Special Report from San Francisco

Inside: A Close-Up of Moscow's New Team; H. H. Wilson on Lippmann's "Anti-Public" Views

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Molotov Wins the First Round For Peace

San Francisco

The Curtain raiser for the San Francisco Conference was an unfortunate bit of pantomine. Delegates flying in from abroad found that Eisenhower was running the American Government from a secret bomb shelter while Molotov was taking the afternoon off to visit an art gallery. No doubt the contrast was sheer coincidence, any implications unintended. But whoever planned Operation Alert to start just five days before the tenth anniversary meeting of the UN was not very wide awake. Incoming foreign ministers picked up their first American newspapers with their breakfasts to read that millions of Americans were assumed to be killed and some 59 cities assumed to be in ruins as the result of an assumed H-bomb attack, while one of the principal architects of all this assumed carnage was touring the Metropolitan Museum in New York and being as ingratiatingly bewildered as any average Joe by abstractionist painting. The dumb show implied that while the Russians were relaxing we Americans were still driving ourselves wacky, and therefore to be humored rather than trusted by a world in search of peace. The timing was deadly. If the Democrats were in power, J. Edgar Hoover would be sure that somebody in Washington was getting paid off for it with the Order of Lenin, two Armenian rugs and a free pass to the Moscow subway.

In the preliminaries, Molotov got the publicity breaks here at home as well as abroad. To the assembled press waiting for his arrival in San Francisco, all of Madison Avenue's hucksters seemed to have gone over to the enemy. That picture of Molotov in a ten gallon hat en route was the biggest stroke of genius in press agentry since the late Ivy Lee discovered that the elder John D. could atone for his millions by giving away dimes. The hat on Molotov recalled similar pictures of Cal Coolidge on campaign; both looked like a 58th variety of pickle in this kind of headgear; the picture suddenly made Molotov seem just another Republican politician ready to pose in anything for a vote. It's going to be hard to keep the cold war going if Molotov starts acting like a brother Elk.

Movie Star Treatment

Here in San Francisco Molotov has been accorded movie star treatment. Under gray skies, in the grimy old railroad station at Oakland last Saturday, reporters, photographers, plainclothesmen and cops swarmed over the platform and the tracks waiting for his train to come in. The limousine driving him off was blocked by reporters until he let down a window and through an interpreter made a statement of greeting. At Monday night's reception for delegates in the Mark Hopkins on Nob Hill and at Tuesday night's glittering affair at the Palace of the Legion of Honor, Molotov's brief appearances stole the show.

Hostile propaganda has boomeranged. The Russians have so long been depicted as monsters that everybody is quite dazed to discover that they are human. Telescopic lenses and cameras watch every move made by Molotov and his entourage in the baronial home they rented in plush suburban Hillsborough. When Molotov finished speaking Wednesday, the Opera House rapidly emptied. Suddenly, for a press and public which craves spectacle, the old Bolshevik has become a character. Of the Big Four ministers, nobody ever heard of Pinay, MacMillan as yet is a name only to the book trade, and Dulles hasn't the popular touch. Perhaps for want of something more exciting, this little gray methodical man, who outwardly seems more like one of Gogol's devoted government clerks than a veteran revolutionary and shrewd statesman, has caught—and is exploiting—popular fancy. Moscow ought to send him on tour. When the papers start calling him "Mollie" the cold war will be over.

To Press Agentry Alone

But Molotov's success here is not the result of press agentry alone. The General Assembly heard President Eisenhower on Monday, the new British Foreign Secretary on Tuesday, and Molotov on Wednesday. Only the Russian offered more than vague generalities to the hunger for peace which makes itself felt even in this gathering of diplomats, politicians and bureaucrats. Mr. Eisenhower's speech was painfully uninspired. He drew applause only twice, once when he said "we shall reject no method, however novel, that holds out any hope however faint, for a just and lasting peace." The other was for that famous quotation from Lincoln about "the dogmas of the quiet past." Lincoln's words shone like diamonds amid the synthetic and labored phrases ghosted for Eisenhower. As for MacMillan, the new British Foreign Secretary has a genius for banality.

The Opera House was jammed Wednesday morning to hear Molotov. The scene was striking. On the stage, the flags of the United Nations were banked against the black curtain with the gold UN emblem. Dwarfed against that huge backdrop Van Kleffens, Hammarskjold and Cordier sat in yellow back chairs overlooking the rostrum below them. The first floor with its red plush seats was given over to the delegates. Little blue flags marked off the sections and gave the names of the nations represented in each. About 10:30 A.M., when Romulo of the Philippines had finished speaking, Van Kleffens gave the floor to Molotov. A little stocky gray-haired man in a gray suit got up from the second row to the right of the auditorium and slowly moved to the rostrum. His voice came across translation headphones in clipped "English English." His own voice in Russian was pleasant, liquid, often forceful but not harsh. The lack of demagogy, the sober tone and earnest manner were impressive, especially after the rather blowsy oratory which is Romulo's stock in trade.

Where Eisenhower was interrupted by applause only twice,

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A Brilliant Young Princeton Political Scientist Challenges "The Public Philosophy"

Lippmann's Strange Prescription for the Evils of Our Time

Editor's Note—The author of this review is Associate Professor of Political Science at Princeton, author of "Congress, Corruption and Compromise" (1951) and (with Harvey Glickman) of "Problems of Internal Security in Great Britain" (1954). We asked him to write on Walter Lippmann's new book, "The Public Philosophy," because the respect rightfully accorded its author as a journalist gives influence beyond their intrinsic merit to the anti-democratic views Mr. Lippmann propagates.

By H. H. Wilson

Mr. Walter Lippmann, long one of the responsible analysts of American politics, writes as a "liberal democrat" who has "no wish to disenfranchise my fellow citizens." It is his hope that "both liberty and democracy can be preserved before the one destroys the other." Despite this declaration *The Public Philosophy* is, in large measure, a restatement of his conviction that democracy is government by the incompetent. He set forth much of this case in *Public Opinion* (1922), *The Phantom Public* (1925), and "Why Should the Majority Rule?" in *Harpers* (March 1926). He is convinced that the Western democracies are "sick with some kind of incapacity to cope with reality, to govern their affairs, to defend their vital interests and, it might be, to insure their survival as free and democratic states."

According to Lippmann's unique view of history, there occurred in 1917 "an unrecognized revolution within the democracies." Because the war had become so costly in lives and material that it no longer made sense to continue, the governments were forced to turn to the people. "They had to ask still greater exertions and sacrifices. They obtained them by 'democratizing' the conduct and the aims of the war: by pursuing total victory and by promising total peace." On the surface this revolution appeared to be a surrender of power by the executive to the representative assemblies. "In fact, the powers which were ceded . . . passed through the assemblies, which could not exercise them, to the mass of voters who, though unable to exercise them, passed them on to the party bosses, the agents of pressure groups, and the magnates of the new media of mass communications." This process results in "a functional derangement of the relationship between the mass of the people and the government." And "this breakdown in the constitutional order is the cause of the precipitate and catastrophic decline of Western society."

Theirs Not To Reason Why

It is Lippmann's recurring thesis that "the prevailing public opinion has been destructively wrong at the critical junctures" in world history. Up until 1914 this made little difference because legislatures were rarely consulted on issues of war and peace. "Even their right to be informed was severely limited, and the principle of the system was . . . that war and peace were the business of the executive department." As a result, then, of the "unrecognized revolution" of 1917, the "people of the liberal democracies" are responsible for the expansion of fascist power in the 1930s and for the inability of their governments to mobilize for defense or to achieve peace.

Quite apart from consideration of its validity the diagnosis is presented plainly enough. In contrast the Lippmann prescription is difficult to follow, extremely confused, tinged with mysticism, and strongly colored with elitist overtones. In preparation for correcting the "morbid derangement" which has weakened the power of the executive, he has some routine things to say about the difference between the executive and the representative function. Contending that it is the executive power which must ask and propose, while the representative assembly consents, petitions, approves and criticizes, he insists that the two powers must remain distinct. "While the electors choose the ruler, they do not own any shares in him and they have no right to command him. . . . Their duty is to fill the office and not to direct the officeholder." However, it is the executive which represents the public interests, i.e. "what men would choose if they saw clearly, thought rationally, acted disinterestedly and benevolently." The important thing is that the executive power should be protected from mass opinion.

> **"Democratic politicians rarely feel they can afford the luxury of telling the whole truth to the people. And since not telling it, though prudent, is uncomfortable, they find it easier if they themselves do not have to hear too often much of the sour truth. The men under them who report and collect the news come to realize in their turn that it is safer to be wrong before it has become fashionable to be right."** —*Walter Lippmann*

If Only The Bastille Hadn't Fallen

In common with many declared conservatives, Lippmann finds that the ascendancy of the Jacobin philosophy, "the doctrine of democratic revolution," deriving from the French Revolution, is the root of all evil. Because of it "the democracies are ceasing to receive the traditions of civility in which the good society, the liberal democratic way of life at its best, originated and developed." They have rejected, or forgotten, or ignored the public philosophy, the belief that rational men can agree upon common principles which possess a universal validity.

Short of writing another book it is difficult to analyze Lippmann's peculiar interpretation of contemporary history because it is a strange melange of shrewd insights, lofty idealism, and patent nonsense. Perhaps no other observer would accept his definition of the "unrecognized revolution" as one in which power passed from the executive to the legislatures and to the people. Throughout the West there is virtually total agreement on the contrary development: that everywhere there has been a vast increment of executive power. To hold the people responsible for the disastrous appeasement of Hitler and Mussolini is to strain credulity.

Are we to forget that many of the most powerful and respectable leaders in all Western countries greeted the rise of fascism as "the wave of the future" and the bulwark against the Soviet Union? One may question popular understanding of crucial issues, but this incurs an obligation to examine the role of the mass media in capitalist society. Operated as commercial enterprises, the media have peddled amusements, distractions, and banalities but only rarely and exceptionally have they served as instruments of enlightenment. How often do public leaders, political parties, or the press offer alternative policies from which voters may choose? Even so, in many instances and without democratic leadership popular reaction to crises was more nearly right than the response of the elites Lippmann seems to favor. There was popular support for applying sanctions to Mussolini in Ethiopia; there was a willingness to supply weapons to Loyalist Spain; and throughout the months prior to Pearl Harbor Americans were prepared to do more than their leaders were asking. One can't help but feel that Lippmann is writing an apologia for the ruling elite with which he prefers to associate. In any case the significant thing is that he does not believe in the possibility of an enlightened and informed citizenry. That democracy faces a crises of unresolved problems deriving from technology, organization, and the mass society few will deny. That Mr. Lippmann's diagnosis and prescription will lead to adequate therapy seems unlikely. One may assert a faith in minority rule, but it requires a tortured interpretation of history to proclaim its wisdom.

A Special Correspondent Finds The Intelligentsia Are Speaking More Freely

The London Times Reports on Russia's New Leaders and Policies

During the week of June 6 the Times of London published an unusually objective series, "Russia Revisited," by a special correspondent. We recommend the series to our readers and here reprint most of the final article on "The New Leaders and Their Policies," which appeared on June 11.

After the long years when Stalin bestrode the Russian world, the new leaders seem at first to be small and rather shadowy figures, even to many Russians. I was continually being struck by finding, as we walked along, how many Russians could not recognize more than three or four of the dozen men whose portraits hang in the streets on fete days. And the upheavals that have taken place in the team since Stalin's death—producing Beria's execution and Malenkov's resignation—are bound to make people ask whether the team is really in final shape even now.

Khrushchev, now emergent as the head of the team in Stalin's old key position as First Secretary of the Communist Party, remains a puzzling figure. He certainly has any amount of vigor and courage. He is not afraid of committing himself to a line, even one that seems made up on the spur of the moment. Lately he has been taking to Stalin's question-and-answer style of speaking, adopting the language with the mantle, but he is much more impetuous than Stalin ever was, much more the extrovert, and his speech in Belgrade showed how clumsy he can be on occasion. It is hard to think of him as Stalin's sole successor. He is rather the leader of a band—even if he sometimes gets ahead of the band.

The Marshals

Marshal Bulganin (he usually drops the Marshal now) is generally regarded as being more easy-going than Khrushchev, but he is extraordinarily busy as Prime Minister and has a good record as administrator behind him. Marshal Zhukov (he keeps the Marshal) brings the army voice into the team, and it is bound to influence policy. It is wrong to think of the army as a distinct political force, but a change from former days is in the way that Marshal Zhukov may speak publicly, "as a soldier," on political or diplomatic matters. Of the other leaders Mr. Molotov (showing his age more and more) and Mr. Kaganovich remain steady, cautious influences, usually in the background. Mr. Malenkov, though present on all big occasions, is subdued and his face sags unhealthily. Of the younger men, the Moscow grape-vine reported that Mr. Shepilov, editor of *Pravda*, was coming forward to strengthen the party theoreticians even before he went with the delegation to Belgrade.

What does the new team mean in terms of policy? One plausible theory is that it is the men of the party's "left wing" who are now dominant. That is to say, Malenkov was "to the right," proclaiming a swift raising of living standards after the Stalinist rigors and offering inducements to the peasants. The new men, as we know, have slowed down the rate of increase for consumer goods in favor of heavy industry. To offset inflationary trends and to put a brake on spending power, they have this year broken the almost traditional spring-time custom of reducing prices, and they have doubled the total of the State loan which each year is met mainly out of wages and prices. Most clearly of all, instead of offering special monetary inducements to the peasants, they are setting out to tighten up organization on very many of the farms in the belief that efficiency and vigilance will produce more results. With it all, they emphasize, more strongly than before the role that the Communist party members must play as the organizers, leaders, and inspirers of national life. The talk of "revolutionary fervour" is heard.

Shifts of Emphasis

The line seems fairly clear. It stands for greater efficiency, closer organization of industry and agriculture, and a stricter control of the purse-strings, in the sense that—though defense expenditure has risen—net investment in the national economy has been slightly reduced in this year's budget. Most of the changes are, in fact, shifts of emphasis rather than reversals of previous policy; they are important but they are marginal.

That is hardly surprising. The leaders have to work within a given context which—in spite of the easier atmosphere—remains basically unaltered since Stalin's day. There is more discussion, and it is a sign of the times that articles in journals for the intelligentsia are raising questions not touched since Stalin's hold tightened on the country. They are asking what kind of matters may be counted "controversial" and therefore fit for public discussion. But, of course, open political groups remain as unthinkable as workers' strikes.

Even more strongly the limits of the Government's policy are set by the social pyramid which is one of Stalin's main legacies. Gone are the exciting and fearful days when a single decree, or a single program, could rock and mould a society that was only taking shape. Gone, too, are the days when Communist Party members took only a small standard wage home or when it was hard to tell a factory director, by his clothes and bearing, from a workman. The society of today has its gradations from poor to rich, its obvious ranks and its many privileges (as well as responsibilities) for the higher ranks.

Soviet Foreign Policy

It takes much patience and many talks in Moscow before any insight can be gained into Soviet foreign policy that cannot be gained outside Russia. But, behind all the talk about the unshakable unity of the Socialist camp that stretches from the Elbe to Indo-China (a unity and a force that cannot be belittled) one notices a touch of reserve, something less than the usual brimming enthusiasm, in references to China. It should not be exaggerated, but Russians were pensive when talking about the potential strength of China's six hundred million people, even if they are six hundred million allies. And there were no furious denials if anyone suggested that China's young revolutionary regime could itself make an over-confident and dangerous step in the Formosa Straits. On the contrary, enough was usually said to show that Russia is as anxious as other countries—whether India or Britain—to remove the danger of an explosion in the Straits at this time.

Probably because the Far Eastern dangers are now counted less, Russians were more anxious to talk about the future of Germany and the prospects of four-Power talks. The chief impression I gained from a number of private informal talks was that Russian policy about Germany was still being thought out. All dwelt on the need to establish a unified, neutral Germany ("prevented solely by western ill-will"), but some were readier than others to discuss the possibility of a working arrangement for security if, in spite of efforts on each side, German unity were not found possible. Where one or two rejected anything less than unity, saying that the only alternative was an arms race, the others did not reject lesser solutions—for example, the idea of an agreement for limiting arms in the two parts of Germany.

If one seeks for the real differences between the Khrushchev-Bulganin Government and the Malenkov Government, it is not to be found in switches of policy. It is rather that, both at home and abroad, the new leaders set out to be more energetic, more positive, sometimes more startling—as when they invited the Austrian leaders or Dr. Adenauer to Moscow.

Dulles Must Answer Molotov Or Lose By Default

(Continued from page 1)

Molotov was interrupted by applause five times. The first was when he called for the outlawing of atomic weapons; the second, when he said that China ought to be a party to any discussion of disarmament; the third, when he spoke of the good feeling of the Soviet people toward the American people; the fourth, when he said it depended largely on these two peoples to consolidate peace and security for many years to come; and fifth, when he said this was all the Soviet people desired and that he was confident that this was also the desire of the people of America.

The tone was conciliatory, and though there was little in the speech which Molotov had not said before there was much which the Western powers have yet to answer. The speech was in large part a repetition of the Soviet disarmament proposals of May 10 but these have been dismissed in Washington with scant attention. Earlier Soviet proposals for outlawing atomic weapons were met with the rejoinder that this would leave the Soviet bloc with superior armies. In the May 10 proposals, as Molotov pointed out, the Soviet Union gave in to this argument and "without any modifications" accepted the Western proposals on conventional armies and weapons. The U.S.A., the U.S.S.R. and China would each be restricted to armies of less than 1,500,000 men. In addition the Soviet Union also went further than ever before in specific proposals for inspection and control to guard against surprise attack and to enforce atomic disarmament. These proposals would lift the iron curtain. They represent major concessions yet they have called forth no response.

British and Belgians Impressed

The San Francisco meeting gave Molotov a world forum in which to make people aware of the Soviet concessions, and in which to force the Western powers to take notice of them. In this sense, the Molotov speech has transformed the nature of the conference. In effect bargaining has begun. Dulles in his speech Friday must make some reply to Molotov's concrete proposals, or lose a round by default in the battle for public opinion. Dulles sought after the Molotov speech to brush it off but British reactions and those of Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak showed how deeply impressed Allied Western opinion was by Molotov's tone. Real concessions have been made by Moscow to the West on disarmament and as Molotov said "it is up to the USA and the other Western powers to make the next move."

So far there have only been petty publicity dodges. The U.S. delegation seems to have feared that Molotov might suggest a ban on nuclear tests in his speech. The night before Lodge therefore issued a statement which created headlines about a new American "Atom Plan," but this when examined turned out only to be a statement which calls for the collection of data on the effect of nuclear tests. Lodge put forward the dubious proposition that "the best scientific information" says "properly safeguarded nuclear testing, in contrast with nuclear warfare, is not a threat to human health." (Obviously some progress has been made, since Mr. Lodge does not insist that nuclear warfare itself is healthful.)

A Brawl That Didn't Come Off

The other "reply" to Molotov was the Cuban speech. If the purpose of this typical cold war speech about Soviet "slavery" was to embroil Molotov in an undignified quarrel, it not only failed but boomeranged. The result of Dr. Portuondo's speech and Romulo's intervention was to anger Van Kleffens, and to make a bad impression on other friendly delegates. The hearty handshake with which Lodge greeted the Cuban after his speech and the pat on the back given him by Dulles showed their approval. They had gotten a stooge to do what they did not dare do themselves. They may have hoped that Portuondo and Romulo between them might turn the meeting into an anti-Soviet brawl.

As this is being written Wednesday night, Molotov has clearly won the first round. Whether he wins the second and last round of this Conference depends on the reply made by Dulles Friday. The resounding defeat in the Senate of the McCarthy "liberationist" resolution shows how united both parties are in support of genuine negotiation; the war party is reduced to pigmy proportions. The Eisenhower Administration could now lead from strength and take the initiative in the search for a settlement instead of merely reacting to Soviet proposals in a half-hearted way and negativistic way unworthy of a great power.

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