limited nuclear war, i.e. war which can be waged safely at a distance without precipitating a third world war which would be mutual suicide. "Massive retaliation" is now feared.

From this same pattern derives the report's recommendations for radical change in the military setup. It wants three combined commands, one for continental defense, one for all-out war, and one for limited war—in effect, three military establishments in place of one. The reform is logical, since the conventional divisions of war-making have disappeared and entirely different equipment and training is needed for these three dissimilar tasks.

Freedom—As in Venezuela

Limited nuclear war, for example, requires large numbers of transports and parachute troops which could be dropped into an Iran, or a Venezuela—wherever American interests such as Standard Oil are endangered by what this report calls "non-overt aggression," i.e. social upheaval. An enormous increase in expenditure and an enormous increase in world tension are entailed by such military planning and national policy, and both are for the benefit of the Rockefeller interests. The recent revolt in Venezuela, where Standard Oil has long supported one of Latin America's most brutal dictators, provides a revealing backdrop for this Rockefeller report's plea that we spare no expense "in the defense of freedom."

Standard PR Techniques

To bring about this change in policy the Rockefeller Brothers have, in accordance with techniques well understood in the public relations business, brought together an assortment of "leading citizens," college presidents and other worthies; given them a one-sided briefing in the dangers of disarmament and the need for greater arms, and brought forth for Monday morning release the week Congress met a report designed to precipitate scare headlines, prod larger military appropriations and block disarmament talks.

It is a pity that when we are fighting to scrap old stereotypes in the struggle for that sense of common humanity on which world survival depends, that the Rockefeller Brothers have come up with something which so closely resembles the caricature of monopoly capitalists sacrificing world welfare to private interest.

For Stassen — All the Rancor That's Fit to Print For the Enemies of Disarmament — Madison Avenue Hoopla

"Well, the floodgates of gab are already opened. Harold E. Stassen, the beleaguered Presidential specialist on disarmament, means to talk to the National Security Council this week. Mr. Stassen wants the President to take a more open-handed attitude toward negotiating with Moscow than Mr. Dulles can tolerate. Washington's wise-money is on Mr. Dulles; the betting is that Mr. Stassen will be out of work before Congress is warmed up."

—*New York Times, Washington Notes, Jan. 6. p. 24*

"... the Rockefeller Brothers Fund report . . . is one of the most thorough and solemn analyses of the West's security problems . . . by some of the best and most experienced minds . . . they have no policies to defend or political motives to protect . . . well-informed private citizens . . . acting the way responsible citizens of a democracy are expected to act . . . not waiting for Government to lead but . . . analyzing and recommending on their own."

—James Reston, "The Rockefeller report," same day, p. 21

Liberal Trend Continues in Supreme Court; What Readers Can Do About the Blacklist

A New Attorney General Makes His Debut Without Mentioning Reds

How times have changed! . . . When the new Attorney General, William P. Rogers, appeared here at his first National Press Club luncheon, he stressed conventional issues—the fight against organized crime, congestion in the courts—said nothing about the fight against Communism, though J. Edgar Hoover was sitting beside him on the platform. . . . Only one question touched remotely on what a few years ago would have been treated as the No. 1 issue. In reply to a question about the Labor Department program for revising Taft-Hartley, General Rogers said he would of course support it, including repeal of the non-Communist oath. . . . Only a few days earlier, in his annual report, FBI Chief Hoover (with an optimism equalled, if at all, only by Wm. Z. Foster) said the Communist party had "emerged from hiding with renewed confidence and determination" thanks to its having been "heartened by a growing public complacency toward domestic threats to America's internal security. . . ."

Including Whittaker and Clark

Another bitter pill for the Red-hunting Old Guard was the Supreme Court's decision in the Heikkinen case, which frees an elderly Finnish American editor in Wisconsin from a five year prison sentence. . . . He was ordered deported in 1952 because he was a member of the Communist party from 1923 to 1930 and then convicted in 1953 of violating the new self-deportation provisions of the Internal Security Act of 1950. . . . The evidence indicates Immigration Service trickery in this McCarthy period prosecution. . . . Heikkinen did nothing about his deportation because he had been informed orally and by letter that the Immigration service was arranging it. . . . The Court held unanimously that there was not enough evidence of "willful" failure to have warranted submission of the case to the jury at the original trial. . . . The decision was unanimous; it was written by the new Mr. Justice Whittaker, perhaps the most conservative member of the Court, and joined in by Tom Clark on whom the Immigration Service and the FBI rely for sympathy. . . . No fundamental constitutional issue was touched upon but the decision was a psychological blow for the government and is another indication of the clearing atmosphere. . . . A similar blow may be in store for

Questions Some Senator Ought to Ask

Stewart Alsop's column of January 5 accuses the National Security Council and the President of ignoring Central Intelligence Agency information. Alsop paints Allen W. Dulles as a man who had been getting "hard" intelligence on Soviet missile progress as long ago as 1952," only to have his CIA reports ignored. Alsop does not mention the fact that three weeks before the first Sputnik, on September 19, Allen Dulles told the Advertising Council in San Francisco the Soviets were "beginning to encounter difficulties in coping with the complex industrial and technological problems of today." Was Allen Dulles ignoring his own CIA reports, too?

the State Department's high handed passport procedures; the Court has agreed to hear the appeal of the physicist, Dr. Weldon Bruce Dayton, blacklisted at home and refused (on secret evidence) a chance to do work in India. . . .

What Readers Can Do

The appropriation for the Hennings subcommittee (of Senate Judiciary) on constitutional rights runs out on January 31 and the subcommittee will then become moribund, although provided for by the Reorganization Act of 1946. . . . Why not write Senator Hennings and the Senators of your respective States suggesting that the subcommittee be given a new appropriation and a new lease on life to study the impact of unfair loyalty-security procedures on the shortage of scientists and teachers. . . . The *Democratic Digest* for January, in an article on Nixon and Pals vs. The Scientists, picks up the story we told in recent issues of what happened to Dr. Edward U. Condon and the scientists at Fort Monmouth; copies of those issues and of the issue in which we told case stories of blacklisted science teachers in New York City are available for use with letters to the Senate. . . . Now that the Democrats are making an issue of the Oppenheimer and Condon cases, why not complete the job and launch a really thorough Senate investigation of the lives wrecked and talents lost through witch hunt practices which hang on, despite a lighter atmosphere. . . .

That Holiday Gift Sub Offer Remains Good Through January—Why Not Send the Weekly to Your Minister?

Fifth Anniversary Dinner

The Weekly first appeared on January 17, 1953. On Friday, January 17, New York Readers are giving the Weekly a 5th birthday dinner at the Port Arthur Restaurant, 7-9 Mott Street, New York City. This will not be one of those mass produced hotel dyspepsia producing dinners but a 10-course Chinese banquet. The price is \$3. Send check with advance reservations to the Weekly. There will be informal speeches by IFS and others and a free-for-all discussion. It should be a memorable and delightful evening.

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