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The Key to the Riddle of the Talks in London

When Disarmament No Longer Means Disarming

A good place to begin, in trying to understand what has been happening in the disarmament talks, is with a curious statement made by Secretary Dulles at the press conference he held on returning from the talks in London. He said that acceptance of the American "open skies" proposal by the Soviet Union would make disarmament "almost inevitable." This odd phrase is the key to the labyrinthine negotiations.

In One Lovely Leap

Mr. Dulles had just put the finishing touches on a grandiose global proposal, virtually utopian in its sweep, whereby the two great powers, hitherto and still morbidly suspicious of each other, would suddenly open themselves up through the skies and on the ground to complete mutual inspection, leaping in one bound from mortal enmity to celestial brotherhood. Yet now it appears that even this miracle would only make disarmament "almost inevitable."

Why "almost"? Why "inevitable"? Mr. Dulles has the skilled lawyer's capacity for choosing every word carefully. Let us suppose that in London he had been negotiating the purchase of a business, and after outlining his terms in great detail he were to conclude by saying that if the buyer agreed to these terms and paid the purchase price, then transfer of title to him—that is, the buyer—would become "almost inevitable." Obviously to say "almost inevitable" is to express a hope, not to make a firm promise.

It had been assumed that strict inspection was to be the price and the safeguard of a disarmament agreement, that if the Russians opened up their skies and gave up their secrets, we would agree to end the arms race, nuclear testing and the danger of an atomic holocaust. But Mr. Dulles's words, carefully examined, imply no such quid pro quo.

What Mr. Dulles "Thinks"

Let us go back and look at his actual words in that press conference. "If, however," Mr. Dulles said, "there can be sufficient inspection to diminish appreciably the danger of a sudden surprise attack, that will change the atmosphere, then I think we will really be moving into a new era where reduction of armaments will be almost inevitable." Obviously if the open skies proposal were offered as a condition of disarmament, if it were coupled in the current proposals with a definite promise of some arms reduction, he would not need to "think" that this changed "atmosphere" would make some reduction of armaments "almost inevitable."

The full meaning of this becomes clearer if one looks at what immediately follows it in Mr. Dulles's carefully phrased statement. He went on to say that if mutual inspection were

agreed upon, "it", i.e. a reduction of armaments "might not even depend upon an agreement" because the nations themselves would realize they did not need so much armament under circumstances which made successful aggression "by an initial surprise attack" unlikely. Mr. Dulles's words disclose not only that the U.S. offer omitted any specified reduction of arms but implied that no such agreement is necessary. Mr. Eisenhower made the same point at his own press conference next day when he said, "If you can relieve the world of the great fear of surprise, devastating attack, then disarmament, in my opinion, will follow step by step automatically."

The key word here is "automatically." The President is not offering arms reduction as part of that voluminous package proposal Mr. Stassen has been unwrapping so slowly in London. He is not even offering to negotiate an arms reduction agreement *after* inspection is accepted. He is saying to the Russians that if they agree to our proposals, then arms reduction will "in my opinion," i.e. the President's, "follow step by step automatically." This is a strange way to make a horse trade.

Mr. Stassen Was Cryptic

To understand what is happening it is useful to go back to a cryptic remark Mr. Stassen made a year and a half ago when he appeared as the first witness in the 18 months of hearings the Humphrey disarmament subcommittee has been holding in Washington and around the country. That very first day, January 25, 1956, Mr. Stassen said, "I think it is well to indicate that disarmament has come to mean not the literal meaning in the dictionary, but any offer to reach any kind of an agreement or limitation or control or inspection affecting armed forces and armaments. It has taken on a special meaning in international circles."

The public has assumed that the disarmament talks were concerned with disarmament. Disarmament has not changed its meaning in the dictionaries. To disarm still means to relinquish arms, if not all of them, then at least some. This is what disarmament is still taken to mean by those who see the talks as reported in the headlines. But that is not what it means to the Eisenhower Administration.

Mr. Stassen's foray into semantics was puzzling at the time. Subsequent observation of the painfully prolonged talks has made it significant. Mr. Stassen was trying to prepare the public mind for the fact that, in the lexicon of the Eisenhower Administration, disarmament no longer meant to disarm. Instead of the "literal meaning", disarmament—So Mr. Stassen

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Travel as Subversion: The State Dept.'s Ignorance Vaster Far than Mr. Gluck's

A Strange Case of Plagiarism and A Helpful Hint to Senator Jenner

On July 30, during the Civil Rights debate, Senator Johnston of South Carolina, who has always posed as a man of the people, revealed hitherto unsuspected gifts of legal scholarship. He delivered an erudite address on jury trial, beginning with the juridical consequences of the Norman Conquest and ending with a particularly fine quotation from de Tocqueville. Next day, on July 31, Senator Chavez of New Mexico, also made a speech and put into the Congressional Record with it a memorandum on the history of jury trial furnished him by the Library of Congress. The memorandum turned out to be word for word the same as the history of jury trial in Senator Johnston's speech the day before. We know the Library of Congress is overworked and understaffed but we think it goes entirely too far when it begins to lift material bodily from the speeches of Southern Senators.

Helpful Hint for Senator Jenner

Except for cases involving the diplomatic and consular officials of a foreign power, and those in which one of the 48 States is itself a party, the Supreme Court has only appellate jurisdiction. Even this, the Constitution says, is "with such exceptions and under such regulations as the Congress shall make." Senator Jenner's bill, S 2646, is based on the cute idea that Congress can use this regulatory power to withdraw from the jurisdiction of the Court the kinds of cases in which it has made rulings the Senator does not like. His bill would forbid the Court to review any cases (like *Watkins*) involving contempt of Congressional committees, State subversion or sedition prosecutions (like *Nelson* or *Sweezy*), teacher loyalty discharges (like *Slochower*) or bar examination cases (like *Schware* or *Konigsberg*). Senator Russell of Georgia expressed friendly interest when Senator Jenner introduced this novel measure. No doubt Southern votes could be won for it by adding to the class of forbidden cases those involving school integration, voting and civil rights generally. By this means the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court could be expanded and contracted like an accordion to suit whatever was the majority opinion of the moment in Congress.

We wonder whether Senator Jenner has had time, on reflection, to see the loopholes in his ingenious measure. His bill would still leave the Federal District and Circuit Courts

in operation. Some of the worst decisions (from Senator Jenner's point of view) have been handed down by these lower courts. Examples are Judge Youngdahl's acquittal of New York Timesman Seymour Peck for contempt of the Senator's own Internal Security Committee, and the decision of the Court of Appeals on the Pacific Coast outlawing the use of anonymous informants in Coast Guard security screening cases. Jenner's Southern allies can cite similar rulings on integration by lower court Federal judges as unreliable as any on the Supreme Court. Even the State Courts cannot be trusted. The Nelson case, as the Senator may recall, was an appeal from a Pennsylvania State Supreme Court decision reversing Nelson's conviction under a State sedition act. We suggest that Senator Jenner withdraw S 2646 and prepare a broader measure. The heart of the trouble seems to lie in the existence of those peculiar institutions called courts, and that Constitution they are always invoking. We look forward next session to a new Jenner bill, abolishing both.

More Ignorant Than Gluck

Poor Mr. Gluck got into trouble because he never heard of Bandaranaike, but it is clear from the State Department's latest on travel to Red China that it never even heard of the Bill of Rights. If travel may be restricted because it would be "subversive of U.S. foreign policy", why not restrict the newspaper editors who subvert U.S. foreign policy by criticizing non-recognition of Peking as foolish? . . . Somebody (Washington's best guess is that it was John Foster Dulles) stampeded Eisenhower into that statement promising return of I. G. Farben's American properties on the ground that it was necessary to help Adenauer get re-elected. But nobody asked just how this would help him. Did I. G. Farben threaten to vote Socialist? . . . One inadvertent confession during the Civil Rights debate ought not to go unnoticed. Senator Ervin protested (July 29, p. 11695 Con. Rec.) that the same election figures used to prove Negroes disfranchised could also be used to prove that so were most whites. "The truth is," the Senator said, "that North Carolina is, in large part, a one-party State. . . . There is no incentive for the people to come out and vote under those conditions." This is true everywhere in the Deep South.

In Tribute to Charles E. Wilson

Almost five years ago, in Vol. I, No. 2 of this Weekly, we opposed the nomination of Charles E. Wilson to be Secretary of Defense. We are happy to acknowledge, on his retirement, that we were wrong. Mr. Wilson not only proved to be an able public official but a man whose humanity, common-sense and blunt honesty won respect and affection.

Though Mr. Wilson was recruited from General Motors, the country's biggest arms contractor, he cut the arms budget. He was an influence for peace, notably in the Indochinese crisis, where he and retiring Secretary of the Treasury Humphrey (a less colorful but equally able man) weighted the scales against the adventurism of Dulles, Radford and Nixon.

Studying the disarmament question, we have been re-reading Mr. Wilson's testimony before the Humphrey subcommittee. Here are a few sample bits which illustrate his quality: "The less the burden of armaments on peoples like

Whose Nomination We Criticized

the Russians and ourselves, the less likelihood of war. . . . Bigger and bigger military power, in my opinion, is not the solution for the problems of the world. . . . If we had twice the military strength we have now or have had in the last five years, I do not know of a single thing different which would have happened in the world than did happen. . . . There is an old saying that perfection is the enemy of the good and I do not think that we should decide that we cannot make any progress [in disarmament] because we cannot do it perfectly to begin with."

Mr. Wilson deserves a vacation but is too young to retire. We'd like to see him head up an organization to bring about full public discussion in this country of the fateful issues in the nuclear arms race and the means by which it may be ended. Not the least contribution, is his repeated assertion that American business can maintain a high level of activity without a big arms program.

Djilas Is A Brave Man But Still Too Much the Arid Communist Theoretician

How Revolutionary Idealists May Become A New Ruling Class

My very first experience on arriving in Belgrade in the Fall of 1950 made it easy for me to understand Milovan Djilas's book, "The New Class" (Praeger: \$3.95). There in the railroad station as I came off the train was a woman I had known in the United States as a Yugoslav Communist, a minor official of the Tito government. She happened to be in the station when I arrived because she was waiting for her new cook, a girl she was bringing from Montenegro, the primitive mountain south of Yugoslavia whence "unspoiled" help might still be obtained. She burst into a long account about the difficulty of finding reliable servants of exactly the same kind I might have heard in a suburban station in Westchester or Connecticut. Her home, when I went there later for dinner, was an expropriated mansion; its linen, silver and luxury, the elegance of the dinner, the conversation, were upper class. For the first time I realized how quickly the sweet fruits of power can transform revolutionary idealists into comfortable bureaucrats.

Another Who Chose Heresy

This is "The New Class", of which Milovan Djilas, Tito's old comrade, dares to write in a book smuggled out of a Yugoslav prison. It exists in every Communist country. Resentment against its special privileges and the omnipresent secret police terror with which it protects those privileges explain both the Polish October, which brought Gomulka to power despite Russian opposition, and the Hungarian rising, which the Russians crushed. There are still many people, both party members and sympathizers, who recoil with horror from this picture, though the same tendencies are blatant in the upper crust of the American labor movement and the Roman Catholic Hierarchy has long demonstrated that power, wealth and luxury may be enjoyed without private property. Just as Hegel thought his dialectic had ended with that flower of perfection, the hierarchical and militaristic Prussian State, so the Communists refuse to believe that the dialectic of change may go on working even after their Revolution. Camus in his *The Rebel* says that in the end every revolutionist becomes either an oppressor or a heretic. Djilas is among the noble company who chose heresy. Those true believers who remember how they were caught short by the Krushchev speech two years ago will protect themselves from further surprises by reading Djilas's analysis and indictment. They are the words of a brave man, written out of that personal suffering only the disillusioned Communist can fully appreciate.

The Heart of the Indictment

"Man may renounce much. But he must think and he has a deep need to express his thoughts. It is profoundly sickening to be compelled to remain silent when there is need for expression. It is tyranny at its worst to compel men not to think as they do, to compel men to express thoughts that are not their own. The limitation of freedom of thought is not only an attack on specific political and social fights, but an attack on the human being as such. . . . *The New Class*, p. 146.

The book's limitations lie in Djilas's own training and habits as a Communist theoretician. Instead of giving us his own rich experience and observation as a lifelong Communist, Djilas devotes himself largely to that quasi-theological exercise which has long constituted Marxist-Leninist controversy. Whether as defender or attacker, the ideologist gives himself to the casuistical task of fitting his own views into or deriving them from, the canon of Holy Writ. The result has been to make Marxist-Leninist literature the most arid region of sterile verbalisms since medieval theology. Djilas, even in revolt, like so many ex-Communists, cannot shake loose from this stultifying tradition.

A second and more important criticism is that Djilas does not go beyond polemics to a program. He believes Communism justified itself in Eastern Europe and China as an instrument of industrialization. He says at one point that most of the opposition in the Soviet countries is not to socialism but "to the way in which it is being achieved. . . . The individual rebels against those limitations which are in the interest of the oligarchy, not against those which are in the interests of society." But he nowhere tackles the question, crucial for the future of those who must live under Communism, of just how they are to achieve their liberation from the one party State and the monolithic dictatorship. Given peace and relaxation of tension, the situation is not hopeless. The iceberg is already cracked. If the cold war gives way to thaw, it will melt, though not without mighty splits and convulsions. The problem is to help a new generation, in an area which knew little of freedom before Communism, to graft onto socialism the institutions, the legal safeguards, the habits, that give men security and freedom to think. This is the practical problem Djilas leaves untouched, and it is this which will make his book disappointing for the younger people it may surreptitiously reach in the Soviet bloc.

The Dialectic Which Haunts Communism: Words of Agony, Despair and Truth

"The internal monolithic cohesion which was created in the struggle with the oppositionists and with the half-Communist groups is transformed into a unity of obedient counselors and robot-bureaucrats inside the movement. During the climb to power, intolerance, servility, incomplete thinking, control of personal life—which once was comradely aid but is now a form of oligarchic management—hierarchical rigidity and introversion, the nominal and neglected role of women, opportunism, self-centeredness, and outrage repress the once-existent high principles. . . .

"Thus, politicking and servility replace the former straightforwardness of the revolution. Where the former

heroes who were ready to sacrifice everything, including life, for others and for an idea, for the good of the people, have not been killed or pushed aside, they become self-centered cowards without ideas or comrades, willing to renounce everything—honor, name, truth and morals—in order to keep their place in the ruling class and the hierarchical circle. The world has seen few heroes as ready to sacrifice and suffer as the Communists were on the eve of and during the revolution. It has probably never seen such characterless wretches and stupid defenders of arid formulas as they become after attaining power."

—Milovan Djilas, *The New Class*, p. 155.

U. S. Military, Dubious Even of Ike's "Open Skies", Shifting to "Limited War"

Renunciation of Nuclear Arms Not Promised Under Any Circumstances

(Continued from page One)

tried to explain—was to mean "any offer to reach any kind of agreement or limitation or control or inspection." An agreement for "control or inspection" does not necessarily mean any reduction of armament.

Unfortunately public opinion everywhere assumes not only that these negotiations are efforts at disarmament "in the literal sense" but are also designed to end the menace of nuclear testing and nuclear war.

A Subject They Don't Like to Discuss

This is equally fallacious. Neither the Secretary of State nor the President mentioned testing or nuclear arms in their press conferences. Neither said that an end of testing and a renunciation of nuclear arms would become "almost inevitable" or follow "automatically" from acceptance of an elaborate scheme of mutual inspection. The omission is significant.

The most important sentence in Mr. Dulles's July 22 radio broadcast on U.S. disarmament policy, the latest authoritative statement, was, "We do not propose to eliminate nuclear weapons or the possibility of their use. . . ." The furthest the government has ever gone was at the Geneva meeting of foreign ministers where Secretary Dulles "stated" (the words are Mr. Stassen's to the Humphrey subcommittee) "that if agreement could be reached to limit nuclear weapons within the framework of an effective system of disarmament and under proper safeguards, there should be corresponding restrictions on the testing of weapons." Thus even within the framework of a disarmament agreement, the Eisenhower Administration is not prepared to go beyond some limitation on nuclear arms and "corresponding restrictions" on testing.

Another Reason to Avoid Agreement

Mr. Dulles spoke at Geneva of "agreement . . . within the framework of an effective system of disarmament" as the necessary condition of any such limitation. Obviously if no agreement need be reached, if disarmament can be allowed to follow "automatically" from mutual inspection, then we need not agree to any limit on nuclear arms and testing but can

make such reductions as we see fit.

This reluctance to make any disarmament agreement reflects the Administration's difficulty in reconciling military and civilian opinion. While the President has been selling the idea that mutual inspection on the ground and in the air would make some reduction of armament feasible, he has been unable to persuade the military. This was apparent from Mr. Dulles's appearance before the Humphrey subcommittee, when the following colloquy occurred:

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Secretary, do the military people believe that inspection from the air would be adequate?

Secretary DULLES. Not alone; no sir . . . any scheme which the United States relied upon as a dependable inspection scheme would include both air and ground inspection.

Senator SPARKMAN. Is it your understanding that the military would feel that that would be adequate?

Secretary DULLES. Perhaps I would rather let the military speak for themselves in that respect. I think that, in the main, the military people do not have great confidence in the efficacy of any attainable control or inspection system.

This testimony must be read against the background of political realities in Washington. The armed services are like feudal principalities before the rise of modern monarchies; the President can call on their services in time of war but cannot dictate to them in time of peace. The armed services acquiesced in the "open skies" proposal as "pie in the sky" diplomacy, a utopian scheme the immemorially suspicious Russians were unlikely to accept. But they were unwilling to go along with any concrete disarmament proposal even on the basis of mutual inspection. This explains the missing element in the package offer, the disarmament plan that contains no provision for disarmament.

Indeed now that the Russians have been moving toward acceptance in part at least of aerial and ground inspection, the military are shying away in alarm from the entire Eisenhower package deal and are beginning to sell the idea that nuclear war may be safely waged on a "limited" basis. This would shelve disarmament altogether.

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