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Mr. Molotov's Time-Bombs

One of the principal comments on the Berlin conference, repeated parrot fashion in the American press, is that the parley served to show that nothing has been changed by the death of Stalin. There could hardly be a sillier observation. For Russia, the question of German rearmament is fundamental. Were Malenkov to follow Stalin to the grave, were the entire Communist regime to disappear, were Kerensky or a Czar to return, Russia reaction to *this* question would be unaffected. No Russian government would relinquish its hold on one half of Germany to permit its reunification and rearmament as part of a hostile bloc, knowing that the re-armed Reich's first demand would be revision of its Eastern frontiers at the expense of territories now held by Russia and Poland.

The magisterial *Times* of London spoke with more objectivity. "It is now clear," it said on February 19, "that neither Russia nor the West can agree to German unification on terms compatible with their national interests. The lynch-pin of western defense—west German cooperation—remains the hard core of Russian fears; and the main western anxiety—Russian armies in the heart of Europe—is, in the Russian view, the indispensable condition of Soviet security. In the state of the world today, neither fear can be discounted as mere propaganda." Few American newspapers would have the capacity, fewer still the courage, for so impartial a statement. Its expression by Britain's leading newspaper is, however, no accident. On the contrary, the complacent tone and detached analysis reflect Britain's own position, which is to try and make the best of two possible worlds, to enjoy the financial benefits of a close entente with the U.S. while striving to enlarge its trade with the U.S.S.R.

A Treacherous "Linch-Pin"

It is this which explains the readiness to fall in with some dubious propositions. The notion that "the lynch-pin of Western defense" is the rearmament of Western Germany panders to a cliché of American politics. It cannot be reconciled with political reality. When Acheson and Adenauer sprang this idea on Bevin and Schuman in the Fall of 1950, they had great difficulty in selling it. There was then one good military argument for it. Were the Korean war to expand into a world war, as then seemed possible, it was important to confront Russia in the West with German forces. It was the logic of the Korean war which alone made West German rearmament at all palatable, and it is the ending of the war—and not some magic spell laid on by Moscow—which has done more than anything else to take the steam out of E.D.C.

While the ending of the war has shown that the Soviet

bloc is in no mood for risky political or military adventures, the German question bristles with dangers. No peace treaty can be signed without tackling the question of the eastern frontiers; the stronger Germany becomes the greater the demands it will make; a "united Europe" must either support those demands or break with Germany; to break with Germany would risk another and more dangerous version of the tactic Germany pursued at Rapallo and again with the Nazi-Soviet Pact. Germany would become the arbiter of Europe. Once united, it cannot be kept from rearming. Once re-armed, it cannot be kept by any device from resuming the course natural to a central power, i.e. to play one side against the other. No defense system on either side could have a more treacherous "lynch-pin." An unnamed French provincial paper quoted by the London *Times* (Feb. 20) said "it was chimerical to expect" that either East or West at Berlin "would seriously envisage abandoning their piece of Germany" and asked, "Is not our best guarantee of security to be found in this division more than in the juridical precautions of E.D.C.?" A majority of Frenchmen would almost certainly agree.

The Unsigned, Invisible but Potent Pact

Beneath the surface of contemporary politics, essentials of geography and strategy—the essentials which drew Czar and Third Republic together in 1894—have reasserted themselves. Though Russia and France today belong to hostile blocs, their unspoken cooperation has succeeded for almost four years in blocking German rearmament. From one point of view, the French idea of a European Army as a means of rearming the Germans without permitting the rebirth of the German General Staff was a brilliant self-deception; the German General Staff has already been reborn, and once the Germans are re-armed no scrap of paper will inhibit them from marching on their own when they wish to do so. But from another point of view, the E.D.C. idea was an ingenious device for delaying a decision; Acheson was dazzled by it, Adenauer was kept dangling—and the debate in the Chamber of Deputies goes on. It will not be speeded by events at Berlin.

American public opinion is poorly informed on Berlin. This conference was an example, not of secret but of half-truth diplomacy, which is considerably worse. The Big Four met behind closed doors and press officers of each afterward "briefed" his own nation's correspondents. This was the system used at Panmunjom. The method encourages each participant to re-arrange the liberetto to make himself the hero. What the American people read was not so much the news of the conference as a "line" handed out each day to the correspondents. The result is propaganda, not news. This

is the system used at the State Department and by the Department's officers in the corridors of the UN, but there and in Washington are other sources of information. In Berlin, there was little but this uninteresting pap—and the bare text of speeches—for hungry correspondents to feed upon.

Not As Unified As They Seem

The American point of view on international questions tends to be as simple-minded and self-righteous as the Russian. All the emphasis on "Western unity" at the conference gets in the way of understanding what happened, because this must begin with some appreciation of the different approaches to the conference on the part of the British, French, and Germans. The British thought an isolated conference on Germany bound to fail, and were anxious only that it not break up in ill-feeling. The French were chiefly concerned with using Berlin as a means of opening a way to peace in Indo-China. The majority of the Germans wanted some progress toward unification of their country. None of our "allies" shared the main preoccupation of Mr. Dulles, which was to demonstrate as rapidly as possible that agreement could not be reached and thus presumably speed ratification of E.D.C. and West German rearmament. Mr. Dulles put through his demonstration in one, two, three order, but the result will not be to speed up his object because British, French and German reactions are as different from his as were their initial expectations.

The rearmament of Germany is Dulles's great passion, but Western Europe feels no urgency about it. The British, on his prodding, will make a new token payment on account toward E.D.C. but their pledge of cooperation will not be enough to satisfy the French. At the moment, in Egypt and Iran particularly, Washington is a greater menace to the Empire than Moscow, and Britain has no desire to sink into the role of a European power, linked uneasily in a European Army with the Germans. The improvement in Mr. Molotov's manners has been enough to appease the British; if they must haggle with the Russians they would rather haggle over trade than the Oder-Neisse frontier. As for the Germans, they show no great enthusiasm for rearmament. The Social Democrats, who would be the strongest party in a reunited Reich, thought unification should have been bartered for abandonment of E.D.C. Powerful sections of the British Labor and French Socialist parties agree. The special meeting of the Socialist International at Brussels will see a strong demand from all three countries for postponement of German rearmament until the possibility of such a deal has been fully explored.

Trapped by His Own Haste

In his haste to get the Berlin meeting over with as quickly as possible, Mr. Dulles allowed Mr. Molotov to plant a whole series of time bombs. The failure to explore many questions fully will give Soviet propaganda an advantage. At one point the Soviet Foreign Minister offered the idea of a plebiscite in which the Germans could choose between unification and E.D.C. It was quickly hooted down, but this will look like an attractive proposition to many Germans in the wake of a conference which leaves the Reich divided indefinitely. Another example is the unresolved question of the proposed

European security pact and NATO. Molotov attacked NATO but only made the abandonment of the E.D.C. (i.e. German rearmament) a condition for the treaty. Unofficial Russian spokesmen said NATO would not be incompatible with such a treaty. Whether real or illusory, the prospect of combining a continental security pact with Russia and an Atlantic security pact with the U.S. will attract many West Europeans and seem well worth the abandonment of so dubious a proposition as a rearmed Germany.

Austria is another example. Mr. Dulles broke off negotiations just when they began to seem promising. Obviously the Russians will not give up the right to station troops in Austria (and thus their right to keep troops along the supply route across satellite Hungary and Rumania) as long as the West has forward bases of its own in Germany and Trieste. But Molotov showed a readiness to reduce this to token proportions and to give Austria more freedom than before, though less than full sovereignty. Also unexplored was the Molotov proposal for removing foreign troops from German soil, and permitting four power supervision of the withdrawal and of the zonal police forces which would maintain order. At any normal conference such offers would have been the spring-board of negotiation. What they reflected was simple. The Russians are unwilling to give up their hold on Austria and East Germany but they are willing to ease the grip of occupation on both countries.

Why They Were Unexplored

These possibilities were not explored because relaxation of tension suits the interests of the Russians but not of Mr. Dulles and Herr Adenauer. For it is only by maintaining some sense of urgency and danger that they can prevail on the West Germans to rearm, on the Americans to finance that rearmament and on the rest of Western Europe to acquiesce in it. In this sense, the final decision of the conference was a victory for Mr. Molotov. The resumption of negotiations on Korea, the opening of talks on Indo-China, the recognition in fact of Communist China's pivotal position in world politics—these must further relax tension and make German rearmament seem all the less urgent.

Why, then, did Mr. Dulles agree to it? There seem to be several reasons. One is that the "liberationist" views which lie behind his anxiety to rearm the Germans have become anachronistic in the Eisenhower Administration; the budget cannot be balanced if tension increases and what matter a few more German divisions in the new A-bomb and H-bomb strategy? Another is that Mr. Dulles had no choice. According to the French press, Mr. Molotov in his private conversations with M. Bidault had offered to mediate directly between Ho Chi-minh and France. In the Chamber of Deputies, M. Mendes-France has been arguing cogently that France would be better off to negotiate directly than to involve Indo-China in the insoluble Korean problem and the political idiocy fomented in Washington by the China Lobby. The alternative to Geneva, where Mr. Dulles may still exercise some veto power over an Indo-China settlement, were separate negotiations between Paris and Peiping. It is this which must make Senator Knowland's tantrums seem so ungrateful to the Secretary of State.—I. F. S.

Both Sides to Blame — "We Must Not Despair"

By Aneurin Bevan

The responsibility for the failure of the Berlin Conference to agree on a plan for the future of Germany must be shared equally by both sides.

Neither side seemed to have come to the Conference with any disposition to make a compromise. Each merely repeated the position it had previously taken up.

Mr. Molotov insisted that the Eastern German Government should rank in equal status with that of Western Germany. For their part the three Western allies made it clear that united Germany should be free to join any alliance it chose—which the Russians know quite well would mean a German reinforcement of NATO.

It passes comprehension that the Allies should believe the Russians would agree to that. What would they get in return? Precisely nothing.

The Allies would get the integration of the whole of Germany into the Western Bloc; German ascendancy would be firmly established in Western Europe and soon Russia would find herself defending her satellites against German claims for a revision of the frontiers.

Elections a Secondary Issue

Much was said at the conference about the method of holding elections and the nature of the supervision of them. All that is very important, of course, but it is of secondary significance compared with the main issue which still remains: who is to command Germany's resources, and if neither side is to enjoy them can they both agree that Germany should be neutralized until some future date?

The answer to that appears to be that the Western powers have reconciled themselves to the division of Germany.

Judged from that angle the Berlin Conference was merely a formal procedure preliminary to the creation of the twelve German military divisions upon which Foster Dulles and Mr. Eden have set their hearts.

Or are they still as enthusiastic about them as they once were? Not long ago the twelve German divisions were looked on as absolutely essential in order to counteract the weakness of France.

The United States military advisers saw the problem in simple terms. France is engaged in a wasting war in Indo-China. America supports her with money and military supplies. This leaves France too weak to man the Western wall in Europe.

The solution to this was to give Western German permission to create and equip a limited army. France objected to this on the ground that it would make Germany once again the master of Western Europe. The United States, however, insisted.

France was sore beset because of the war in Indo-China, and her domestic economic problems made her sensitively dependent upon American financial aid. It was at this point that France made a slip.

It occurred to some Frenchmen that the influence of a re-armed Germany might be kept in check if two things could be accomplished.

First, the creation of a European Defense Community in

which national military contributions could be merged. By ingenious arrangements it could be made impossible for any one nation taking part in this to possess a completely autonomous military establishment. Only the E.D.C. as a whole would be a complete military unit.

The United States jumped at the suggestion. This was the birth of the idea of E.D.C. and it has haunted France ever since.

The second condition was that Britain should agree to forming part of it. In this France was encouraged by some vague phrases of Sir Winston Churchill's.

Britain, however, has never accepted this view. She holds that her commitments are world-wide and that therefore she cannot tie down her forces only in Europe.

Atomic Warfare and A German Army

It may be that the new conception of atom warfare which has been developed in the United States does not now place such an emphasis on German ground forces, although they would still be welcome.

The U.S.A. values much more the air bases she enjoys in Western Germany from which she could deliver atom bombs in great numbers against the Russian satellites and against Russia herself.

This shift in the technique of war has also brought about new thoughts in Germany itself. Obviously large ground forces are not going to be as important as they once were and this fact for the time being at least reduces Germany's military value. It also blunts the edge of Germany's eagerness to rearm.

In an atom war Germany would be at the receiving end of atom bombs from Russia. With the memory of saturation H.E. bombing still vivid in German minds she can hardly be complacent about the prospect of hydrogen bombs.

It is therefore not surprising to find that the German Social Democrats are prepared to bargain a neutralized Germany in return for unity. It is true the Social Democratic leader did not go as far as that in his actual statement, but he went very near.

He said that Germany should be prepared to renounce E.D.C. provided Russia would agree to free elections for a united Germany. But, as he is not a party to the negotiations, the views do not prevail.

His point of view does, however, highlight the conclusion that the chief obstacle to the unity of Germany is simply the desire of the Western powers to number Germany among their military assets. It has all along been obvious that no solution of the German problem could be realized on these lines.

Unity on the basis of neutrality: that seems the only way out. It will be argued, it is not possible to keep a nation of the importance of Germany permanently disarmed. It would inflict on her an inferior status which she would resent.

Quite right, although it would be a little anodyne to her feelings that by it she might be exempted from the horrors of atom bombing. It is clear that a disarmed Germany could be made tolerable only if it is regarded as preparatory to gen-

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Corliss Lamont's Inside Story After 21 Years . . .

EDITOR'S NOTE: In a "grass roots" revolt at the biennial conference of the American Civil Liberties Union in New York City over the Lincoln's Birthday week-end, the A.C.L.U.'s Affiliates forced its National Board to withdraw proposed new statements of policy and to accept a substitute reaffirming the organization's traditional position. The Weekly last October 31 exposed the internal fight within the A.C.L.U. and in an exclusive article alerted many A.C.L.U. members to what was going on; that and succeeding articles in the Weekly were referred to during debate at the conference. Scant attention has been paid the conference in the press. We asked Corliss Lamont, retired from the Board after 21 years, to tell the story of the internal fight within the organization for our readers.

Lamont's retirement and the new members chosen by the self-perpetuating Board of Directors do not promise a militancy to match the policy statement forced on it by the Affiliates. The new members are New York City Councilman Earl Brown, a Republican; Lewis Galantiere, program director of Radio Free Europe; John Jessup, chief editorial writer of *Life* magazine, and C. Dickerman Williams, once assistant to Samuel Seabury and a former solicitor of the U. S. Department of Commerce. In the February 22 issue of the ultra-rightist *The Freeman*, Mr. Williams has an article supporting "immunity" legislation to compel testimony before Congressional investigating committees.—I.F.S.

By Corliss Lamont

As one who served on the Board of Directors of the Civil Liberties Union from 1932 to 1954 and participated actively in its long drawn out debates on policy over the past two years, I feel concerned over the developments reported at the Biennial Conference of the A.C.L.U. The basic question is whether the determined stand of the affiliates at this Conference will be sufficient to halt and reverse the growing tendency of the National Board to inject irrelevant Cold War considerations into decisions on fundamental civil liberties issues, to compromise more and more on the original free speech principles of the A.C.L.U. and to put across unsound policies by thwarting democratic procedures in the organization as a whole.

The Affiliates, in all but unanimous revolt against the vacillating behavior of the Board, won a significant victory in obtaining the withdrawal of three new policy statements that undercut the traditional position of the A.C.L.U. on civil liberties. They also recommended the elimination of the monstrous provision in the A.C.L.U. By-Laws permitting the Board of Directors to set aside the results of national referendums and to veto all amendments to the by-laws.

In one of the policy statements rejected by the Biennial Conference the Directors in effect threw overboard the Fifth Amendment's safeguard against self-incrimination. They disregarded the recommendations of the Union's excellent Aca-

demic Freedom Committee. The Committee wished to defend teachers who on constitutional grounds decline to answer the inquisitorial questions of Congressional Committees. For more than a year the Board has given the run-around to its Academic Freedom Committee. Members of this Committee include such civil liberties stalwarts as Arthur C. Cole, Professor of History at Brooklyn College; Helen M. Lynd, Professor of Social Philosophy at Sarah Lawrence; Broadus Mitchell, Professor of Economics at Rutgers; and H. H. Wilson, Professor of Politics at Princeton.

In this same statement on the Fifth Amendment the National Board also turned down the recommendations of its Special Committee on International Civil Liberties, of which the moving spirit was Mr. Roger N. Baldwin, former executive director of the A.C.L.U. This Committee had urged a protest against investigations into the political beliefs and associations of American members of the United Nations staff as inquiries which violated both the U. S. Constitution and the UN Charter.

The A.C.L.U. and the McCarran Act

Another of these policy statements of the A.C.L.U. National Board compromised the defense of the Bill of Rights by a long, violent and irrelevant attack on the Communist Party. This embodied the spirit of the introductory sections of the Internal Security (McCarran) Act. This statement paves the way for the government to prosecute Communist Party members under the Foreign Agents Registration Act. It undermines the A.C.L.U.'s formal opposition to the Smith Act and the Internal Security Act by implying that most Communists are guilty of conspiracy and illegal acts. It extends the witch hunt to so-called Communist fellow-travellers and sympathizers and it gives general encouragement to the McCarthyism and McCarranism which mortally threaten civil liberties today.

Another fundamental objection to the statement on the Communist Party is that it takes the Civil Liberties Union into a realm of sweeping judgments on domestic politics and international affairs where it has no business. The Directors and other officials of the A.C.L.U. are not supposed to be experts on international relations and political systems. They are united in the Civil Liberties Union for the defense of American civil liberties. We may hope that they possess some degree of expertise in that field. But it is not the function of the A.C.L.U. to describe, analyze and judge the inner nature of the organizations whose civil liberties it defends, any more than it is its function to determine whether some individual deprived of free speech has really been telling the full truth or is faithful to his wife.

What the Statement under discussion does is to turn the American Civil Liberties Union from an organization concentrating on civil liberties to one engaged in the general battle against world communism. It enlists the A.C.L.U. in

BEFORE —

Excerpts from the proposed new policy statements approved by the National Board of the ACLU and rejected by the Affiliates at the biennial conference:

"... But: (1) It is not a violation of civil liberties to take into account a person's voluntary choice of association when that choice is relevant to a particular judgment —providing that such a judgment is not indiscriminate or automatic, but specific and comprehensive in weighing all relevant factors . . . This is not to condone "guilt by association" in the reprehensible sense of holding a person

guilty of believing or doing what someone else with whom he is (often remotely) connected believes or does.

"... On the other hand, the Union will continue, for example: (1) to recognize the indispensability of police measures to prevent and punish actual subversive acts at the earliest moment they can be identified as acts, and the necessity in drawing the line of "clear and present danger" —of taking more factors into account with respect to the free speech of a secret conspiratorial group aiming at sabotage than with respect to the open-air preaching of a single anarchist."

... The "Grass Roots Revolt" in The Civil Liberties Union

the Cold War. We do not object to militant anti-Communists being officers of the A.C.L.U. We must strenuously object, however, when they attempt to make the struggle against communism that organization's chief aim instead of the struggle for civil liberties. There are a thousand and one other organizations, which anyone can join or support, dedicated to fighting communism and winning the Cold War.

An Internal Filibuster

The Board of Directors debated the three policy statements from December 1952 to June 1953, and kept the national office busy mimeographing and distributing endless memoranda and reformulations during these six months. The normal day-to-day work of Executive Director, Patrick M. Malin, and his staff was seriously disrupted during this long period. And the Board itself became demoralized. What the Cold War group really did was to conduct a six months' filibuster in which it would not permit the Board to carry on with its regular business. Thus the large final vote for the three resolutions was due primarily to fatigue, boredom and the feeling on the part of many Directors that compromise was the only way to make the non-stop talkers cease and desist.

After the Board had adopted the statements, I and nine other members of the Corporation initiated a national A.C.L.U. vote on them according to the provision of the By-Laws providing for such a referendum by petition of ten members. In the first week of September the referendum documents went out to the full Corporation: the Directors, the members of the National Committee and the Affiliates.

Some six weeks later the referendum was concluded and Mr. Malin sent out an official report, referring to October 16 as "the deadline." Much to everyone's surprise the negative had won by a small margin. The vote of the Affiliates was decisive, 13 of them having voted in the negative and only 3 of the smaller ones in the affirmative. Instead of accepting this democratic decision, the Board group which had originally forced through the three statements immediately started maneuvering to set aside the referendum.

Two weeks later a report came through from the A.C.L.U. office that the Chicago Affiliate had switched its vote from negative to affirmative and that therefore the statements had been adopted. I objected to this procedure on the ground that it was improper to change the ballot totals after the referendum had been officially concluded. I also discovered that the Chicago switch had taken place as the result of a hasty and incomplete poll of its Board members by telephone. Accordingly, I phoned the Chicago Affiliate and protested. My protest went before the next meeting of its Board, which declared that the whole business of a "second vote" was unacceptable, withdrew the results of its telephone poll and reported its referendum vote again in the negative. Hence on November 13 Mr. Malin had to return to his original report that the negative had won the national referendum.

The Decision to Over-Ride

But the Cold War group on the National Board was determined to have its way; and shortly afterwards put through a Board decision (the first of its kind in the 34-year history of the organization) to over-ride the referendum under cover of a special veto provision slipped into the new By-Laws of 1951. The three policy statements stood adopted officially by the American Civil Liberties Union. I argued against the over-riding as a violation of democratic procedure in the A.C.L.U. by an inner Board dictatorship and pointed out that an organization dedicated to democracy and civil liberties should be the last one in the world to abrogate the democratic process in its own functioning. I stated that the disregarding of the referendum was unjust to the Affiliates and the National Committee and made a mockery of our whole machinery allowing appeal from Board decisions.

Meanwhile, some of the Directors had become increasingly annoyed over my continued opposition to the three policy statements and my drastic criticism of Board tactics. Although I had been a Board member in good standing since 1932, the Nominating Committee did not include my name among the nominees for the 1953-56 term. Nonetheless, the Board early in November amended the Committee's report and nominated me. Then the storm broke. Heavy pressure was suddenly brought on me to withdraw from the nomination because several Directors were threatening to resign if my name went on the ballot and to publicize current controversies in the A.C.L.U. as a great Left-Right battle centering around me. It was the Cold War group in action again.

I refused to withdraw, taking the position that the campaign against me was based on untrue and unjust assumptions, and that it was highly improper and violative of democratic procedures for a minority group of Directors to try to reverse a Board decision through devious threats and pressures. At the next meeting of the Board, however, the majority yielded to these factional tactics and rescinded my nomination. A minor factor in this decision was that some of the Directors were furious about my telephone call to the Chicago Affiliate which resulted in the negative finally winning the referendum and made necessary the Board veto power as the only method of putting the three policy statements into effect. My answer here was that I was merely doing my duty as a Director, that my protest to Chicago had prevented the Board from putting through an unprincipled and unpardonable action, and that if we believed in freedom of speech within the Civil Liberties Union, then a Director had the right to discuss Union affairs confidentially with any other member of the Corporation.

During my 21 years of service as an A.C.L.U. Director I had leaned over backwards to keep confidential Union matters within the A.C.L.U. family of Board, National Committee and Affiliates. But the right-wing, anti-civil liberties group

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Excerpts from the substitute statement of policy drafted by former Senator Frank P. Graham, Professor Robert Lynd and Morris Rubin, overwhelmingly approved by the affiliates and finally accepted unanimously at the biennial conference:

"The American Civil Liberties Union is gravely concerned over the extent to which the suppression of basic liberties and the corruption of historic safeguards have replaced legitimate police and judicial procedures required to safeguard the security of the country. We therefore stand against guilt by association, judgment by accusa-

tion, the invasion of privacy of personal opinions and beliefs and the confusion of dissent with disloyalty—all of which are characteristic of the totalitarian tyrannies we abhor . . .

" . . . the American Civil Liberties Union . . . pledges itself to continue to defend and champion the rightful civil liberties of any person or organization, the essentials of academic freedom, fair hearings and due process, whatever be the issues of the hour, the temper of the times, the alarms of crises and the pressure of groups."

What The Cold War Has Done to the ACLU . . .

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on the Board had again and again been responsible for direct leaks to the press of confidential Board decisions, often giving out the precise vote recorded. Most frequently these leaks appeared in stories run by the *New Leader*, the *New York Journal American* and the *New York World Telegram*. And sure enough it happened again in reference to the rescinding of my nomination when someone in the inner circles of the A.C.L.U. leaked the news to Frederick Woltman of the *World Telegram and Sun* who ran a story on December 11, 1953, headed "Lamont's Leftist Ideas Rouse A.C.L.U.: Director Taken Off Ballot."

A group of rank-and-file members of the A.C.L.U. in New York City were anxious that I permit them to nominate me as a Director through the special section of the By-Laws making provision for such nomination by 25 regular members of the organization. I declined this suggestion on the grounds that the situation had become too confused and unpleasant for me to go on waging a minority battle at present within the A.C.L.U. Furthermore, as I said in a statement to the Board of Directors itself: "If I were renominated now, the same high-handed group that forced the withdrawal of my Board nomination would in all probability renew the controversy and create a terrible furor which would again plunge this organization into bitter dissension. I am tired of all this. I believe that I can be more helpful to the cause of civil liberties by giving over my energies directly to the fight against McCarthy and McCarthyism than by endlessly debating my able and eloquent opponents on this Board."

The strange history of the Board of Directors of the Civil Liberties Union during the recent past must make us cautious about placing too much store on the successes scored by the Affiliates as the Biennial Conference. Only time will tell whether the headstrong Board of Directors has truly reformed or is temporarily bowing to the pressure of 20-odd militant Affiliates meeting together for the first time in three years.

The pressures from the Right on the Board and within the Board are very heavy. The American Legion has repeatedly called the A.C.L.U. a Communist front and demanded that it be investigated. Many Board members have succumbed to hysteria.

Where the Trouble Began

As Professor Alexander Meiklejohn, ever alert member of the Executive Committee of the Northern California Affiliate and ablest civil libertarian within the ranks of the A.C.L.U., pointed out in a brilliant analysis of the three policy statements, the trouble started with the National Board's famous resolution of February, 1940. That ill-conceived declaration barred as officers of the Union or members of its staff any

person "who is a member of any political organization which supports totalitarian dictatorship in any country or who by his public declarations indicates his support of such a principle." This not only involved the A.C.L.U. in issues of foreign affairs, but also in practice made anti-Communist militancy and purity the main qualification for the nomination and election of individuals to the Board of Directors and National Committee.

The 1940 Resolution, which I never ceased to oppose, was in essence the first Loyalty Oath which a reputable American organization put into effect. In adopting it the Civil Liberties Union set the worst possible example for the nation.

New York's Predominance

The fact that the headquarters of the A.C.L.U. is in New York City and that all Directors, in order to be able to attend the Board meetings every other week, must live in the city or vicinity is a significant factor in the evolution of the organization. New York is also the headquarters of the Communist movement and many of the Directors have had unhappy first-hand experiences with the Communists. This is one reason for a fanatical anti-communist spirit on the Board which does not exist on the executive committees of the Affiliates. The more bitter anti-Communist Directors, often sincere, likable and brilliant individuals, are so wrapped up in the world-wide struggle against communism that they are unable to concentrate on the special task of the Civil Liberties Union, which is to support the American Bill of Rights; they find it difficult to think clearly on civil liberties issues affecting Communists and radicals in general.

While the Cold War group on the Board consists of almost half the Directors, the most energetic and vocal of these persons has probably been Norman Thomas, the outstanding figure in the Socialist Party of the United States during the past 25 years. An amiable enough man personally, Mr. Thomas obviously has a political bone to pick with the Communists and burns with righteousness and Gospel fervor when he gets going on the Communist menace. It was he who publicly initiated the campaign for the 1940 Resolution. He was a prime mover in forcing through the 1953 policy statements. Thomas was always finding signs of dangerous Communist plots within the Civil Liberties Union. When the three policy statements were rejected in the national referendum, he immediately began muttering about "interpenetration by Communists and fellow-travellers."

My conclusion is that the future of the American Civil Liberties Union and especially of its Board of Directors still remains in doubt. But we can be confident that whatever happens on the National Board, the score of Affiliates throughout the country will maintain the original principles of the A.C.L.U.

Bevan on Berlin: "The Chief Hope of Mankind"

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eral disarmament.

This is why I have always insisted that the solution of the German problem can be considered only in a wider context. Germany is too important in the strategy of the Great Powers to be the subject of a partial settlement.

To many this will appear to be a gloomy conclusion, because disarmament seems so far away and all attempts to achieve it have been lost in a morass of procedural difficulties and bitter recrimination.

But there is a new situation, full of fresh urgency. A final appeal to the atom bomb is now universally regarded as suicidal for mankind. Unfortunately, it cannot be ruled out

merely because of that.

Suicidal impulses might supervene on the strain of delayed decision. That is why the failure to reach a satisfactory settlement of the German problem must not be allowed to cause despair.

There is hope in the fact that private discussions have occurred over the Eisenhower proposal to consider the pooling of fission materials. This proposal unites in itself two main aspects of the world problem which must always be studied together if anything useful is to emerge.

Those are disarmament and assistance for the underdeveloped areas. In the unity of these two conceptions lies the chief hope for mankind.

I. F. Stone's Weekly

• Editor and Publisher, I. F. STONE

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AROUND THE CAPITOL

THE HISTORIAN, with more leisure than we, will dwell with irony (we hope) on the interminable debate over the Bricker amendment, now in its fourth week in the Senate. In this topsy-turvy America, it is not surprising that the lengthiest speeches of our time on the menace to constitutional liberty should be delivered by crypto-Fascists engaged in undermining what they purport to defend. The basic issue itself is hopelessly entangled, and the opposing sides might easily exchange positions were an isolationist rather an internationalist President in power. The fact is that Presidents for some time have circumvented the Constitution by using the semantic device of the "executive agreement" to avoid the provision requiring submission of international pacts for Senate approval. The fact also is that the supporters of the Bricker amendment are generally fearful, not of restricting, but of expanding fundamental human rights by international agreement, particularly the rights of Negroes and other minorities. Incidentally, this is an issue on which the American right and the leftist Russians agree—on the menace to national sovereignty lurking in such documents as the UN Declaration of Human Rights.

THE COWARDICE OF THE RESPECTABLE ELEMENTS in our society is one of the principal features of this period, as it was of pre-Nazi and Nazi Germany. As we went to press, there was to be another test of just when high placed worms would turn and fight. Secretary of the Army Stevens was to face McCarthy (with that brave disciple of Wild Bill Hickok discreetly silent as usual under the bed in the Lincoln Room at the White House) in a showdown to determine just how mean McCarthy can be to Generals and get away with it. So far, as the testimony published in our last issue on The Affair of the Siberian Pamphlet shows, the Army has always knuckled under. Behind this affair is not only McCarthy's monumental effrontery but the undercover feud long waged by the FBI against military intelligence, CIA and the capital's other gumshoe agencies. McCarthy is paying off some scores for J. Edgar Hoover.

Apparently the Army has on several occasions dared to find unreliable the information supplied by some of the FBI's pet informers. The Annie Lee Moss case seems to have been an instance. The most nauseating moment in the hearing at

which that was aired came when McCarthy claimed that other witnesses named as Communists by Mrs. Mary Markward, the FBI informer, had all taken refuge in the Fifth amendment. When Senator Jackson (D. Wash.) interjected that they had not claimed the Fifth when asked about Mrs. Moss, McCarthy accused him of breaching the rule against disclosing testimony taken in executive session!

JOURNALISTIC PORTENT: The New York World-Telegram, in printing a dispatch on February 12 about Jenner's speech accusing the Democrats of deliberately seeking defeat in Korea, took an unusual step. It played the story on page one with a two column head but put in this warning to the reader: "Editor's Note: The World-Telegram and Sun prints the following dispatch because it is a statement by a United States Senator. It should be pointed out, however, that Sen. William E. Jenner offered no facts to substantiate his irresponsible charge." When the Weekly phoned Executive Editor Lee Wood, he explained the italic preface was suggested by Assistant Managing Editor Richard Starnes and okayed by Wood. We applaud this episode in honest journalism, but suggest the office boy be instructed to keep a sharp eye open for subpoena servers from the Jenner committee. Although their boss, Roy Howard, has been underground on Park Avenue for many years, he is reliably reported by confidential informants whose identity cannot be disclosed to have been the lifelong associate of a radical newspaperman named Scripps.

THAT STUPID JOKE being circulated by the Democrats reveals more than intended and will boomerang. It is about a farmer with three sons who voted for Eisenhower and now has his three boys back, one from Korea—the other two from Detroit. This corrosive cynicism reflects a really bankrupt point of view. If the two boys in Detroit cannot be kept working unless the third brother goes on risking his life in Korea, parents may conceivably prefer to get all three back, even at the cost of doubling up at home. We prefer Defense Secretary Charles E. Wilson's wholesome evangelism on the theme that we can have prosperity without war to this sneer at the Korean truce.

FOR YOUR CATHOLIC FRIENDS: Father John Fearon's discussion of "Congressional Investigations and Moral Theology" in the February 19 issue of *The Commonwealth*. A Los Angeles priest, a member of the Dominican Order of Preachers, argues the moral case for the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination and discusses the moral limitations on any obligation to "volunteer information about Communistic activities." Also recommended in the same issue, William V. Shannon's article, "The Administration and Civil Liberties."

H'M, WE NEVER KNEW THEY HAD TO THINK IT OVER: "The Veterans of Foreign Wars made their choice long ago between freedom and Communism."—Speaker Joseph W. Martin, Jr., at the V.F.W.'s Washington Birthday celebration in Alexandria, Va.

HAT'S OFF: To Robert M. Hutchins, and the editors of *Look*, for a bravely outspoken article in its March 9 issue, "Are Our Teachers Afraid to Teach?"

Some Personal Chatter by the E. and P.

An operation for deafness forced suspension of publication last week. This double issue takes the place of the one missed. We hope you enjoy its special features. The Bevan article gives you a point of view rarely heard in this country where "neutralism" has been made almost as horrid a word as c----ism. Corliss Lamont's story speaks for itself. Even the liberal weeklies have shied away from the internal fight inside the ACLU. The Indo-Chinese war glimpses are from the diary of a French soldier which created a stir when it was published in Paris last winter

by *Editions de la Table Ronde*. We wonder how many of you saw the two column ad about this special issue on page four of the Review of the News section in the New York Times of Sunday, February 21. First returns were good. Many thanks to those who sent their best wishes on the operation. It will be a week or so before the ear clears up and then we'll give you a news bulletin. In the meantime, those of you who still lag, don't forget those renewals. Use the blank on the next page, and don't put it off any longer, please.

The Indo-Chinese War—As Seen in A French Soldier's Diary

By Phillippe de Pirey

Two columns moving towards Cao-Thon . . . Muddy flags of rice paddies surround us, villagers file past, people bent in two, hands joined, endlessly mumbling entreaties and prayers. We fearsome warriors do harden our eyes as we look down upon the women with domineering self-assurance.

The advance elements of the first column, in which I happen to be, are met by a shower of bullets on the outskirts of the village of Co-Quan. The deeper rat-tat of a sub-machine gun seems to dominate the orchestra.

When we finally reach the first canhas (huts) it is too late, the Viet-Minh have vanished. Only a few women and impotent old men remain. Orders to burn the place down. Walking up to a rather clean and prosperous-looking hut, I find in it a man. True, he is paralyzed from the waist down and drags himself around on a rough pair of crutches. His French is correct as he repeats ceaselessly: "I am poor, do not burn my house." I ask him where the V.M. are, he does not know; they are gone. Lajose turns up holding a torch and sets fire to the straw roof. The man crawls out to the yard and just stands there, stunned; tears run slowly down his cheeks. All I can find to say is: "Well, you know, war is war."

* * *

At 3 a.m. several rifle shots ring out. In a flash every man is at his post, throwing grenades and firing. Cries of "Alert—alert." Mortars and machine guns join the dance, echoed by the Ao-Trach artillery. Lt. Gonzales voice behind me: "There they are! Fire at will!" We do not need to be told, shell-bursts a few inches from our fox-holes are incentive enough, especially as my platoon is in the first firing line. We never stop firing until daybreak.

I do not think it is strange not seeing anything in the stark light of flares and rockets, but as we have plenty of ammunition, I decide we might as well be over-cautious. At dawn, however, officers and men are slightly embarrassed by the discovery that they have been shooting at shadows all night. All the ammunition is gone, the Ao-Trach batteries fired 3,000 rounds . . . With calm restored, it was easy to see how the

mistake was made. The third line of defense threw grenades; these, exploding just under the first line of holes, led us to think an attack was on.

For this great feat of arms we rate an official communique, relayed by press agencies as follows: "Violent V.M. counter-attack on Peak 4 during the night of January 22d. Franco-Vietnamese forces successfully repulsed every assault."

* * *

Feverish activity this morning on the Ao-Trach post. Very intriguing. We are soon to learn the cause of it: the imminent arrival of the Secretary of Associated States. My company is asked to supply two platoons of 21 men. Our uniforms are in rags and our shoes have no soles. So what! The company commander organizes an amazing flea-market. From those remaining behind we glean every decent-looking piece of gear, and in no time 42 apparently well-dressed men line up on the road. The others, with bare feet or bare buttocks, will just have to wait for the return of their boots and trousers . . .

Soon, the official convoy draws up with an impressive escort of tanks, scout cars and half-trucks. M. Letourneau alights from a de-luxe red Willys. He has got himself dressed up as a GI for the occasion, complete with olive drab field jacket from American surplus stores. He is flanked by Generals Salan and de Linares while more brass falls in behind. An American information mission and a Viet-Namse Colonel supply the international note.

For the next ten minutes reporters' flash-bulbs replace the usual 105 salute. Colonel de Quincerot, with monocled eye, presents the troops in a guttural tone.

Then comes the patriotic speech, inevitably pompous and flowery. The Minister has just reached the crucial point, France's undying gratitude for our splendid action on R.C. 6, when he is interrupted by a sharp detonation from our hill-station. Anguished looks as all eyes turn in that direction. A radio-man is dispatched to report: someone threw an empty can and it hit a mine. Smiles, everybody relaxes. M. Letourneau can resume his speech.

—Operation Cachis (Operation Waste), Table Ronde (Paris).

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