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WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Mr. Dulles Proposes Nuclear Global Recklessness Instead

Worse Than Massive Retaliation

It is astonishing how little attention has been paid at home to the implications of Secretary Dulles's opening address to the United Nations and the article in the Autumn issue of *Foreign Affairs* amplifying the same ideas. One of them, which has been hailed as marking the end of the "massive retaliation" policy, really supplements the threat of massive retaliation with something far worse—a policy of global nuclear recklessness. The other theme initiates a new propaganda line in the campaign to prevent the cessation of nuclear testing. This line—by an extraordinary twist—seeks to picture the opposition to testing as opposition to humanitarianism and the progress of mankind. I want to spell them out here for the full consideration they deserve.

I

I begin with a remark made by Secretary Dulles to the UN General Assembly. "We want to end the risk," he said, "that nuclear weapons will be spread promiscuously throughout the world, giving irresponsible persons a power for evil that is appalling even to contemplate." Despite these words, the promiscuous spread of nuclear weapons throughout the world is exactly the policy on which Mr. Dulles is embarking, the very course which he says quite correctly would give "irresponsible persons a power for evil that is appalling even to contemplate."

The Double-Talk From London

This danger obviously had been discussed at London, for there are sections in the final Western disarmament proposals which deal with it. The reader may examine the full text for himself in the *New York Times* for last August 30. Superficially read, these proposals seem concerned to prevent this peril. Actually they pave the way for it and for Mr. Dulles's new policy. A close examination of the relevant portions of the text are doubly revealing. They display not only the outlines of the new policy but that fruity legalistic kind of phrasing which seeks to hide the full purport from the unwary.

Section IV deals with the control of fissionable material. Paragraph C says that after all production of fissionable material for weapons purposes has ceased, "Each party undertakes not to transfer out of its control any nuclear weapons, or to accept transfer to it of such weapons. . . ."

So far, so good. Once production for weapons has ceased, the spread of existing weapons to new countries unable to produce them would thus be stopped. Unfortunately the sentence we have just quoted does not end there. It goes on to say, ". . . except where, under arrangements between transferor and transferee, their use will be in conformity with Paragraph III."

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The Ifs and Buts

Paragraph III, like Paragraph IV, also starts out in one direction and ends up in another. Paragraph III starts out by saying, "Each party assumes an obligation not to use nuclear weapons. . . ." But it ends by saying, ". . . if an armed attack has not placed the party in a situation of individual or collective self-defense." This means, of course, that any country is privileged to use atomic weapons in what it considers to be its own defense or the defense of an allied nation.

But now to go back. If Paragraph III is read with Paragraph IV, they end by providing that even after all production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes has ended, any power possessing nuclear weapons is free to distribute atomic arms from its stockpiles to its allies.

Since most nations are now allied with either the U. S. or the U. S. S. R., nuclear arms could be distributed to all of them even if the Western proposals for disarmament were accepted and fully implemented. Mr. Dulles, in his *Foreign Affairs* article, reveals that this is exactly what he intends the U. S. to do.

II

In the *Foreign Affairs* article, published a few days before his speech to the General Assembly, Mr. Dulles said that in the future it may "be feasible to place less reliance upon deterrence of vast retaliatory power." This is what the headlines interpreted as the abandonment of the massive retaliation policy, though the sharp eyed reader will notice that he speaks only of "less reliance upon it."

Mr. Dulles says that as an alternative, "It may be possible to defend countries by nuclear weapons so mobile, or so placed, as to make military invasion with conventional weapons a hazardous attempt. For example," he goes on, "terrain is often such that invasion routes can be decisively dominated by nuclear artillery." Mr. Dulles goes on to paint the new policy. "Thus," he says, "in contrast to the 1950 decade, it may be that by the 1960 decade the nations which are around the Sino-Soviet perimeter can possess an effective defense against full-scale conventional attack and confront any aggressor with the choice between failing or himself initiating nuclear war against the defending country."

A Border Bristling With Nuclear Arms

But nuclear arms can be used for attack as well as defense. If the Sino-Soviet perimeter is to be armed with nuclear weapons, the countries on the other side must also arm themselves the same way, since they fear attack just as we do. Around the world border would bristle with nuclear arms.

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Mr. Dulles speaks of the "Sino-Soviet perimeter," of the Chinese as well as the Russian borders. Consider some of the countries along that border. The first is South Korea. If South Korea is to be armed by us with nuclear weapons, the Russians are going to have to arm the North Koreans the same way. The next "country" on the perimeter is Formosa. If Chiang Kai-shek is to have nuclear arms, Communist China will have to have nuclear arms. Do we want to trust Syngman Rhee and Chiang Kai-shek with nuclear weapons? Do they not fit Mr. Dulles's definition of "irresponsible persons" who would be given by atomic arms "a power for evil that is appalling even to contemplate"?

Was the U.S. Subject to Nuclear Blackmail at London?

III

The necessity for debate and clarification is indicated in an almost unnoticed memorandum by former Atomic Energy Commissioner Thomas E. Murray which Senator Wiley of Wisconsin put into the appendix of the Congressional Record last August 6. The text may be found at pages A6362; it has not been published elsewhere. Mr. Murray dealt with the very subject we have been discussing, the transfer of nuclear weapons. His warning deserves careful consideration not only because as an Atomic Energy Commissioner he had access to much secret information but also because he is himself an advocate of limited nuclear war and of transferring small nuclear weapons to allied nations.

Mr. Murray warned first of all that in talking of nuclear weapons for our allies a distinction ought to be drawn between small atomic arms of a one or two kiloton capacity and the larger weapons. Mr. Murray wrote that he was not sure "any valid military purpose" would be served by making these larger weapons available. He warned that by such transfers "our own control over the appalling possibility of all-out nuclear war would be dangerously diminished."

Scraps of Paper in A Crisis

"It is true," Mr. Murray wrote, "that no transfer of weapons would be made except under prior agreements with our allies as to the circumstances in which these weapons could be used. However," he went on, "the stability of such agreements under the stress of actual hostilities is open to serious question. If a nation were to be faced with the imminent possibility of major aggression, it would hardly hesitate to use whatever weapons it had in its stockpile. . . . no matter what its agreements with the United States may have been."

Look back again at that phrase about "the imminent possibility of major aggression." We see that the concept of "defense" is not limited to actual attack but also to what a nation may believe is "the imminent possibility" of attack. What if a nation were mistaken? What if it unleashed the big weapons in error? The dangers are obvious, among them the danger that by giving out such weapons we might, as Mr. Murray warned, lose "control over their use, and in possible consequence . . . control over our own destinies."

How much more does this reasoning apply when we are dealing not with responsible powers like Britain or France but with a Syngman Rhee or a Chiang Kai-shek?

We Don't Even Trust Him With Gasoline

The U. S. has rationed the supply of gasoline to Syngman Rhee because it does not trust him, because our military authorities fear that if he had enough in the way of supplies to risk it, he might start up the Korean war again. Are we to trust with nuclear weapons a man we do not even trust with gasoline? And are we to allow Chiang Kai-shek nuclear weapons? Those U. S. supplied planes with which he drops leaflets on the Continent could as easily drop atomic bombs one night and unleash a world conflict. Is this new policy not a global recklessness worse than massive retaliation? Why has there been no outcry against it? Why is it accepted without debate?

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Mr. Murray indicated his belief that we were being forced into just such dangerous transfers by our Western allies in the London talks. He said that even for the British, now the third nuclear power in the world, nuclear testing costs were heavy and "many [more] Christmas Island tests would be required before the United Kingdom could come into possession of weapons designs comparable to our own. Even then," Mr. Murray added, "once designs were frozen, the cost of a large-scale production program [for thermonuclear weapons] would be prohibitive for the United Kingdom."

Mr. Murray indicated that he thought the U. S. was being subjected to a squeeze play in the bargaining negotiations with its own allies. "In these circumstances," he went on, "it seems evident to me that the present disarmament negotiations perhaps are being used as a sort of instrument by which our allies win from the United States an agreement to transfer nuclear weapons to them."

"The Mark of A Great Nation"

Mr. Murray went on to suggest, "As a condition of getting England, France and (possibly) other countries to forego the testing and production of nuclear weapons, the United States is being called upon to make these weapons available. Our allies say, in effect, that either they themselves must go ahead in the field of nuclear weapons or else the United States must make it worth their while to stay out of the field."

The motive, as Mr. Murray saw it, was not merely one of defense. "They want the prestige," he wrote, "that attaches to the capacity to make nuclear war; this is presently the mark of a great nation. Therefore, they present the alternatives: either they will themselves pursue this capacity, or else the United States must endow them with it."

Mr. Murray is now consultant to the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy. His experience and knowledge give this warning great weight. The final disarmament proposals, as we have seen, provide for the transfer of nuclear weapons to allied powers from stockpile even after all production has ceased.

But there has been an important change of policy in the meantime. When Mr. Murray wrote that memorandum, the discussions among the Western powers in London were in the context of negotiations among themselves for those conditions on which they could agree to an end of testing and pro-

duction. Mr. Dulles's new outline of policy, however, envisions continued testing, and continued production in order

to have more and better nuclear arms to distribute to all the countries around the Sino-Soviet perimeter.

The New Atomic Delusions Being Fathered by Mr. Dulles

Now let us turn to the new line of argument with which Mr. Dulles seeks to defend the idea of further testing, further development and further production of nuclear weapons. In the *Foreign Affairs* article he says, "the United States has not been content to rely upon a peace which could be preserved only by a capacity to destroy vast segments of the human race. Such a concept is acceptable only as a last alternative."

"In recent years," Mr. Dulles goes on, "there has been no alternative. But the resourcefulness of those who serve our nation in the field of science and weapon engineering now shows that it is possible to alter the character of nuclear weapons. It seems now that their use need not involve vast destruction and widespread harm to humanity. Recent tests point to the possibility of possessing nuclear weapons the destructiveness and radiation effects of which can be confined substantially to predetermined targets." (Italics added).

"Discriminating" and "Refined" Atomic Weapons

"We seek, by experiments now carefully controlled," he told the United Nations, "to find how to eliminate the hazardous radioactive material now incident to the explosion of thermonuclear weapons. Also," he continued, "we seek to make nuclear weapons into discriminating weapons, suitable for defense against attacking troops, submarines and bombers, and for interception of intercontinental missiles."

But the Soviet Union, Mr. Dulles went on, "seems not to want the character of nuclear weapons thus to be refined and changed. It seems to like it that nuclear weapons can be stigmatized as 'horror' weapons." In *Foreign Affairs*, developing the same theme, he wrote, "It is precisely this evolution that Soviet diplomacy and propaganda strive most vigorously to

prevent. They oppose all such experimental testing of nuclear devices as is necessary to find ways to reduce fall-out and to reduce size. They seem to prefer that nuclear weapons be only the 'horror' type of weapons. They apparently calculate that humanitarian instincts will prevent us from using such weapons."

Enemies of Progress

In the United Nations speech, Mr. Dulles amplified this last note. "Does it," i.e., the Soviet Union, he asked the General Assembly unctuously "perhaps calculate that, under these conditions, governments subject to moral and religious restraints, thereby gain a special freedom of action and initiative as regards such weapons?"

This seeks to create the impression that those who oppose further testing are not only tools of Soviet propaganda, but are wickedly opposing the progress of mankind, perversely trying to prevent the development of "refined" and "discriminating" atomic weapons. The opponents of testing are accused of deliberately seeking to keep atomic weapons in the "horror" class so that religious and moral persons like Mr. Dulles will be unwilling to use them!

VI

Finally Mr. Dulles holds out the prospect that, in the future, nuclear testing can and will be controlled and held in safe limits by unilateral action of the U. S. and the United Kingdom. This is the most dangerous fallacy of all.

The Secretary told the United Nations that last March the U. S. and the United Kingdom declared "their intention" to conduct nuclear tests "only in such a manner as would keep

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How the Advent of the Missile Makes The Idea of Limited War Even More Hazardous

"All the analyses that were made of the strategic implications stemming from the combination of nuclear bombs with long-range bombers are still valid as applied to warfare with guided missiles. These analyses stress the fact that if both the United States and the U. S. S. R. possess the means of delivering hydrogen bombs on each other the result will be a stalemate, a balance of power based upon fear of the awful consequences of a total thermonuclear war. If the stalemate were actually broken by such a war, then the methods of warfare, whether manned bombers or guided missiles are used, could not bear a relationship to any tenable political objective; the result would be mutual suicide.

"It is at this point that the idea of graduated deterrence is usually discussed in an effort to concoct some way of limiting what might otherwise be a global war. This idea is concerned with the graduated use of force and its limitation to military targets such as battlefields, airfields, and warmaking production plants. This strategic idea is put forward not as a substitute for mass retaliation, but rather as a complementary plan inasmuch as it is also part of the

deterrent idea but held to be more closely related to tenable political objectives. It is often advocated by those who think military policy should be based upon both the doctrine and the capability to use force in a graduated manner, and thus cut down the destruction of warfare.

"When this idea is examined in the light of the capabilities and limitations of ICBM's and IRBM's, it becomes apparent at once that the circular-error probability of the long-range ballistic missiles is such that no guaranty could be given that they would hit only specific military targets rather than nearby cities. Once ICBM's and IRBM's become operational and plentiful, their capabilities for area destruction and their limitations in accuracy would create conditions within which the idea of graduated deterrence could not thrive. Graduated deterrence, aside from depending upon nations honoring a new rule of war, would also have to depend upon manned bombers striking only military targets. There is nothing in the history of warfare to date that gives hope to the idea of graduated deterrence as a realistic method of controlling a war after it has started."

—*Guided Missiles in Foreign Countries, A Report Prepared by the Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, February 1957, at Pages 1443-1501, Part 2, House Appropriations Committee Hearings on the Defense Dept. Budget, the most sober and careful study of its kind I have been able to find.*—IFS.

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world radiation from rising to more than a small fraction of what might be hazardous."

"Indeed," Mr. Dulles told the General Assembly, "because each year a percentage of radioactivity dies away, we have reason to hope that in the future any needed testing can be accomplished without any material raising whatsoever of the levels of radioactivity in the world."

Rarely has so much pseudo-science been concentrated in so few sentences. The first thing which needs to be said of this picture is that control of testing is only possible on a worldwide basis; as more and more countries begin to test, the problem will become too big not only for the U. S. and the UK but for them and the U. S. S. R. put together.

The second is that when Mr. Dulles talks of matching the new radioactivity from tests to the amount which annually "dies away," he is talking of the so-called "equilibrium" point. Theoretically, as the recent fallout hearings here in Washington showed, if the radioactivity created by tests were held at a constant rate, it would at some future time about equal the amount of radioactivity dissipated.

"Equilibrium" Does Not Mean Safety

But it would take about a century before that point was reached and even if testing was held at a rate no greater than that of the last five years, the achievement of the equilibrium would not be the same as the achievement of safety. The amount of radioactive fallout at equilibrium would be—so it was estimated at the hearings—from eight to 33 times as great as the amount today, or enough to constitute a far greater hazard.

On the other hand, if Mr. Dulles is talking of reaching equilibrium in the near future, then this would require a very sharp reduction in testing.

What the Joint Committee Reported

This very question was explored in the hearings on fallout held in May and June by the Holifield subcommittee of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy. In its recent summary-analysis of those hearings, the Joint Committee discussed the so-called "equilibrium level" for a constant test rate.

Where Mr. Dulles speaks with such easy assurance, the Committee found a host of uncertainties in trying to determine "a reasonable future permissible annual release of fission products from indefinitely continued testing." These are the main points of uncertainty spelled out:

"1. What the future testing pattern will be. The assumption

has often been made of a constant average annual rate of testing. But the testing up to now has been sporadic. The concept of 'present rate of testing' is in any exact sense meaningless. Not only the *rate*, but the kind and location of testing are important and difficult to predict."

(Thus, it may be explained, the amount of dangerous fallout will vary in relation to the height at which the weapon is exploded, the amount of fissionable material in the outer shell of the hydrogen weapon, the interval between tests and the area in which the tests are held, whether on the uninhabited seas or in Nevada or Siberia.)

Is Fallout Uniform?

"2. What the degree of nonuniformity of fallout in the atmosphere really is." (Up to now most official discussion has assumed a uniformity most scientists do not believe occurs; if the fallout is not uniform, then averages are meaningless since certain areas may get an amount of fallout already sufficient to be dangerous).

"3. What the storage times in different parts of the atmosphere and in different geographical regions of the globe are." (The Atomic Energy Commission's assumption of an average shortage time of about ten years now appears to be too optimistic; if the stuff comes down from the stratosphere much faster than this, the danger of reaching a risky amount of fallout is that much greater).

"4. How the fallout will behave under the different geological and biological conditions that exist around the world.

"5. How fallout will distribute itself in a human population. 6. Whether a threshold for radiation damage exists or not. 7. How to arrive at an acceptable maximum permissible concentration of radioactive isotopes in man."

Guessing In The Dark

Where Mr. Dulles speaks so confidently of holding testing to safe limits, the Joint Committee concludes after hearing days of testimony by America's foremost scientists in the nuclear field, that "the question of how much and what kind of testing is 'acceptable' is very difficult to answer . . . unless one is willing to make judgments in the absence of information."

The impression created by Mr. Dulles, that unilateral control is possible, that the limits of safety are known and can be respected, and that a healthy "equilibrium" can be attained in the near future, are all dangerously misleading. Mr. Dulles has never maneuvered onto a more awful brink than in his new approach to the problems of nuclear weapons and nuclear testing.

This Is A Double Issue to Make Up For Unavoidable Delay in Publication Last Week

STATEMENT REQUIRED BY THE ACT OF AUGUST 24, 1912, AS AMENDED BY THE ACTS OF MARCH 3, 1933, AND JULY 2, 1946 (Title 39, United States Code, Section 233) SHOWING THE OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT, AND CIRCULATION OF I. F. Stone's Weekly published 48 times a year at Washington, D. C. for 1957. 1. The names and addresses of the publisher, editor, managing editor, and business manager are: Publisher, I. F. Stone, 5618 Nebraska Avenue, Washington, D. C. Editor, same. Managing editor, same. Business manager, Esther M. Stone, 5618 Nebraska Avenue, Washington, D. C. 2. The owner is: (If owned by a corporation, its name and address must be stated and also immediately thereunder the names and addresses of stockholders owning or holding 1 percent or more of total amount of stock. If not owned by a corporation, the names and addresses of the individual owners must be given. If owned by a partnership or other unincorporated firm, its name and address, as well as that of each individual member, must be given.) I. F. Stone, 5618 Nebraska Avenue, Washington, D. C. Esther M. Stone, 5618 Nebraska Avenue, Washington, D. C. Jeremy M. Stone, Stanford Univ.; Christopher D. Stone, Harvard; Celia M. Gilbert, Cambridge, Mass. 3. The known bondholders, mortgagees, and other security holders owning or holding 1 percent or more of total amount of bonds, mortgages, or other securities are: none. 4. Paragraph 2 and 3 include, in cases where the stockholder or security holder appears upon the books of the company as trustee or in any other fiduciary relation, the name of the person or corporation for whom such trustee is acting; also the statements in the two paragraphs show the affiant's full knowledge and belief as to the circumstances and conditions under which stockholders and security holders who do not appear upon the books of the company as trustees, hold stock and securities in a capacity other than that on a bona fide owner. 5. The average number of copies of each issue of this publication sold or distributed, through the mails or otherwise, to paid subscribers during the 12 months preceding the date shown above was: (This information is required from daily, weekly, semiweekly, and triweekly newspapers only.) 9,946. Signed, I. F. Stone. Sworn to and subscribed before me this 30th day of September 1957. Alvin Bernstein. (My commission expires 7-31-1960.)

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The United States As Three Nations, Not One

The problem which confronts our country in the integration crisis may be illuminated if we regard the United States for a moment not as one nation but as three, the South as a land apart, the Negro as a people apart. The differences among the three may be seen in their sharply different responses to the President's action in calling out the troops in Little Rock. The white South was overwhelmingly hostile; the white North—which constitutes a majority of the whole people—was overwhelmingly approving. The white South was shocked at military "occupation"; the white North relieved that we were not to give in before mob rule. The Negro's reaction was of a different kind. The Negro felt like Cinderella. When a station wagon guarded by Army jeeps took little Negro children to and from school instead of leaving them to run the gauntlet of hate alone, the Negro felt that for the first time in American history he was being treated like a first class citizen, that for a wonderful moment he was no longer on the outside, wistfully looking in.

"Satchmo" Said It

"Satchmo" Armstrong's anguished cry, "Sometimes it seems like the Negro doesn't have a country," must have echoed in every Negro's heart during the days in which it seemed as if Faubus and the mob would get away with it. Amid the hand-wringing over Little Rock by the so-called Southern moderates, and the (lily white) conferences in the White House to negotiate withdrawal of troops, and to let Faubus save face, it is forgotten that for the Negro the law never looked more truly majestic than it does today in Little Rock where for once the bullies of the South have been put on notice that they cannot take out their venom on the Negro and his children.

Quite different is the scene through white Southern eyes. The white South feels like an oppressed minority because the white North has interfered to prevent it from oppressing its Negro minority. If one recalls the bitter feelings of the Irish to this day about Cromwell, it is less difficult to understand that for the white South the defeat of its armies only a century ago and its occupation by Northern troops are memories which the calling out of the Army in Little Rock makes vivid again. The white South feels a victim of injustice, misunderstanding and brute force. That these are exactly what it visits on the helpless Negro who steps out of line merely illustrates the capacity of human beings to go on doing to others what they violently object to when done to themselves.

When three groups in one country see the same problem in such sharply different ways, it is difficult to find a common language. What the white South so proudly calls its way of life looks to the white Northern outsider as a dark and

tangled complex created by slavery, reconstruction and sex. The mind of the white South seems sick with a strange hatred for the Negro people, though from this same hated people have come beloved playmates, nursemaids and mistresses. The outcry against "mixing" is revealing in the century of Freud. "Mixing" is what Southern white males have been doing with pleasure for generations. The recurrent outbursts of savagery in which Negroes are emasculated is a symbol no special training is required to decipher. A psychoanalyst would suspect that all this racialistic hysterics masks a longing to "mix." But what can the crude methods of politics do with tensions which would appall a psychiatrist?

Whose Law? Which Majority?

When any effort is made to change this "way of life," the reaction is nationalistic. White Southerners draw together, moderates and extremists, as a nation does when under attack from the outside. No voice is raised in the white South itself to say that racialism is an illness, an anachronism. The moderates loyally insist that they, too, are for segregation. The best they can still argue today—it may be less tomorrow—is the need to uphold the law. But law has firm sanctions only in majority views of what is moral. The white Northern majority, which is also the majority of the U. S., feels that segregation is obsolete and wrong, though Northern whites practice segregation, too, in their own way. But the overwhelming majority of whites in the South believe segregation is right, as their forbears taught themselves to believe slavery was right. The problem of enforcing in the white South what the North considers "law" but the South doesn't can easily become insoluble. Troops may be an answer in Little Rock but they will not prove an answer in Atlanta.

A time of troubles may be beginning, the most serious conflict of our generation, poisoning our politics for years to come, capable of fomenting volcanic eruptions of bloodshed. Integration cannot be stopped. If the country is not to be torn apart in the process, every American, white and black, Northern and Southern, who exercises any kind of leadership, must be willing for the sake of our common country to take an unpopular position against his own hotheads, and must resist the temptation of the easy popularity to be gained by pandering to the thoughtless emotions of his own "nation." If America, which has made so much progress in two centuries toward a fruitful and inspiring equality, could succeed at last in integrating the black man, too, America would again become a beacon for all mankind. The ideal is great enough, the dangers acute enough, to challenge and inspire a generation if the leadership can be found. None of us can yet comprehend fully how much depends on that if.

Only the Admiral Speaks Up While Civilian Opinion Is Silent

Suppose the Russians Sent An Atomic Fleet to Practice in Our Backyard?

A reporter at the Pentagon for the *Washington Star* asked why those recent naval maneuvers in the Eastern Mediterranean were held so close to Russia, only 30 miles south of its satellite, Bulgaria. He reported in the issue of September 29 that an unnamed naval authority told him "the Dardanelles obviously would be a target in any war. Therefore, it is imperative that the forces which would be called upon to defend that area should familiarize themselves with the terrain." We wonder how we would feel if the Russian Navy held maneuvers 30 miles off Cuba or Panama, explaining that this was so it could familiarize itself with the terrain in case of war.

The maneuvers in the Eastern Mediterranean were well named. They were called "Operation Deep Water." When one of the two great Powers holds war games in the backyard of the other great Power, it is certainly operating in deep water. The possibility of grave incidents was indicated when jet interceptors were ordered to shoot down an unidentified plane watching the maneuvers. An error, a nervous or trigger happy aviator on either side, and there might have been serious consequences. It indicates how drugged American public

opinion has become that this spectacle is taken for granted, passed over without comment. No one asks who was responsible for such provocative maneuvers.

The only person who expressed misgivings publicly was the Vice Admiral, Charles R. Brown, in charge of what the Associated Press described in a dispatch from his flagship as "the atom armed U. S. 6th fleet." Admiral Brown wondered just what would happen if he had to shoot those things. He said he didn't know of any alternative to massive retaliation but he thought the time was coming "when we have got to get another formula." He thought that when the day came "when our power to destroy the whole world, to commit suicide—when that comes, I don't know. The decision is beyond the President and it is beyond Congress. Humanity has to make this decision." The musings do the Admiral credit. He said what civilians seem to stupefied to say. But if we are approaching the point when no man has the right to press that button, when the decision is for humanity itself, have we the right to send our fleet so close into danger, where the miscalculation of one aviator on either side might unwittingly make that final decision?

Warning Against Illusions About

Too much can be, and already is being, read into Dean Acheson's statement at a press conference here that our China policy needs to be restudied. Mr. Acheson spoke as chairman of a newly appointed Democratic foreign policy advisory committee. His cryptic remark that Chiang Kai-shek "cannot live forever" is as likely to reflect speculation on the future of Formosa as an American base as on the unreality of our non-recognition policy. The remark may be read in connection with Herbert Feis's article in the *New York Times* of September 29 hinting that under any circumstances, even recognition, it would be against American interests to let Formosa go back "under the unqualified control" of Peking.

The urbane former Secretary of State is refreshing after a long siege of Mr. Dulles. But except on the question of China trade, there was little in his necessarily guarded remarks to give one hope of a better foreign policy from the Democrats. He expressed himself, for example, against any cessation of nuclear testing and his opening remarks disclosed

Democratic Party Foreign Policy

that same oversimplified cold war Manicheanism which leads straight to the conception of inevitable war between the Forces of Light (us) and the Forces of Darkness (them).

Thus Mr. Acheson, who shares Mr. Truman's weakness for dubious historical analogy, spoke of the century before the first World War as one in which the Concert of Europe was able to keep the peace because the world was not divided into hostile ideologies. This would have startled Monroe at the beginning of this period and Wilson at the end of it. The Monroe Doctrine declared the Holy Alliance in Europe based on a political ideology so inherently hostile to ours that we could not allow its expansion into the New World, and Wilson took us into World War I as an ideological crusade to make the world safe for democracy. The Nineteenth Century was as ideologically divided as the Twentieth; Jacobinism and democracy were as feared as Bolshevism. To assume that ideological agreement is a precondition for peace is to make an assumption that renders peace impossible.

State Department Is Hardening,

"U. S. Is Softening Passport Policy" said a headline in the *New York Times* of September 26. This is deceptive, as those will see who examine for themselves the speech made in Baltimore the night before by Roderic L. O'Connor, administrator of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs in the State Department. This is the most definitive statement to date of present passport policy, and it shows no sign of retreat.

Mr. O'Connor insists that the Secretary of State has the power not only to deny passports to persons suspected of aiding the Communist cause but also to other persons when in his opinion the applicant's travel would be "inimical to U. S. foreign policy or detrimental to the orderly conduct of U. S. foreign relations." As Mr. O'Connor said, "a traveller who has nothing to do with Communism may still be subject to restriction for reasons of foreign policy." Philo-

Not Softening, Passport Policy

sophically, the State Department takes its stand on the same basis as the Kremlin. It is for the State, not the individual, to decide when and where he may travel.

It is on this basis that the Department has finally decided not to renew the passport of William Worthy, Jr., the Baltimore newspaperman, to punish him for visiting China. The coming ACLU court test of that decision will be crucial. In the meantime, State will duck a frontal clash with public opinion by subjecting each of the 42 students returning from China to separate appeals procedures in which the issue will get lost to sight in a bureaucratic maze. "We shall inquire," Mr. O'Connor said of those separate hearings, "what the individual's intention is regarding future travel were he again to receive passport facilities." Those who knuckle under and promise to be "good" may retain their passports.

On the Civil Liberties Front: A Significant New Retreat on the Smith Act

Some Progress Being Made in the Fight Against the Attorney General's List

The National Lawyers Guild has won a small interim victory in its long legal fight against the Attorney General's effort to put it on his list of subversive organizations. Unnoticed by the press, a special attorney appointed by the Attorney General to hear the Guild's complaint has struck out a number of the interrogatories submitted to the Guild. These interrogatories represent a peculiar device worked out by Mr. Brownell to get around the Supreme Court's ruling several years ago that some form of hearing must be accorded by him before putting an organization on the blacklist. The Attorney General, instead of filing charges and holding a hearing, propounds a long list of questions which he insists must be answered. Whether a hearing would then be held depends on the Attorney General. The questions, often involving matters of opinion, are answered (as his letter warns the Guild) under penalty of Section 1001 of Title 18 which makes it an offense punishable by \$10,000 fine and five years in jail for false statement. David J. Coddaire, formerly a member of the Subversive Activities Control Board, sitting as special attorney, has now recommended on objection by the Guild that a number of the 64 interrogatories propounded to it be withdrawn. Among these questions Mr. Coddaire would disallow are those which ask whether the Guild ever received directives "directly or indirectly" from the Communist party and whether since 1946 it had ever "collaborated with or otherwise associated itself" with any organization on the Attorney General's list. Mr. Coddaire thought the questions too vague.

Wide Range of Opinion Monitored

Interrogatories 30, 31, 32 and 37, all of them upheld by Mr. Coddaire, are worth attention. They show the wide sweep of the Attorney General's inquisition. The Guild is asked to supply all information on any position it took on—among other subjects—disarmament, admission of Communist China to the United Nations, "atomic energy and control of weapons thereof," withdrawal of U. S. troops from Europe, the conviction of Luis Carlos Prestes in Brazil, Mexican oil expropriation, the Vogeler and Mindszenty cases, and the question of maintaining diplomatic relations with Argentina and Spain. The Guild is asked its opinion on—among other domestic topics—loyalty oaths for teachers, Universal Military Training, the FBI, Congressional committees investigating Communism, and legalized wire-tapping. Some of the questions are "loaded." An example: the Guild supported the United Nations in finding North Korea guilty of aggression. Question 32 asks whether this was eight days before the House Un-American Activities Committee accused the Guild of following Communist Party line, and Question 33 whether the Guild had advance knowledge of this report.

How the Press, Too, Is Policed

If the Attorney General has a right to go over the opinions of organizations with a fine toothed ideological comb, many will be inhibited from taking positions which the government may deem critical or unorthodox. The inhibitory effect of such procedures are not to be underestimated. The Supreme Court, in a petition for certiorari just filed with it, has been asked to pass on the Attorney General's right to blacklist. The petition was filed on behalf of the Association of Lithuanian Workers and the American Lithuanian Workers Literary Association. The former is a fraternal benefit society. The latter is alleged by the Attorney General to publish three Lithuanian newspapers "which have consistently supported and implemented policies, aims and objectives of the Communist party"—thus the press, too, can be policed. Even Judge Prettyman, who has written some of the most reactionary decisions of the cold war period, objected in a dissent on the Court of Appeals here last May, that the questions propounded by the Attorney General to the Association of Lithuanian Workers were in many cases "impossible to answer." Judge Prettyman, dissenting, thought the Attorney General ought to be ordered either to revise his procedure or dismiss the charges.

Be Careful What You Say— The Attorney General May Be Listening

"Did Robert J. Silberstein, National Executive Secretary of the National Lawyers Guild ever make the following statement at an official meeting of the NLG?

"The middle class may hold the balance of power in the present struggle between progress and reaction. The Guild would fall far short of performing its duty to the profession and to the people if it failed to do everything within its power to exert its special influence as a bar organization toward the end of strengthening the progressive forces in this struggle."

"If so, identify the subject matter under discussion and detail the context in which this statement was made."

—Interrogatory (22) submitted to the National Lawyers Guild by Attorney General Brownell.

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New Definition of Membership

The memorandum filed by the Department of Justice in the Supreme Court on the *Scales* and *Lightfoot* cases has been misinterpreted by the press. It is true that the memo begins by saying that both convictions should be reversed for a new trial in the light of the *Jencks* decision. But the government obviously fears that the Court has more drastic action under consideration in handling these first two convictions under the membership clause of the Smith Act. The Court's order directing reargument on *Scales* and *Lightfoot* was handed down June 3, the same day as the *Jencks* decision holding that defendants have a right to see the original reports of witnesses called by the government and to use them for purposes of impeachment. If the Court felt that *Scales* and *Lightfoot* were entitled to new trials under that decision, new trials could have been ordered the same day. Since the Court did not do so, the Department of Justice in its memorandum assumes that the Court wants to hear reargument on whether the membership clause is constitutional. The Department, in an effort to avoid an unfavorable decision, retreats significantly to the position that only "active" membership is punishable under the Smith Act. In a suggested instruction for juries in membership cases, it defines "active" membership in such a way as to make it clearly applicable only to Communist party officials like *Scales* in North Carolina and *Lightfoot* in Illinois. Ordinary members would not be subject to prosecution. The case will be reargued next week.

ADA Leader Calls for Abolition of House and Senate Witch Hunt Committees

The Really Urgent Task for Israel's Tenth Anniversary Year

Next year will be the tenth anniversary of the founding of Israel and high level committees are already being formed in this country for the celebration. We believe the most urgent task for the anniversary year is a mission of reconciliation. We would like to see the formation of a world Jewish committee to make new homes for the Arab refugees. Every dollar spent for resettlement will do far more in the long run than many dollars spent for the arming of Israel. It cannot live forever as an armed camp amid hostile neighbors, and those of us who are Jews cannot harden our hearts against the sufferings imposed upon the Arabs of Palestine by the birth of Israel without betraying our best traditions. The refugee camps eat away the moral foundations of Zionism. It is in this—rather than in the military equations of the Middle East—that the real danger to Israel lies. As a military force, Israel must always be Lilliputian; only as a moral force can it be great. It is only over the rocky road to reconciliation with the Arabs that Israel can reach the Scriptural vision of a Jerusalem whence the law may go forth in healing peace.

Is Every Liberal "Pseudo" to the FBI?

Our hat is off to Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., defense counsel in the historic Watkins case and former National Chairman of Americans for Democratic Action, for the militancy with which in a debate with Robert Morris before the Federal Bar Association here (Sept. 19) he called for the abolition of the Senate Internal Security Committee and the House Un-American Activities Committee. Mr. Morris, counsel of the Senate committee, attacked the Supreme Court for "creating a new legal fiction in the Watkins case—freedom of association." The hatred of the witch hunters for the ADA and men like Rauh was reflected in the speech J. Edgar Hoover made to the American Legion attacking "certain organizations" which "hypocritically bar Communists from their membership, but . . . launch attacks against Congressional legislation designed to curb Communism." The idea that anybody might oppose repressive legislation on principle seems completely absent from Mr. Hoover's calculations; every liberal, to him, is a "pseudo-liberal."

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Worth More Attention Than It Got

"And this brings me to the next national goal I would suggest—the fashioning of means for dissolving the 'cold war.'

"We cannot achieve either peace abroad or a more abundant life at home by keeping our own economy and that of all our allies artificially stimulated with greater and greater military investments. . . .

"Today we have not just the one world Willkie described but an even smaller one world—a world encased in . . . an atmosphere which, if contaminated in any part of the world by radio-active poisons, becomes contaminated all over. . . .

"It will take courage to give the American people a foreign policy program written in response to realities abroad. . . . It will take more than condemnations of communism. It will require offering something far better to the millions of people in the so-called 'uncommitted' areas [than] . . . our friendship in return for military bases."

—Collins of Florida at the Southern Governors' Conference in Sea Island, Ga., Sept. 28.

The Head Count on Communist China

Paul W. Ward, covering the United Nations annual debate on whether to admit Communist China, figured in the *Baltimore Sun* (Sept. 25) that the 47 nations which voted to exclude Peking represent almost 805,000,000 people while the 27 which voted in favor of Communist China represent 868,000,000 people. The 7 nations which abstained have a population of 109,000,000. . . . The three Scandinavian States, Ireland and Finland joined the Soviet bloc in voting for Peking, as did India, Burma, Indonesia, Nepal, Afghanistan, Ceylon, Syria, Yemen, Egypt, Morocco, the Sudan and Ghana. . . . The abstainers were Israel, Pakistan, Cambodia, Laos, Portugal, Tunisia, and Saudi Arabia. . . . Saudi Arabia also abstained in the UN vote condemning the Soviet intervention in Hungary. . . . At the UN, as in the Syrian affair, Ibn Saud despite that White House buildup as America's mainstay in the Arab world has been playing a strikingly independent hand. . . .

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