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The Volcanoes We Ignore—East West (and South)

In pre-inaugural Washington the holiday atmosphere did not match the alarmist headlines. The gay bunting and the special parade stands which lined the streets from the White House to the Capitol provided their own commentary on the picture of imminent catastrophe the Administration had been painting for a reluctant Congress. So did the relaxed almost bucolic air which greeted the chance visitor to the Pentagon; its chiefs huddled secretly for another kind of war—their annual Armageddon with the appropriations committees lying in ambush for them on the Hill. A less reassuring paradox was also discernible. While the Administration still insisted on the urgent necessity for a blank check against a form of aggression no one expected, it was ignoring really imminent crises.

Liberation, Like Charity . . .

Events may soon prove we have been sitting on volcanoes, and paying least attention to those closest home. The danger spots in the order of their urgency are our own South, then Eastern Europe where a new explosion may come at any time in Poland, and lastly that triangle of tension between Suez, Aqaba and Gaza. Of those observing this panorama none have more right to be bitter than our own Negroes. The violence spreading in the South is consigned to the back pages, like news of interest only to colored folks. The President finds time to visit a West stricken by drought, but turns a deaf ear to appeals from a South whose human resources have long been wasted by bigotry. Montgomery, Atlanta and Tallahassee have "freedom fighters" as brave as Budapest's but they don't command one tenth the attention. When the Governor of Georgia tells a footstomping legislature there will be no breakdown of segregation "no matter what any court may rule", and the head of the Klan confers like a respectable visitor with the State Attorney General, mob spirit is rising high. This is one area where Mr. Eisenhower's prestige and personality could do much; the longer he shirks the obligations of leadership the greater the danger.

As great a bitterness may be felt by the dissident forces struggling in Eastern Europe against Russian domination. This is another area in which the Administration has evaded its responsibility. Three former State Department officials, George Kennan, Paul Nitze and Benjamin V. Cohen, in testimony before the Humphrey disarmament committee of the Senate, have shown that the one way to liberate Eastern Europe lies in Moscow's offer to negotiate a mutual withdrawal of armies. But this runs so counter to official policy that it has been ignored or slighted by the press. We reprint the heart of Mr. Kennan's testimony on Page 2; it is the most brilliant analysis we have seen of the real problem in Eastern Europe. Mr. Nitze told the subcommittee that last Fall, when it became evident that unrest in Poland and Hungary was greater than any-

one had anticipated, he approached acquaintances in the Administration with the suggestion that we offer to negotiate a mutual withdrawal but nothing was done about it. If the Red Army is gotten out of Poland and Hungary, a peaceful evolution toward more independent and less repressive regimes will become possible. But the Russians must have assurance that they will not become forward bases for attack against them.

The Real Question in East Europe

The price of liberating East Europe is a change in our German policy. If there is to be a neutralized East Europe, its cornerstone must be a reunited neutralized Germany. The real question is whether we care more for an unreliable alliance with a resurgent rearmed Germany than we do for the peoples of Eastern Europe. Until this is settled, disarmament will only be the occasion for a sham propaganda battle. The new proposals presented at the United Nations are designed, like so much else by this Administration, to win a maximum of glamorous publicity with a minimum of substance. We are now ready to accept the Russian acceptance of the Western proposal of several years ago to reduce the Russian army and our own to 2,500,000 men each, but it is not clear how much inspection we will require even for this. The program as a whole is safely perfectionist, i. e. it depends on the establishment of inspection controls so foolproof that the General Staffs need never worry that they may actually be required to scrap weapons. The problems are too enormous for settlement in one miraculous package; some relaxation of tension, some growth of confidence, some settlement of political issues must come first. The danger is that we will do nothing and let Eastern Europe stew in its angry juices until there is a new outbreak.

Congress and the country do not seem to be in a mood for such complex realities. The mood in Congress is to grant Eisenhower a blank check on manpower for war in the Middle East, but not for money to improve the possibilities of peace. There seems to be special anxiety over reports that the Administration is considering vast water projects for the whole area; "TVA's on the Danube" are as unpopular as when first broached by Henry Wallace; the constructive potential seems to arouse more opposition among the men who really count in Congress than the blatant ringing of war alarms. The Middle East is really not so different from Eastern Europe in that the key to a settlement with the Russians may lie in neutralizing the big bomber bases in Arabia which they see as a threat to their own security. But what Mr. Dulles seeks is an American protectorate. The Arabs are offered *baksbeesh* and a promise of non-interference in their quarrel with Israel (Mr. Dulles last week dismissed this as an "intraregional" problem, as if that made it less a threat to peace) if they accept U.S. hegemony. But it is too late for a new style colonialism in the East.

Not A Line of This Illuminating Testimony Appeared in the New York Times

George Kennan Tells How We Might Really Liberate East Europe

It is a journalistic scandal that the New York Times did not carry a line on the testimony of George Kennan, once the State Department's "Mr. X" at the opening of the Senate's Humphrey disarmament subcommittee hearings January 9. Mr. Kennan's testimony indicates how the Soviet satellites really might be liberated. We believe readers will find Mr. Kennan's testimony indispensable for an understanding of what is happening in Eastern Europe and of the political preconditions for making any progress on disarmament talks. Since this testimony, which runs counter to official policy, was slighted or ignored by the press and the wire services, we are providing the heart of what Mr. Kennan had to say from the official but unpublished committee transcript.—IFS.

Mr. Kennan told the Humphrey Subcommittee:

"If means could be found for the peaceable and gradual retraction of Soviet power—I am speaking here of Europe—to levels which would be more tolerable with world stability, then I think that is the best thing that can happen from the standpoint of the reduction of armaments throughout the world.

"But if it comes in the way of a flagrant and violent defiance of the present military alliances in Eastern Europe, it is my belief that the Soviet government would then see itself compelled to take action much more violent even than it has recently taken in Hungary and the main sufferers then would be the satellite peoples whose fortunes, I am sure, we all have at heart. . . .

"I have never felt that there was any great possibility of arriving at any multilateral agreement for the reduction of armaments, of conventional armaments, as long as you had American and Soviet forces face-to-face in the middle of Germany.

"I believe that this problem has to be tackled first, and that only when some solution has been found to that can you expect a mutual reduction of the size of armed forces and even then, I am not sure that it can come by agreement. I think it might just come by unilateral action on both sides. . . .

What the Russians Fear

"In my opinion the Soviet leaders are sincere in their belief, whether or not they are right, that any unilateral withdrawal of their forces from Eastern Europe, any withdrawal that is not balanced by some compensatory action on the western side, would in the present circumstances be detrimental, seriously detrimental, both to the military security of the Soviet Union and to the internal security of the regime.

"They consider that if any of the Eastern European countries were to depart from the Warsaw Pact—and it will be remembered that this was the request of the Nagy government—it would almost immediately become a member of the Western military bloc, which they insist on regarding, I think quite wrongly, as hostile to themselves. . . .

"On the other hand if no such military security considerations were involved, if there were no Atlantic Pact and if U.S. forces were not in Europe, if the Germans were not a member of the Atlantic Pact, and if they don't have to fear that in releasing the Eastern European peoples to a greater freedom, it would merely be consigning these people to inclusion in the Atlantic Pact group, then I think there would be a real ques-

tion whether they would consider it desirable and expedient to try to continue to maintain the same sort of military hegemony in Eastern Europe that they have maintained up to this time. . . .

What the West Must Decide

"All this means, as I see it, that we have here in the West a certain basic policy decision to be made. If we wish to continue to make things as difficult as possible for the Soviet government in Eastern Europe—and there is a lot to be said for that, because they are to blame for their problems there today, and I have no sympathy with them in the problems they have got—if we wish to let them toss unaided on the horns of what I think is the dilemma in which they have involved themselves, then we ought to continue to do what we have been doing in recent years, and to make no new proposals with regard to Germany or with regard to a general European settlement.

"If we cling to our present position, I believe that the Soviet leaders will feel that they have no choice but to cling to theirs, to retain their troops in Eastern Europe and to continue as best they can the tragic effort to repress the national feelings of the Poles and the others.

"When I say they will feel that they have no choice, I mean no choice from their standpoint, because they will see the alternative to that as a disastrous collapse of their prestige in that area, and one which is apt to carry into the Soviet Union itself. . . .

[The alternative is] "some shift in the Western position directed toward the eventual reduction or redisposition or withdrawal of both the Soviet armed forces in Central Europe and toward the early political unification of Germany, and toward the supplementing of the existing alliances by some sort of a general European security pact.

Senators Alarmed over Germany

SENATOR SYMINGTON: ". . . Would you be willing to scrap NATO in order to have our troops get out of Western Germany and Russian troops out of Poland or Eastern Germany?

MR. KENNAN: "I am inclined to think that the dangers might be less by not having Germany in NATO, if the Soviets would really get out of Eastern Europe. When we established NATO, the Germans were not in it, and it was not intended at that time, as I recall it, that they should be. . . . If we say the Germans are to remain in NATO, we say we are going to hold the division of Europe. . . .

SENATOR HUMPHREY: "Are we not somewhat on the spot here in terms of the German reunification question, speaking in terms of any demilitarized zone, lest we undermine a very good friend in the West German Republic, namely, Chancellor Adenauer?

MR. KENNAN: "That is unquestionably true. . . . But it is a question which I think we ought to explore in the light of most recent happenings. . . .

"I think it might be possible for the satellite peoples to regain a real independence if that came within the framework of a general European settlement in which the Western powers, including ourselves, would also make certain concessions."

The Old Red Menace—She Ain't What She Used to Be

For those interested in watching the climate of opinion, we report three related—and hopeful—items at the very beginning of the 85th Congress. The President's annual State of the Union message this year, Eisenhower's fifth, was the first to contain no reference to Communism or "subversion" as a domestic problem. A bill (S. 371) to repeal the non-Communist oath provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act was introduced by—of all people—Goldwater (*R. Ariz.*), hitherto a faithful fellow traveller of the National Association of Manufacturers. And a newspaper friend on the other side of the political fence tells us that Senator Jenner (*R. Ind.*) said sadly, "I have so few friends left in the Senate that if I had a heart attack there wouldn't be enough to carry me to the cloakroom."

No one was more startled than Senator McNamara (*D. Mich.*) by the Goldwater bill to repeal the non-Communist oath provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act. McNamara, the only trade unionist in the Senate, introduced a bill to repeal the oath early last session (S. 3187) but couldn't even get it reported out of committee. This time Goldwater introduced an almost identical bill before McNamara had time to re-introduce his. McNamara's office was surprised, indignant and bewildered. Goldwater is up for reelection in 1958, but Arizona is hardly a labor stronghold; no one seems to know just why he sponsored this legislation. Goldwater's own explanation in a press release is that the non-Communist oath is no longer needed because Congress passed the Butler bill two years ago allowing the Justice Department to act against "Communist infiltrated" unions: "The Arizona Republican said further that the work that has been done by the unions themselves in removing Communists from their ranks is an additional and compelling reason for the adoption of his amendment." This

substitutes a gold star for the red badge. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce must be wondering what infiltrated Barry Goldwater.

Against this background it is easy to understand the gloom enveloping our colleague, Mr. Westbrook Pegler. "The campaign against communism and communists is over," he wrote bitterly in the *New York Journal-American* January 10, "and the fight has been lost. . . ." He added that "not so long ago a friend counselled me to forget communism as a personal issue involving individuals . . . Americans who were 'misled' when they were in college under Roosevelt are extremely sensitive and many of them now occupy positions in which they can hurt crusaders who reveal the errors of their troubled youth." This sounds like an implied threat. Have mercenary syndicate managers and greedy capitalist publishers, been putting pressure on an independent crusading columnist? Mr. Pegler hints that he is not only under pressure but about to give way. "There have been martyrs to faith in ages past who were stoned and scourged," he noted darkly, "and driven forth to live in hairy skins in caves. But to suffer and die for God is not exactly the same as to endure abuse and horrible injustice for a mere political cause." Does this mean that Mr. Pegler, under persecution, is about to throw in the sponge? We had hoped, when we came to that bit about "hairy skins in caves", that he would stick it out. It would have been an inspiring sight to see Mr. Pegler, holed up in the Palisades, nattily dressed like Johnny Weissmuller for a Tarzan picture, resolutely pecking out another column for posterity, tracing the income tax straight back to Karl Marx or linking some newly appointed deputy collector of customs with a man of the same name said to have signed an appeal for the Scottsboro boys in 1935.

U. S. Press Misleading on Meaning of Shift from Eden to Macmillan

The replacement of Eden by Macmillan is being presented in most of the American press as an effort to placate the U.S. But the British press pro and con views the new Cabinet as so completely staffed with Eden men as to be a challenge to the U.S. and a declaration of continued independent policies. Macmillan, who supported Eden on the Suez adventure, was picked over Butler, who opposed Eden and hoped to step into his shoes as a State Department favorite. The fact that Churchill and Salisbury advised the Queen to pick Macmillan means that Britain's two leading elder statesmen share popular resentment over U.S. policy on Suez and wanted Washington to know that in Eden's resignation Britain was not "knuckling under" to Dulles, a pro-Axis apologist in the pre-war days when Eden risked his political future to oppose appeasement of Mussolini and Hitler. The new Prime Minister was like Eden an anti-Axis rebel against Neville Chamberlain and at home an advocate of a progressive conservatism.

The Truman article on the Mid-East, presented here as support of Eisenhower, appeared in the London *Daily Express* under headlines an inch high, "We Let Britain Down." This was based on Truman's "I would ask what the American people think we should do if the Panama Canal were seized in violation of treaties and made subject to the will of a dictator. I know what I would do." The Truman article was read as a defense of Eden's Suez policy.

Eden and Dulles differed sharply on the cold war; Eden, like Churchill and Salisbury, favored negotiation and relaxation of tension. Eden with Churchill's backing insisted on the summit meeting and brought it about over Dulles's objections. "It is no longer a secret," Constantine Brown, the well-informed diplomatic correspondent of the *Washington Evening Star* reported January 14, "that neither President Eisenhower nor Secretary Dulles was enthusiastic over the scheme [of meeting Krushchev and Bulganin at Geneva]. But once they had agreed to make that useless move they had to play along and pretend for a few weeks at least that everything was fine and co-existence between the wolf and the lambs was around the corner." This is an interesting sidelight on the spirit in which Eisenhower and Dulles went to Geneva.

One of the areas in which the Macmillan government and Washington may not see eye to eye is the Middle East. London expects Washington to take over its annual \$33,000,000 subsidy to Jordan and with it control of the Arab Legion. British opinion like French is growing more pro-Israel and the military correspondent of the influential *Sunday Times* of London (Jan. 13) suggested that Britain ally itself with Israel and make Haifa its main middle eastern base. This he wrote, "would unquestionably alienate the Arab bloc, but a strong base there would so alter the balance of power in the Middle East that such alienation might be a price worth paying."

How Committee Counsel Robert Morris Might Have Lost His Right to Travel

Senator McClellan Suggests That All Passport Applicants Be Fingerprinted

Some interesting testimony by Ashley J. Nicholas, acting chief of the State Department's passport legal division, has just been released by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee but received little attention in the press. Mr. Nicholas said that if the present trend in the courts continues new legislation would be required "if we are to continue to refuse passports to Communists."

Senator McClellan (*D. Ark.*) commented that he was "very apprehensive" that even with such legislation the Supreme Court might hold "that it violated a constitutional right of the citizen." The Senator said that "under the present trend of decisions we might expect almost anything from the Supreme Court" and added solemnly, "I make that statement publicly. I am very apprehensive about it." What makes some Senators so nervous about enforcement of the Bill of Rights?

Mr. Nicholas himself was taken aback by Senator McClellan's proposal that maybe what we needed was a law requiring all applicants for passports to be fingerprinted. It will be odd if, just when we're about to revise regulations and let Russians come here without fingerprints, we decide not to let Americans travel abroad without them.

How Frauds Were Stopped

The Nicholas testimony showed that in the 30's there were a good number of passport frauds by Communist functionaries and agents who obtained passports under false names. But the testimony also showed that these frauds were stopped under the criminal law not by interfering with everybody's right to travel. Several people went to jail. "I think that the Communists since 1940," Mr. Nicholas said, "have been rather afraid to try much along these lines."

The postwar practices of which Mr. Nicholas complained were of a different category. He charged that a number of people "had misrepresented in their passport applications, where they were going and why they were going. For instance, if they were going to attend a Communist youth festival in Prague, Czechoslovakia, they might say they were going as tourists to France."

But this is the domain of politics, not crime. Does the citi-

zen of a free country, travelling abroad, have to tell his government where he is going and why? If he can attend a Communist sponsored meeting at home, why can't he attend one abroad? Here we enter an area in which the right to travel is subjected to political censorship.

This may be seen in Mr. Nicholas's complaint of political activities abroad. He said a number of Americans went to the Peking Peace Conference "and took part in anti-American propaganda and spread reports of germ warfare and things like that. . . ." However deplorable, this was still no more than free speech. Is it any less legal abroad than at home?

What If This Were Confidential Information?

Mr. Nicholas is mainly concerned with the right to keep informants and their information confidential in cases where passports are denied. But an amusing moment in his own testimony shows how useful it is for an accused man to be present and able to confront a hostile witness.

The passport official told of "one trick that was tried once without success." He said a man went into the New York office of the passport division a number of years ago "and applied for a passport and submitted his birth certificate, but said he didn't have his pictures with him; so he would bring them back later. So later on he came in and handed in some pictures, but they were the pictures of Robert Morris, the Communist leader." This startled the Senate committee and its counsel, Robert Morris. The following colloquy occurred:

MR. MORRIS. Robert who?

MR. NICHOLAS. Morris. [Laughter]. I mean not Morris, but Robert Minor.

MR. MORRIS. Minor?

MR. NICHOLAS. Robert Minor, who was one of the leading Communists in the country, and Minor's wife. I am sorry, Mr. Morris.

MR. MORRIS. That is all right.

But what if Mr. Nicholas were a confidential informant honestly confused, and poor Mr. Morris did not happen to be a Senate committee counsel?

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