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Stevenson Again Offers Leadership for Peace

More striking even than Adlai Stevenson's speech at Chicago was the little noticed hint in his final article for *Look*. There the Democratic leader had the courage to suggest negotiating recognition of Communist China. His words are worth close examination. "In China," Stevenson wrote, ". . . industrialization and increased food production will require goods and machinery from the West. That's why many experts I talked with conclude that China wants peace and trade above all . . . Our allies are hungry for trade with China, too. . . . Some kind of Western policy for China must be worked out, now that the Korean fighting has ceased. Views among the allies are far apart now; but if China wants unrestricted trade, admission to the UN, diplomatic recognition and Formosa, and if we want a unified Korea, peace in Indochina and a separate status for Formosa, there is at least a broad base for negotiation."

The assumption is that we must co-exist with the new China, a daring proposition in the bedlam of American politics. As in the last campaign, Stevenson makes containment a stepping stone to co-existence rather than to "liberation." When interviewed by *Newsweek* on his return, Stevenson said he was convinced that we should "continue to resist Communist expansion" but "must decide whether we are trying to destroy Communism or trying to achieve a peaceful co-existence with it." He said, "the rest of the free world is alarmed by our seeming inflexibility. There's a suspicion that our objective is to exterminate Communism . . . Merely being against Communism is old stuff in Europe and will win few hearts in Asia. They need convincing that we are more interested in settlements by negotiation, in reducing tensions and in stability, than in force and military action." The tone differs not only from Dulles but from Truman and Acheson.

To find a common denominator of leadership for peace in the Democratic party and in the country at this time requires finesse. For many months the only theme of the Democratic opposition in foreign policy has been that Eisenhower was "dismantling" our defenses. No Democrat has challenged Dulles for implying before the American Legion that our bombers will attack China if there is renewed war in Korea or Chinese intervention in Indo-China. Something perilously close to a commitment to World War III has been made without protest from the opposition party or a numbed public opinion. The Indo-Chinese commitment indeed merely implements the original Truman Doctrine, which was intended to be global.

One wing of the Democratic party, with Byrnes, is "liberationist." Another, with Symington, is the support of the Air Lobby. Truman sees eye to eye with Symington on Air Force cuts and is reported by Drew Pearson to have spoken con-

temptuously of the Korean truce as something he could have had months ago if he had been willing to take the terms Eisenhower accepted. Senator Douglas, the main speaker at Monday night's dinner in Chicago, still pursues the Mac Arthurite line and implied that Eisenhower had settled for a "cheap peace in Korea which might give away our security." To conciliate such diverse and belligerent voices, to find formulas for peace which they might be led to accept, is a task which requires political genius.

Stevenson again displayed the art of seeming to agree with these other party voices, yet leading them off in a quite different direction. He, too, is against "unilateral disarmament" and he, too, is for a firm policy in Indo-China. At a time when American diplomacy seems to be a constant exercise in demonology, Stevenson uses the ritualistic verbalisms necessary for political respectability. Yet he ends up with such heresies as the right of a large part of the world to be neutral, the need for relaxation of tension and (most breath-taking of all) the proposition that not all the ills of the world are due to Communism. To ask before that audience and in that atmosphere whether China would "yield at the conference table what it fought to prevent on the battlefield" and to answer that this was unlikely took nerve. To go on and say that he hoped that in negotiating we would not be "prisoners of domestic political propaganda" was to make himself the No. 1 enemy of our No. 1 political power, the China Lobby.

It has too quickly been forgotten that Stevenson was the only American political leader last spring to endorse Churchill's call for a new try at negotiation. He stopped off at Chequers to see Sir Winston on his way home. The design he offers for world compromise is much like Churchill's. This is strikingly so in the case of Germany which Stevenson, too, would "win for the West" but with "durable assurances of non-aggression—for Russia as well as for France." (Obvious as the notion may be in the rest of the world, here it was hazardous for Stevenson to suggest that the Russians have legitimate security needs, too.) This formula lacks long range realism—the Germans will never be safely and permanently "Western"—but it offers a basis at least for negotiation.

Stevenson's suggestion that we swap Chinese recognition and trade for a separate status on Formosa has similar defects and similar virtues. The Chinese will never accept a rump regime on Formosa. Even a "UN trusteeship" for the island may be as unpalatable to them as a UN trusteeship over Hawaii would be for us. But at least this breaks the ice and sells the feasibility and desirability of negotiation and co-existence. For this and for Stevenson's protest against "the current wave of conformity and fear here at home" we are grateful.

Adenauer's Victory and the New Berlin-Washington Axis

The logic of the Adenauer victory in Germany is quite simple. It does not pay the Germans to negotiate unification with Moscow as long as there are still benefits to be collected from the West. At the moment "unification" with Washington is worth much more than unification with East Germany. The American alliance offers a means of rearming Germany at American expense. One reason for West Germany's remarkable economic recovery is that it has been the only country in the West with no armed forces to support. Either through the European Defense Community (if ratified) or directly, the Germans will get U. S. aid in rearming. And a rearmed West Germany can make a better deal with the Russians than could an unarmed Germany today.

The Russians are left holding the bag in Eastern Germany. Basic German-Slav antagonisms centuries old make it difficult for the Russians to develop a real base in an occupied East Germany. The German Communists are compromised by their relations with the occupying power. The level of operating efficiency in Germany is much higher than in Russia. The Russians seem to have more difficulty with the workers than with any other class in the zone. Moscow cannot compete with Washington in the handing out of favors. The longer a unification deal is delayed, the higher the German price will be. Adenauer is already saying that a "solution" of the Eastern frontier can only be negotiated with a "free" Poland and talking of a condominium or UN trusteeship over the Oder-Neisse territories. The iron and steel masters of the Ruhr are anxious to "liberate" the Silesian iron and steel resources which lie in the Oder-Neisse territories annexed to Poland. The German goal is a new partition of Poland, recovery of East Prussia.

The Adenauer election has strengthened John Foster Dulles and enabled him to resume the liberationist aims which the Eisenhower Administration had shelved. Always pro-German, Dulles will be freer than before to give a German orientation to the State Department, which has tended for a generation to be pro-British and to a lesser extent pro-French. German leverage is now stronger than that of any country on the Continent. Its traditional power to blackmail East and West has revived. It can always threaten to repeat the maneuvers of Rapallo and the Nazi-Soviet pact if Washington does not dance to its tune; in this respect Adenauer becomes a European Syngman Rhee but on an incomparably bigger scale.

"If this is a triumph for American democracy," one newspaper said of the Adenauer victory, "it is a strange one indeed, for if Germany has elected to tie its future to America, America is by the same circumstance, tied more closely to Germany's future. The Germans have voted themselves a strong claim upon American military and economic support . . . a more intimate and direct involvement in the most explosive of Europe's many explosive problems, the problem of German unification and rearmament." The paper went on to warn that "the exigencies of politics may lead the Russians, if not him, to force the issue . . . the American people had better consider carefully before the event, for if they wait until the ultimatums have been delivered, it will be too late." These dour reflections on the Adenauer victory were the Chicago Tribune's; it wasted no space on the poppycock in most of

the American press about Germany having been saved for the "free world."

Adenauer is an authoritarian old man, exactly the kind of father image to whom the Germans respond. He has kept the reins of power in his own hands to a ludicrous extent; unlike Hitler, he has neither a Goering nor a Goebbels nor a Ribbentrop. The "freedom" he represents is the freedom of German big business to rule Germany its own way; the post-election ultimatum to the trade unions, and the big business demand that he sell government owned industrial properties are indicative. A tight oligarchy representing the Ruhr-Rhineland industrialists and the Catholic Church rule West Germany through Adenauer. The Churches outdid themselves in a McCarthystyle pre-election campaign against the Social Democrats, and the outcome is a signal for more "free enterprise" Germany style. This is the old cartel system in a new package. The anti-Communist vote reflected hatred for the Russians, but the decline in the neo-Nazi vote does not mean "democracy" is safe in Germany. The Germans will not turn further right until that serves their purpose. This is the time for another Bruening; a new Hitler would be premature.

Will the Russians step in to prevent the rearmament of Germany? All we know of Russian history and the mood of its people leads one to doubt it. "Preventative" war is as far from the Russian pattern as from the American. Moscow gave way before Hitler until attacked and will give way again to German pressure. The post-Stalin changes reflect vast popular discontent within the Soviet Union, and a determination to appease this by slowing down the pace of forced industrialization and military preparation. The Russians will not go to war to prevent the Germans from rearming, but neither will they be mollified by any maneuver as phony as Adenauer's pre-election talk of a new "security" pact with which to sugarcoat German rearmament as part of the Western bloc. German non-aggression pacts are traditionally worthless, and the Russians answer is more likely to be an attempted return to the alternative tactic of the Franco-Russian alliance.

This, however, no longer seems possible. France is tied to the dollar, and the Indo-Chinese war has made her a captive of current American policy. As seen from this point of view, a settlement of the Indo-Chinese war would run counter to Dulles's purposes in Europe as much as in Asia. Once the Indo-Chinese war is ended, France would resume greater freedom of action on the Continent. This would run counter to German interests, and to the aims of the "liberationists". A new Franco-Russian pact, supplemented again by a new Franco-Polish pact, would be a fundamental obstacle to Dulles's dream of a new counterrevolutionary crusade.

At the moment any such reorientation of European politics is out of the question. Washington holds by far the better cards than Moscow in Europe. In Europe, unlike Asia, there are no neutral powers. In the Soviet zone of Eastern Europe the revolution is a more or less imposed and artificial product rather than a grass roots affair as in China. And the Germans are in no hurry to deal with Moscow so long as through the camouflage of a "united Europe" they can dominate their Western neighbors.

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COMMENT

White-Washing Mc Carthy

In an interview at San Diego on August 21 (see the *Weekly* of September 5), J. Edgar Hoover declared his friendship and admiration for Mc Carthy, and called the Senator an "honest" man. Two weeks later the Department of Justice, perhaps testing the temper of public opinion, let it be known that a "lower echelon" of lawyers had found no basis for indicting Mc Carthy after a seven month study of the Senate privileges and elections subcommittee report on his financial operations. The Senate report showed that Mc Carthy and his administrative assistant banked \$268,000 from 1948 to 1952 and that almost \$105,000 of these deposits had "not been identified as to source."

The first task of any inquiry would be to try and determine whence, how and why such huge sums flowed into the accounts of the Senator and his assistant and alter ego. If the FBI had investigated and found no impropriety, one would expect the fact to be announced. But there is no indication in any of the news stories that there has been any investigation at all. On the contrary they give the distinct impression that all that happened is that Department of Justice lawyers took the facts as presented by the Senate report and on that minimum basis determined whether there was any ground for prosecution. Part of their conclusion is merely that no charges can be brought unless persons who paid sums to the Senator were to complain that they had been defrauded. This sort of technical legal analysis is a very far cry from a real investigation.

But how have a real investigation when the head of the Federal Bureau of Investigation calls Mc Carthy a friend and terms him "honest?" On this the silence even of the anti Mc Carthy press is thunderously eloquent. The combination of Mc Carthy and Hoover really has them scared.

Narrow Escape: Durkin Resigns

Martin Durkin's resignation represents a narrow escape. For the sake of a few concessions on the Taft-Hartley Act, the Eisenhower Administration might have split the labor movement politically, attaching the craft unions to the G.O.P. Many of these union have traditionally been Republican anyway. The Durkin resignation and the decision to stand pat on Taft-Hartley at last puts labor into opposition.

When one sees how dependent the organized labor movement in this country has been on political favoritism, how closely linked especially on the municipal level with corrupt

political machines, how ready to jump on the bandwagon of war and war preparations, how uninterested generally in anything but its own immediate bread and butter problems, one shudders to think of what a shrewd and demagogic rightist regime could do to create a contented and subservient American Labor Front.

The problem of the American intellectual is the preservation of peace and freedom. The labor movement is not overly concerned with either. On the contrary, it remembers two World Wars as periods of great progress. Under Wilson as under Roosevelt, labor made big gains as a reward for co-operation. Under Truman, it found no fault with the cold war or the Korean war as long as these provided the economic basis for full employment. Such a movement could easily be enlisted in an American Fascism, so long as labor was assured its share of the spoils.

This Administration, however, is neither Fascist nor a militarist regime, but a government of conservative business men. It is busy placating and appeasing a powerful crypto-Fascist wing, but its own objectives are those of the cautious banker, not the adventurer. One objective in the current deflationary policy is to weaken the labor movement and end the spiral of wage increases. In that framework, a Durkin is an impediment and the Taft-Hartley Act a valuable instrument.

ACLU and The O'Connor Case

There are times when news still seems to travel slowly. On June 11 Einstein urged American intellectuals to defy the witch hunt and refuse to answer Congressional inquisitors. On July 14 Harvey O'Connor refused to answer questions when subpoenaed by Mc Carthy in his "book burning" investigation. On July 23 the Senate voted to cite O'Connor for contempt. O'Connor was the first intellectual to take "the Einstein pledge." For the first time since the Hollywood Ten, a witness did not invoke the Fifth amendment but took his stand on the First. The Supreme Court declined to hear the Hollywood Ten and has never passed on the constitutional point. It might do so in O'Connor's case.

Against that background it was a little weird to find in our mail under date of September 8 a letter from Louis Joughlin, research director of the American Civil Liberties Union, saying "This office would like to study that issue of the *Weekly* which contains the full text of a statement by Harvey O'Connor concerning academic freedom. I should be grateful if you would send me a copy." We sent him a copy of our issue No. 27, dated July 25, which carried the full text of the O'Connor testimony before the Mc Carthy committee. We are at a loss to explain just what led the ACLU's research office to think that O'Connor's statement had something to do with academic freedom or just why two months later it still was unaware of the news that a man at last had bitten a dog. Now that the ACLU knows, we are waiting to see what it will do.

News Note

Professor Thomas I. Emerson of Yale Law School will be given a testimonial luncheon by the Emergency Civil Liberties Committee at the Fifth Avenue Hotel in New York on Monday, September 21. He is leaving for six months of study abroad.

JENNINGS PERRY'S PAGE

Can Demos Rise to Nothing to Fear but Fear Again?

Just how much new harmony in Democratic ranks was found or generated at Mr. Mitchell's well-publicized Chicago picnic for paying guests time will tell: the party's way-down South wing apparently intends to continue its long pout about the so-called loyalty pledge and a few dedicated members of the party's dwindling band of liberals obstinately cling to the view that bolters should not be given the right hand of fellowship without some sort of slap on the wrist. As of now, however, the one September song sung in sweet unison by all who lay claim to the Democratic name—those who were "detained by previous engagements" as well as those actually in attendance at the rally—projects the theme of a Democratic come-back in the congressional elections of 1954.

The note of confidence in this prophetic chorus probably is justified. It has not taken many months of Republican administration to arouse a lively nostalgia in several population groups of great voting strength. The farmers particularly are unhappy. Labor is apprehensive. And the always harried white-collar level, distressed on the one hand by an undiminished cost of living and on the other by the failure of the Republicans, in their turn, to end deficit financing, sadly suspects that—so soon again—it is time for a change.

But if the trend is toward a Democratic restoration in Congress, if the American people shall be ready for that next year, can it be assumed, from anything the opposition party up to now has had to offer, that the Democrats will be ready with vigorous and inspiring leadership? At Chicago, speaker after speaker skinned the "reactionaries" for plotting and trying to "turn the clock back" in internal affairs for "chipping away" at the Democratic agricultural program, for "getting ready" to hand over the natural resources of the commonwealth to the boodlers, for a "hard money" policy that clips the coins in every citizen's pocket. As certainly was to have been expected at such a convocation the Republicans caught the devil. The question remains of whether the opposition party hopes to *win* an election or merely to pick one up, whether it has any ideas at all that the popular nostalgia on which it is trading is not so much for Democratic programs "tried and true" as for imaginative and heart-quickening courses of government the people have not had proposed to them of late

by the leaders of either party.

There is much to suggest that the Democrats have no more in mind than to take over where they left off: to return the legislative processes, indeed, to "experienced hands" but to permit the all-important attitudes of this nation's government toward the rest of the world to rock along in the same, deepening rut. In any case, Mr. Eisenhower would continue to reside in the White House; as if preparing for their prospective resurgence in Congress to disturb as little as possible the ritual of the Cold War, the Democratic spokesmen have missed no opportunity of pointing out that the President has had to rely at every crucial point "on Democratic votes." And though the familiar complaint that bipartisanship in foreign policy is "dead" now is heard in Democratic accents, the fact remains that Mr. Eisenhower himself, by his very reluctance "to lead," has placed himself in the position of titular "head of government" in the pattern rather of European republics than of our own, ready to "form a government" congenial to any party in representative elections come to power.

It is difficult to suppose that Mr. Stevenson, his man Mr. Mitchell or any other Democratic spokesman does not realize that the one solid basis of Mr. Eisenhower's enduring "popularity" is the ability of his supporters to claim that "he has made good his promise to end the war in Korea." The fact should mean something to the party now out of power but bubbling with expectation of "taking over Congress" in the off-year. It should mean that the Democrats, when they go to the people, will stand on something better, more in consonance with the universal disgust with splenetic accusations and ominous "or 'elses," than a mere resumption of the blind, brittle "toughness" of the Truman-Acheson days.

Twenty years ago, the people's dread of a staggering economy gave the Democrats the chance to institute remedial measures the Republican administration has not been able to attack with impunity. Fear now has another, a deadlier complexion. If the Democrats have no answer for the malaise of these times, but count on coming back solely on the strength of favor won by accomplishments long past, they shall hardly deserve the nod of a nation looking above all for a bold leadership for peace.

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